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JOHN F. KENNEDY – LEADERSHIP QUALITIES 
THAT MOVED A NATION 
 
 Christian Hald-Mortensen, M.P.A. 
University of Pittsburgh, 2007
 
Leadership studies ask ‘what makes an effective leader?’. The research question in this thesis is: 
“How can the three factors - vision, decision-making style, and delegation - explain whether 
John F. Kennedy was an effective President?” 
 
While there are many other leadership factors such as integrity, political/legislative skills and 
communications skills three factors were chosen. The research methodology was a single case 
study of the Kennedy Presidency.   
 
The Vision Hypothesis  
A President will be effective if he has a compelling vision of the future of America  
The MA thesis tested whether ‘The New Frontier’ was a successful vision from which visionary 
initiatives were derived. The Moon Project was the most ambitious national scientific project in 
two decades, propelling the U.S. forward in the space race.  
JFK’s ideas on peaceful cooperation with the Soviets were a consequence of the Cuban Missile 
Crisis. The vision was enunciated with his ‘Test Ban Treaty’ speech at American University, in 
which he pledged for a pause in the Cold War.  
 
The Decision Making Style Hypothesis 
A President will be effective if he has a competent personal decision making style 
The thesis tested whether President JFK had an effective personal decision making style. JFK 
often took issues out of the bureaucratic system in time to defend his own right to decide and his 
own right of innovation. JFK’s collegial decision making model was a consensus-seeking vehicle 
which ensured that problems were debated through cross-fertilization.  
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 The Delegation Hypothesis: 
A President will be effective if he delegates with an eye to his political control  
JFK knew what he was looking for in every position. Secretary of State Dean Rusk was probably 
chosen because JFK had conceived a greater role for himself. Scholarly work has demonstrated 
that JFK was very engaged in foreign affairs. Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara was 
chosen as a rational, intelligent civilian that could provide political control over the military 
establishment.   
Speech Writer Ted Sorensen knew JFK’s ideas, and they cooperated closely on the speeches of 
the Administration.  
JFK’s selection of advisors reflected the strengths and weaknesses of his own policy experience. 
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PREFACE 
The MA thesis was intended as a comparative leadership analysis of President Kennedy, 
President Reagan and President G. W. Bush. As the research process on the Kennedy Presidency 
began, it became difficult to research into more than one Presidency given the time constraints 
and if the analysis had to be reasonably thorough.  
Furthermore, the historical events in the Kennedy Presidency itself - the Bay of Pigs, the Cuban 
Missile Crisis, the launch of the Moon Project are already substantive case studies in political 
science, ensuring a broad and in-depth analysis of Presidential Leadership at work. 
 
The thesis originally had a chapter on the President’s control of the bureaucracy, focusing on the 
theoretical school of ‘Bureaucratic Politics in Foreign Policy’ started by Graham Allison: how 
bureaucracies form policy different from the policymakers. In the delegation chapter in the thesis 
some of the thoughts of political control of the Bureaucracy chapter remain.  
 
The American Presidency literature is vast – it covers the new policies initiated in that period, 
the time Presidents govern in and the legislative and mobilizing powers they use. From the 
American Presidency literature, the work of ‘Presidential Greatness’ by Landis and Milkis and 
the seminal work by Richard Neustadt; ‘Presidential Power and the Modern Presidents – The 
Politics of Leadership from Roosevelt to Reagan’ were chosen. 
 
An extensive literature exists on the Kennedy Presidency itself, e.g. the eyewitness accounts such 
as Ted Sorensen’s ‘Kennedy’ and Arthur Schlesinger Jr.’s ‘A Thousand Days’. A range of new 
books are published every year and historian Robert Dallek’s ‘Let Every Nation Know’, Richard 
Reeves’ ‘President Kennedy’, James N. Giglio’s ‘The Presidency of John F. Kennedy’ and John 
A. Barnes’ ‘JFK on Leadership’ are some of the recent releases chosen for this thesis.  
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1.0  INTRODUCTION 
This chapter will present   
• Definitions of Leadership  
• Contemporary Theory – The Transformational  
Leader 
• The Statesman vs. the Politician: A Focus on     
Long-term Interests of the Nation 
• The President Must Be As Big A Man as He Can 
• The Research Question  
• Presenting The Leadership Traits: Vision, 
Decision-making Style, Delegation  
• The Case Study Research Methodology  
 
In this section a brief overview of general thoughts on leadership will be presented, followed by 
ideas on presidential leadership – this serves as a background to more specific theories on the 
three factors. 
 15 
1.1 DEFINITIONS OF LEADERSHIP 
Leadership has been defined in many ways: as a matter of personality, as a power relation and 
as ‘the process by which groups, organizations, and societies attempt to achieve common 
goals’2.  Leadership is essential to the human condition and is both current and timeless3.  
The research field on leadership is filled with contradictions: One of the leading U.S. scholars on 
leadership, James McGregor Burns writes in his book, “Leadership” from 1978, that “one of the 
universal cravings of our time is the demand for compelling (…) leadership”4. Yet leadership is 
an ambiguous concept; Thomas Wren writes it is “one of the most observed and least understood 
phenomena on earth”5. Thomas Cronin echoes Burns, that leadership is a ‘mysterious’ concept 
which is poorly defined and not well applied6.  
Thus there is no coherent theoretical ‘school’ of leadership thought. We have the ‘makings’ of 
such a school in the literature but no overarching theory. The fundamental crisis is intellectual; 
we have failed to set the necessary intellectual and scientific standards to measure good 
leadership7.Second paragraph. 
1.2 CONTEMPORARY THEORY – THE TRANSFORMING LEADER 
How to lead a group of followers effectively is debated within leadership theory; one strain of 
thought is the idea of the “transforming leader” who literally attempts to change the mindsets of 
his followers. James McGregor Burns has done research on transforming leaders that articulate 
                                                 
2 Wren, J. Thomas (1995), “The Leader’s Companion – Insights on Leadership Through the Ages”, p. x 
3 Bass, Bernard M.(1990), “Bass & Stogdill’s Handbook of Leadership – Theory, Research & Managerial 
Applications”, 3rd Edition, p. 13 
4 Burns, James McGregor (1978), ‘Leadership’, pp. 1, Harper Collins Publishers  
5 Wren, J. Thomas (1995), “The Leader’s Companion – Insights on Leadership Through the Ages”, p. ix 
6 Cronin, Thomas E. (Winter 1984), ‘Thinking and Learning about Leadership’, Presidential Studies Quarterly 14, 
pp. 22-24 (For more scholarly work on leadership, this writer recommends Howard Gardner and Emma Laskin’s  
“Leading Minds” from 1996, Harper Collins Publishers) 
7 For many scholars, history is shaped by the leadership of great men. Nietzsche thought a sudden decision by a 
great man could change the course of history,  Bass, Bernard M.(1990), “Bass & Stogdill’s Handbook of Leadership 
– Theory, Research & Managerial Applications”, 3rd Edition, p. 38 
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and reinterpret historical situations in times of uncertainty. These leaders are effective because 
they keep the fundamental political values of their time up to date.  
Burns argues that for the leader to appeal solely to the self-interest of their followers will not 
work: To base the advice of Machiavelli’s “The Prince”’ and a conception of human nature is 
only a one-sided truth of a selfish human nature, where leaders lead by manipulating incentives.  
A transforming leader stimulates enthusiasm and moves the nation when his goals are goals that 
the followers wish themselves to attain. He can do this by appealing to the best in the followers8. 
Political leaders can be transforming by articulating a shared moral purpose to the citizens. This 
purpose may awaken dormant needs and values that would be accepted once awakened9. 
Leadership scholar Bernard M. Bass echoes Burns - the political leader succeeds when the 
compelling political purpose is accepted 10.  
We can thus speculate that the U.S. President must strive to be “transforming” to be effective. 
When he is transforming, he clarifies norms and values when times are changing, keeping those 
shared values fresh.  
1.3 THE STATESMAN VS. THE POLITICIAN – A FOCUS ON THE LONG-TERM 
INTERESTS OF THE NATION 
Bernard M. Bass (1990) observed that most politicians are not transforming. Both constituents 
and leaders focus on short-term goals, but a short-term perspective is not the most effective way 
to lead. More statesmanlike leaders will arouse and direct a democracy toward achieving longer-
term goals11. This appeal to longer-term goals in stead of short term goals is found in the 
conceptual distinction between ‘the politician’ and the ‘statesman’.  
                                                 
8 Bass, Bernard M.(1990), “Bass & Stogdill’s Handbook of Leadership – Theory, Research & Managerial 
Applications”, 3rd Edition, p. 207 
9 Burns, James MacGregor (1978), ‘Leadership’, pp. 38-39 
10 Bass, Bernard M.(1990), “Bass & Stogdill’s Handbook of Leadership – Theory, Research & Managerial 
Applications”, 3rd Edition, p. 9 
11 Bass, Bernard M.(1990), “Bass & Stogdill’s Handbook of Leadership – Theory, Research & Managerial 
Applications”, 3rd Edition, p. 16  
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1.4 THE PRESIDENT MUST BE AS BIG A MAN AS HE CAN 
Since the detonation of the nuclear bomb in WWII, the U.S. President has lived with the 
knowledge that his judgment can put half the world in jeopardy. Many of us recognize this 
intellectually, the President experiences this emotionally. The American Presidency is therefore 
‘sui generis’ - it cannot be compared to any other office, which sets the President apart from us 
and from his men, the advisors. His responsibility compels him to stretch his control and 
judgment, as wide and as deep as possible – or better expressed by President Woodrow Wilson 
"The President is at liberty, both in law and conscience, to be as big a man as he can."12
 
1.5 RESEARCH QUESTION 
“How can the three factors - vision, decision-making style, and delegation - 
explain whether John F. Kennedy was an effective President?”   
 
To answer the question the MA thesis will test three hypotheses:  
The Vision Hypothesis:  
A President will be effective if he has a compelling vision of the future of America  
The theory underlying this hypothesis will be presented and the hypothesis will be 
tested in chapter 3.  
 
The Decision Making Style Hypothesis 
A President will be effective if he has a competent personal decision making style 
The theory underlying this hypothesis will be presented and the hypothesis will be tested in 
chapter 4.  
                                                 
12 Appendix A:  Speech By John F. Kennedy: ‘The Presidency in 1960’ 
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 The Delegation Hypothesis: 
A President will be effective if he delegates with an eye to his political control  
Chapter 5 presents the theory underlying this hypothesis and tests the hypothesis. 
Chapter 6 summarizes the conclusions of the individual hypothesis tests. 
The relevance of other leadership factors is discussed in chapter 6: summary of 
hypothesis tests.   
 
This MA thesis draws on a selection of theoretical frameworks in political science; the American 
Presidency literature, decision making theory in foreign policy, leadership and management 
theory, etc.  
 
1.6 PRESENTING THE LEADERSHIP TRAITS: VISION, DECISION-MAKING 
STYLE, DELEGATION  
How can the President be as big a man as he can? What levers can he pull? How can he unify 
these disparate levers towards a single direction? He must cooperate skillfully with the U.S. 
Congress to enact legislation, and he may deploy military power as the commander in chief. 
Vis-à-vis the public the President is the “bully pulpit” – and can single-handedly raise 
awareness on a policy problem - simply by addressing it in speeches.  
 
This MA thesis claims that three levers are crucial for Presidential effectiveness.  
First, the president must create a compelling vision of the future of America, and present it in a 
way that is desirable to the American public. Vision is the strategic leadership factor which 
defines the direction of a Presidency. The vision is a future-oriented description of where the 
country is going. To formulate a coherent vision is complex, for the President is both a foreign 
affairs leader and a domestic leader – and he must have a vision for both.  
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Second, the U.S. President makes thousands of decisions every year – some can change the 
future of an entire region of the world – such as President George W. Bush’s decision to invade 
Iraq. The decision-making style is an operational factor and covers how the President makes 
decisions, how he uses his advisors in crisis and in daily operations and how he reaches out for 
external advice and information. In short, his decision-making style is an equally important 
factor for a President’s effectiveness.  
 
Third, delegation matters – the Presidential advisors themselves enable effective leadership. This 
factor examines the personnel policy of the President; does he choose leading academics - or 
unknown friends from the party ranks, thereby favoring patronage over competence? What are 
their backgrounds, and in the final analysis how well did they help the President serve the 
nation? 
 
1.7 THE RESEARCH METHODOLOGY – THE CASE STUDY APPROACH 
 
A case study may arise either from ‘a theory in search of a test case’ or ‘a case for which a 
theory is a good test’13. It puts concrete flesh on the bones of a theoretical idea in order to help 
readers see its meaning. Many of the variables that interest social scientists, such as democracy 
and political power are difficult to measure quantitatively and may make successful case 
                                                 
13 King, Keohane and Verba, Designing Social Inquiry, pp. 17-18 
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studies14. Leadership is one of these social phenomena. In this study, empirical cases from the 
Kennedy Presidency were tested against various leadership factors15.  
A case is a specific event, such as a decision to devalue a currency or a trade negotiation. The 
Cuban Missile Crisis contains different classes of events: deterrence, coercive diplomacy, crisis 
management, and so on. The researcher’s key task is therefore to pick the cases and build a 
chronological narrative which outlines the case. 
 
1.7.1 Case Studies Aim at Causality 
Case studies explore causal mechanisms in a case in detail and whether there were any 
unexpected aspects of a casual relation. The case study may also define what conditions activate 
the causal mechanism16. Within a single case, we can also look at a large number of intervening 
variables and observe any unexpected aspects of a particular causal mechanism17. The case 
study here is whether or not three variables, the leadership factors, mattered to the leadership in 
the JFK Presidency. 
 
George (2002) identifies four research tasks in a case study: 
1. Identification of ‘a research objective’18. The objective throughout the MA thesis was to 
gain a deeper understanding of the question “what makes an effective leader?”. The objective is 
also to fill the gaps in the field of leadership.  
2. Developing a research strategy by specifying variables 
                                                 
14 Case study researchers generally sacrifice the parsimony and broad applicability of their theories to develop 
cumulatively contingent generalizations that apply to well-defined types or subtypes of cases with a high degree of 
explanatory richness (Alexander L. George and Timothy McKeown, “Case Studies and Theories of Organizational 
Decision Making,” in Robert Coulam and Richard Smith, eds., Advances 
in Information Processing in Organizations, Vol. 2 (Greenwich, Conn.: JAI Press, 1985), 
pp. 43–68; McKeown, “Case Studies and the Statistical World View.”) 
 
15 The social scientist Alexander George explains that case studies have illuminated virtually every subject studied 
by political scientists: imperial expansion, interdependence and war, world depressions, trade wars (Odell, John S., 
Case Study Methods in International Political Economy, International Studies Perspectives 2001, 2, 161–176). 
16 George, Alexander, Case Studies In Social Sciences, p. 21, 2004 
17 George, Alexander, Case Studies In Social Sciences, p. 19, 2004 
18 George, Alexander, Case Studies In Social Sciences, p. 74, 2004 
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The researcher develops a strategy for ‘solving the stated puzzle’ and derives and tests 
hypotheses. At this step, the researcher identifies the independent and dependent variables19.  
2. Case selection 
Here the task is to avoid “selection bias” - the problem of choosing a case that has a higher 
probability of finding positive answers to questions than other cases that might in fact be more 
representative. Selection bias can understate or overstate the relationship between independent 
and dependent variables, meaning the factors and presidential leadership20. 
3. Data Requirements  
Data is chosen as a function of the research design, which is determined by the research strategy 
which here is to focus on vision, decision-making style and delegation21. 
                                                 
19 The research strategy should also specify which of the variables that will be held constant and which will vary 
across the cases in the comparison, George 2002: 79 
20 Case study methods involve a trade-off among the goals of attaining theoretical parsimony, establishing 
explanatory richness, and keeping the number of the cases to be studied manageable (George, Alexander, Case 
Studies In Social Sciences, p. 29, 2004) 
21 The data requirements ought to be specified through sets of general questions asked of the cases (George 2002: 
86) 
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2.0  SECOND CHAPTER: BIOGRAPHY OF PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY 
• Becoming a Politician, “Why England Slept” 
• Congress, Senate, “Profiles in Courage”  
• President Kennedy 
• JFK Enjoyed the Presidential Leadership Experience 
• What Was his Presidential Purpose?  
• JFK Died Too Young, So How Can We Assess His Performance?  
 
The elements below are chosen because they demonstrate how JFK steadily build 
his knowledge of the world, gained political experience that prepared him for the 
Presidency and what the most important issues were to him as President.  
This biography does not examine JFK’s obsession with Winston Churchill and 
how he ran his Presidential campaign on the Churchill ticket22. It does not cover 
the legislative choices he made as Senator or how his family skillfully built their 
public image23.  
                                                 
22 For more on this, see: Leaming, Barbara, ‘Jack Kennedy – The Education of A Statesman’, pp. 234-236, W.W. 
Norton Company   
23 For more on this, see: Sidey, Hugh & Goodman, Jon et al. (2006), ‘The Kennedy Mystique – Creating Camelot’, 
National Geographic, Washington, D.C.   
 23 
2.1 BECOMING A POLITICIAN, ‘WHY ENGLAND SLEPT’ 
John Fitzgerald Kennedy was the son of Joseph Kennedy and Rose Fitzgerald Kennedy, a fragile 
child, set to live in the shadow of a more physically robust and older brother. He was born in 
May 29, 1917. 
JFK’s illnesses were a source of frustration to his politically ambitious father, who served as the 
U.S. ambassador to Great Britain from 1937 to 1940. Joe Kennedy’s maxim had been to educate 
his sons as winners, deliberately fostering a highly competitive atmosphere.   
The millionaire patriarch was preparing the older brother, Joe Jr. to run for office; hoping he one 
day could become the next American President. He died fighting in the 2nd World War. At the 
same time, JFK was pursuing his interest in journalism and toured Europe with his father, 
making observations on foreign affairs that shaped his understanding of the world. The trip to 
Europe caused JFK to take his studies at Harvard more seriously, and he went on to analyze 
Britain’s appeasement of Hitler’s Germany in ‘Why England Slept’, published in 194024. JFK 
had worked hard on the manuscript for the book, which had turned into an obsession for him at 
Harvard.  
When the 2nd World War began, he requested sea duty and commanded a motor torpedo boat, PT 
109. His boat was hit by a Japanese destroyer and the young JFK towed one of his shipmates to 
Bird Island, where they were later recovered after seven days.  
Consequently, JFK became a war hero. 
2.2 CONGRESS, SENATE, “PROFILES IN COURAGE” 
JFK ran for Congress in 1946 - a scrawny rich kid in a blue-collar district in Boston. His 
entrance into politics surprised his college friends that thought he would become a professor. 
                                                 
24 Barnes, John A. (2005), “John F. Kennedy on Leadership – The Lessons and Legacy of a President, Amacon, 
New York.  
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JFK never enjoyed campaigning, but was elected, and won a Massachusetts seat in the Senate in 
1952. In 1956 he published the book ‘Profiles in Courage’ on eight U.S. senators who had 
asserted political courage in the pursuit of their version of the public interest. Historican Barbara 
Leaming writes in her 2006 book: Jack Kennedy: The Education of A Statesman. That Profiles in 
Courage was an echo of what JFK wanted to be, a statesman who would educate his citizens, and 
act regardless of the political risks25. 
2.3 PRESIDENT KENNEDY 
In stead of waiting until his time had come, JFK used his youth as strength in the campaign for 
the Presidency. He appealed to ‘a new generation’, consciously displaying vigor and energy. JFK 
was a mere forty-four years old when elected President.  
John F. Kennedy had one of the shortest presidencies in American history, two years and ten 
months. Nevertheless, the JFK Administration remains one of the most documented and 
remembered administrations ever.  
Domestically, the civil rights struggle dominated the agenda, although JFK through out most of 
his Presidency ignored the issue.  
JFK was eager to write history himself, and saw the space race as one of the great adventures and 
challenges of his generation. With the advice of his Vice-President Lyndon B. Johnson, he 
initiated the Moon Project - the greatest national scientific and technological effort since the 
‘Manhattan Project’.  
 
He oversaw some of the most perilous times in United States history; Berlin and Cuba were the 
two epicenters of the Cold War, over which the Soviet Union and the US wrestled.  JFK presided 
over one of the great U.S. foreign policy fiascoes in the 20th century, the ‘Bay of Pigs invasion’ 
in 1961, and one of the greatest U.S. diplomatic successes, the ‘Cuban Missile Crisis’ in October 
                                                 
25 Dallek, Robert & Golway, Terry (2006): Let Every  Nation Know, pp. xi   
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196226. In the Bay of Pigs invasion, American troops and air power were to assist exile Cubans 
to overthrow the Castro regime. Due to faulty intelligence and poor planning, the operation 
failed. The primary test of JFK as a decision maker came in the Cuban Missile Crisis, where the 
Soviet Union had placed offensive nuclear missiles that could reach the U.S. in less than 10 
minutes. 
2.4 JFK ENJOYED THE PRESIDENTIAL LEADERSHIP EXPERIENCE 
Some politicians do not match the office they come to govern, and some Presidents curse the 
Presidential experience. Jefferson called the Presidency a “splendid misery”. Buchanan called it 
“a crown of thorns”. Truman called the White House “the finest prison in the country”27. 
However, JFK never spoke this way about his Presidency. JFK did not  complain about the 
“loneliness” of the office.  
Historian Arthur Schlesinger Jr. who was working on a pioneering biography on Franklin D. 
Roosevelt compared FDR - the last ‘natural President’ - to JFK, who hired him as a top adviser. 
Schlesinger said JFK was “the child of a darker age, more disciplined, more precise, more 
candid, more cautious, and more pessimistic”. Yet Schlesinger makes no hesitations when he 
compares JFK to FDR and concludes he also was ‘a natural President’28. 
JFK had little ideology beyond his anti-communism and a faith in an active government. JFK’s 
activist philosophy of government was tied to the power of the office of the President: Presidents 
needed to be assertive; for no one sat where he sat and knew what he knew. In a speech as 
Senator aspiring to the White House, named ”The Presidency in 1960’, he expressed this 
                                                 
26 Giglio (1991) claims that JFK had made extensive promises to the public during his Presidential campaign, which 
boosted the expectations. No presidential nominee had ever committed himself to do so much – not even FDR in 
1932. Kennedy pledged to restore American military strength by increasing conventional forces and boost the 
missile program, while improving the relations with the Communist world. He worked persistently towards a 
nuclear arms control agreement, pledged to defend Berlin, rebuild NATO, revitalize assistance to the Third World 
and create an Alliance for Progress with Latin America (Giglio 1991: 284). 
27 Landy, Marc & Milkis, Sidney M. (2000), ‘Presidential Greatness’, pp. 3-10, University Press of Kansas 
28  Schlesinger Jr., Arthur (1965), “A Thousand Days – John F. Kennedy in the White House”, Houghton Mufflin 
Company, pp. 679 
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philosophy; no other politician had the same power to lead, to inspire or to restrain the Congress 
and the country29.  
JFK later came to feel the Presidency strongly enough to doubt whether the quality of the 
presidential experience could be understood by anyone who had not shared it. JFK believed that 
there was no experience a person could get, that could possibly prepare him or her for the 
Presidency.  
 
Finally, JFK was one of the most image-conscious presidents of the 20th century. The 1960’s was 
a media-centered decade, and JFK used imagery through the press, always striving to appear 
with vigor, glamour and sex appeal: He delivered the Inaugural coatless and hatless in freezing 
weather to project youth and a break from traditions. Family life and the projection of his 
beautiful, aristocratic wife, Jackie, attracted attention to the Presidency as ‘the vital center’ in 
American political life. JFK also invited pictures of him and his children to project warmth and 
humanity30.  
 
The two eyewitness books ‘A Thousand Days’ by Arthur Schlesinger Jr. and Theodore 
Sorensen’s ‘Kennedy’, authored by his advisors in the White House, were written within two 
years of the assassination. Both are quite positive tales of JFK’s personal growth focusing less on 
his mistakes, as he learns from them to gain a better control of the powers of the presidency31. 
After his extensive research, interviews and memoirs, historian Richard Reeves (1993) is more 
critical:  
‘The Kennedy I found certainly did not know what he was doing in the beginning, 
and in some ways never changed at all particularly in a certain love for chaos, 
the kind that kept other men off-balance’32. 
 
                                                 
29 For JFK’s own thoughts on the Presidency and how he intended to govern as a President, APPENDIX A: ‘THE 
PRESIDENCY IN 1960’, Address by Senator John F. Kennedy, National Press Club, Washington, D.C., January 14, 
1960 
30 For more on the conscious manufacturing of the ‘Kennedy Image’ – please see this book: ‘The Kennedy 
Mystique: Creating Camelot’ by Jon Goodman, Hugh Sidey , Letitia Baldridge, Robert Dallek, Barbara Baker 
Burrows, National Geographic, 2006 
31 Reeves, Richard (1993), ‘President Kennedy – Profile in Power’, Simon & Schuster, p. 18 
32 Reeves, Richard (1993), ‘President Kennedy – Profile in Power’, Simon & Schuster, p. 18 
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2.5 WHAT WAS HIS PRESIDENTIAL PURPOSE?  
The leading U.S. Presidency scholar Richard E. Neustadt claims in ‘Presidential Power and the 
Modern Presidents’ that we must look at responses to events where JFK committed himself 
beyond recall33.  Neustadt (1991) concludes that JFK was deeply committed to reducing the risk 
of accidental or purposeful nuclear war – to ‘bottle the nuclear genie’, and that JFK strived to 
render statecraft manageable by statesmen. Striving to find an area for agreement between the 
U.S. and the Soviets, JFK negotiated a limited Test Ban Treaty that prevented the proliferation of 
nuclear weapons and nuclear fall-out, a topic of considerable concern in the period34. 
2.6 JFK DIED TOO YOUNG, SO HOW CAN WE ASSESS HIS PERFORMANCE? 
JFK was only President for 2 years and ten months. We can never know what his full record of 
accomplishments would have been, had he not been assassinated. More newly released details 
about his life and his accomplishments suggest that history’s verdict will perhaps be less 
favorable that what JFK would have liked. Richard Reeves has recently documented that JFK 
used cortisone and other drugs to help him overcome his back injuries from the 2nd World War 
and his feeble health35.  
Speculations still exist today whether Theodore Sorensen actually wrote JFK’s Pulitzer Prize 
Winner, ‘Profiles in Courage’ or just did the research as Sorensen claims. It is also debatable 
whether JFK actually won the Pulitzer in a fair competition, since the Kennedy dynasty had 
strong ties to several people on the board. Evidently, JFK’s reputation and accomplishments 
grew tremendously in the aftermath of the assassination. 
 
 
                                                 
33 Neustadt, Richard E. (1990), ‘Presidential Power and the Modern Presidents – The Politics of Leadership from 
Roosevelt to Reagan’, p. 167 
34 Dallek, Robert & Golway, Terry (2006): Let Every  Nation Know, pp. xi, Sourcebooks Inc.    
35 Reeves, Richard (1993), ‘President Kennedy – Profile in Power’, Simon & Schuster, p. 42-44 
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3.0  THIRD CHAPTER: VISION 
This chapter will present 
• Vision Theory 
• The Vision Hypothesis  
“A President will be effective if he has a compelling vision of the 
future of America”  
• President JFK’s Vision: The ‘New Frontier’ (1960)               
o The Inaugural Address presented the Vision of the Presidency to 
the United States and to the World (1961) 
? The Vision at Home: The Idealist “Call to Service” – ‘Ask Not…’ 
and ‘The Peace Corps’ (1961) 
o The Vision of Space: ‘America Unrivaled’ - The Moon Project 
(1961) 
o The Vision of Peace: The Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (1963) 
3.1 VISION THEORY 
A simple definition of a vision is a picture or a view of the future - something imagined but not 
yet real; it is effective when it has a ‘vivid description’ of that future. A vision is a state to be 
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aspired to – which aligns people by focusing efforts. To be effective a vision must be simple and 
memorable and to be durable, it ought to be flexible and inclusive36.  
A vision must articulate the purpose of why a country exists. From a vision we ought to 
consistently derive actions that aim at achieving it, and these actions or goals ought to stretch the 
country in the pursuit of future goals37. E.g. a Presidential vision of a bold, adventurous, leading 
America ought to be supported by relevant public initiatives38.  
In their book: ‘Presidential Greatness’, scholars Landy & Milkis (2000) write that a characteristic 
of the ‘Great Presidents’ in the past: Washington, Jefferson, Jackson, Lincoln, and Franklin D. 
Roosevelt, was that they ‘took the public to school’ and accepted the responsibility for the 
public’s civic education. ‘Great Presidents’ taught the citizenry about how to reconcile the need 
for change with American constitutional traditions and purposes39. Landy & Milkis’ important 
conclusion is: ‘Great presidents’ were great because they not only brought about change in 
America, but left a legacy – principles, institutional arrangements, or policies that defined an era. 
‘Great presidents’ reconstructed the American democracy in a bold and lasting manner, taking 
decisive action in the face of crisis without guidance from the people. Alexander Hamilton 
pointed this notion out early in American History: Presidents must ‘pursue extensive and 
arduous enterprises for the public benefit”40.  
Landy & Milkis also claim the “great” presidents had a rhetorical capacity to tie fundamental 
changes to enduring political truths41. This writer believes the device JFK chose for 
transformational leadership was the rhetoric in his most important speeches, and has therefore 
listed ten of JFK’s most important speeches in Ch. 9. These are therefore used as empirical data.  
As an attempt to synthesize the two theoretical traditions on ‘vivid description’ in vision theory 
and the principles of presidential greatness, this hypothesis is derived:  
 
                                                 
36 Thornberry, Neil (2001), ‘A View About ‘Vision’’, p. 133, In: Rosenbach, William E. & Taylor, Robert L., 
“Contemporary Issues in Leadership”, Fifth Edition, Westview Press  
37 Thornberry, Neil (2001), ‘A View About ‘Vision’’, p. 135, In: Rosenbach, William E. & Taylor, Robert L., 
“Contemporary Issues in Leadership”, Fifth Edition, Westview Press 
38 Thornberry is located in the management literature that applies to all types of organizations, and to apply him 
directly to Presidential visions may be considered a stretch by some political scientists, as political leaders maneuver 
within fundamentally different environments than business leaders. 
39 Landy, Marc & Milkis, Sidney M. (2000), ‘Presidential Greatness’, pp. 3-4, University Press of Kansas 
40 Hamilton, Alexander, Madison, James, and Jay, John (1961), ‘The Federalist Papers, (ed.) Clinton Rossiter (New 
York: New American Library, 1961), No. 71, 437 
41 Landy, Marc & Milkis, Sidney M. (2000), ‘Presidential Greatness’, pp. 3-4, University Press of Kansas 
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The Vision Hypothesis:  
“A President will be effective if he has a compelling vision of the future of America” 
3.2 PRESIDENT JFK’S VISION: THE NEW FRONTIER (1960) 
JFK first articulated the concept of the ‘New Frontier’ in the Democratic Convention Speech in 
1960. In this speech he contested that the 2nd World War generation could relax in the 1960’s42. 
Instead, JFK’s vision implied that they had to conquer a ‘New Frontier’ of challenges to be the 
world’s leading nation. 
 
43
Figure 2: JFK at the Democratic National Convention in Los Angeles (1960) 
  
‘The New Frontier’ was an “umbrella vision” containing a list of challenges  - in science, space, 
foreign affairs, race and economic inequality: these waited this generation if they could match 
the pioneers in courage and determination. JFK’s presidential vision had the clear intent of 
                                                 
42 Appendix B: JFK Democratic Party Nomination Speech, Memorial Coliseum, Los Angeles, July 15, 1960 
43 www.americanrhetoric.com/images/jfk1960dnc.jpeg (Retrieved on July 27, 2006) 
 31 
arousing the citizens, creating a feeling of urgency in the American public – against the 
complacency, which JFK argued the Eisenhower Presidency had caused. 
JFK claimed that some would say that all the battles were won, and the American frontier no 
longer existed:  
 
“ But I trust that no one in this vast assemblage will agree with those sentiments. For the 
problems are not all solved and the battles are not all won--and we stand today on the edge of a 
New Frontier--the frontier of the 1960's--a frontier of unknown opportunities and perils-- a 
frontier of unfulfilled hopes and threats.” 
“But I tell you the New Frontier is here, whether we seek it or not. Beyond that frontier are the 
uncharted areas of science and space, unsolved problems of peace and war, unconquered pockets 
of ignorance and prejudice, unanswered questions of poverty and surplus. It would be easier to 
shrink back from that frontier, to look to the safe mediocrity of the past, to be lulled by good 
intentions and high rhetoric--and those who prefer that course should not cast their votes for me, 
regardless of party.” 44
 
JFK asked the Americans to be pioneers on the New Frontier at ‘a turning-point in history’. 
Faced with the monolithic advance of the Communists, the Americans again had to prove 
whether “such a nation could survive”, echoing Lincoln’s First Inaugural. In other words, this 
was a critical election, determining whether the U.S. would lead the world, or be surpassed by 
the Soviets. To dramatize the perceived condition of urgency of the New Frontier, JFK listed a 
set of dichotomies, between ‘national greatness’ and ‘national decline’, ‘between public interest’ 
and ‘private comfort’, ‘determined dedication’ and ‘creeping mediocrity’45.  JFK did not really 
answer what the role was for the Americans. But this was to be explained in the Inaugural. 
“The New Frontier” was the first coherent presentation of JFK’s vision. It captured the spirit of 
the time and forecasted the themes of the JFK Presidency and became the slogan of the 
Administration46. Thornberry said that a vision ought to have “vivid description” – the New 
Frontier was a smart way of getting a single, compelling image across to the public. 
 
 
                                                 
44 Appendix B: JFK Democratic Party Nomination Speech, Memorial Coliseum, Los Angeles, July 15, 1960 
45 Appendix B: JFK Democratic Party Nomination Speech, Memorial Coliseum, Los Angeles, July 15, 1960 
46 Dallek, Robert & Golway, Terry (2006), “Let Every Nation Know, pp. 29-31 
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3.3 JFK’S INAUGURAL ADDRESS PRESENTED THE VISION OF THE 
PRESIDENCY TO THE UNITED STATES AND TO THE WORLD (1961) 
Presidential inaugural addresses set the policy vision of the next four years of an Administration, 
and present the principles that the President deems vital. Leadership analyst John A. Barnes 
claims JFK’s inaugural address has become the standard for presidents in the modern era47. 
Written in forward-looking rhetoric and imagery, it has been ranked among the world’s greatest 
orations48. The scholarly website on rhetoric, www.americanrhetoric.com ranks the Inaugural the 
2nd best speech in American history. For these reasons it is useful to analyze what visions it 
contains.  
 
JFK’s inaugural is almost entirely a statement on foreign policy, and only includes domestic 
policy in the sentence; “the defense of human rights – at home and around the world”49. It was 
conceived in a time of new beginnings and great tensions. JFK mainly scrutinized the liberal 
American ideology and spoke in thematic statements aiming at reducing world tensions. 
 
The inaugural operated at multiple levels: serving not only as a vision for a new decade, but also 
as a vehicle for political rebirth of America. It was an appeal for a reassessment of the principles 
of American democracy in the world. It extended an ‘olive branch’ to the Soviet Union from a 
nation that now had the responsibility of a superpower with allies and enemies. JFK’s vision was 
a stronger America that could face up to the challenge to freedom posed by Communism around 
the globe: “Let every nation know, whether it wishes us well or ill, that we shall pay any price, 
bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe to assure the survival 
and the success of liberty” 50. 
 
                                                 
47 Barnes, John A., (2005) John F. Kennedy on Leadership, p. 20 
48 “Its contribution to American political discourse is comparable to the addresses of Abraham Lincoln’s Gettysburg 
Address, Woodrow Wilson and Franklin Roosevelt’s speeches”  (Silvestri, Vito N. (2000), ‘Becoming JFK – A 
Profile in Communication, pp. 160) 
49 Appendix C: President John F. Kennedy’s Inaugural Address 
50 Appendix C: President John F. Kennedy’s Inaugural Address 
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Speaking to the Soviet Union, JFK pledged for cooperation towards peace, stating that ‘Civility 
is not a sign of weakness’, and stressed the threat of nuclear annihilation, stating that the both 
should explore the ‘wonders of science instead of its terrors’.  
 
From the Nomination speech to the Inaugural, Kennedy had extended the depth and meaning of 
the concept of the “New Frontier” with the concept of Idealism. In JFK’s understanding of 
idealism, the citizens had to be actively involved in keeping the U.S. strong:  
“(…) And so, my fellow Americans, ask not what your country can do for you; ask what you can do for your country. 
(…)”51
This word equation, where the order of words in one line is reversed in the next line, called for 
sacrifice of the Americans in the Cold War. The New Frontier could only be reached if everyone 
contributed. America was already a great force for freedom and prosperity; yet his idea of 
American greatness was not measured in power or material wealth, but by whom the Americans 
were and how much they would do for their country.  
When we scrutinize Thornberry’s ‘vivid description’, the part beginning with  
“Since this country was founded, each generation of Americans has been summoned to give 
testimony to its national loyalty. The graves of young Americans who answered the call to 
service surround the globe…”52,  
 
and ending with “Ask Not…” phrase we find this is probably the most memorable part of 
Kennedy’s Idealist vision, resonating with a new generation, and invoking selflessness53. JFK 
here appealed to the best in the followers by weaving the idealist element into his vision. One 
could claim that JFK here walked in the footsteps of Burns’ transformational leader. 
 
 
                                                 
51 Appendix C: President John F. Kennedy’s Inaugural Address 
52 Appendix C: President John F. Kennedy’s Inaugural Address 
53 A former professor of mine, Jay Shafritz, Ph.D., at University of Pittsburgh told this writer that the Inaugural had 
a large effect on his fellow college students in the early 1960’s. The majority were inspired by Kennedy’s vision, 
and only one in his college class did not go into public service.  
 34 
3.4 THE IDEALIST VISION IN PRACTICE: THE PEACE CORPS (1961) 
JFK backed up the idealist part of his vision of America within a few months by a public 
initiative, the founding of the Peace Corps in February 1961. President Kennedy appealed to the 
self-sacrifice of the American youth, urging them to use their skills in the service of peace away 
from home54.71 percent of the American public approved of the initiative, indicating that he had 
read the time correctly55. The initiative was conceived after a visit in his campaign to University 
of Michigan, where the idea had resonated with the students56. 
The objective of the Peace Corps projects in health, agriculture and education in developing 
nations across the globe was to show the world that America was benevolent and compassionate. 
In fact the Corps was an instrument of American foreign policy in the larger game between the 
Soviet Union and the U.S. The lessons from the Inaugural and the Peace Corps cases are that the 
idealist element rested well within the vision of a New Frontier of challenges. 
3.5 THE VISION OF SPACE: ‘AMERICA UNRIVALED’ - THE MOON PROJECT 
(1961) 
The political and geopolitical reason for launching the Moon Project was the geopolitical 
struggle between East and West over the undecided nations. The Gagarin effort by the Soviet 
Union had marshaled the U.S. to action, as JFK knew that the countries that were undecided 
between the Soviet Union and the United States in terms of alliances and political and economic 
systems would look at which of the two that would first make it to the moon and then make their 
judgments about which side to join57.  
                                                 
54 Appendix D: President John F. Kennedy’s statement on establishing the Peace Corps 
55 Reeves, Richard (1991), “President Kennedy”, pp. 275-276 
56 Dallek, Robert & Golway, Terry (2006); “Let Every Nation Know”, p. 85  
57 Appendix E: President John F. Kennedy’s Speech to a Special Session of Congress on ‘Sending a Man to the 
Mon’ 
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JFK himself, competitive as he was, did not want an America that was second in anything. The 
project would ultimately demonstrate that America was unrivaled around the globe58. When 
Americans acted boldly in space, it was to advance freedom's cause on Earth. 
 
The project was a large commitment of financial resources – JFK called it ‘a staggering sum’59. 
Yet he believed his fellow citizens would be willing to sacrifice the extra tax dollars60. At Rice 
Stadium in 1962, JFK also defined the Moon project as “among the most important decisions that 
will be made during my incumbency in the office of the Presidency”61.  
The initiative was largely a symbolic effort – no one knew exactly what was to be found in space 
– if it truly was to benefit the American people or mankind. But one thing was certain – if the 
United States did not act, they would end last62.  
As JFK said it in the famous Rice Stadium speech:  
“We choose to go to moon in this decade and do the other things, not because it is easy, 
but because it is hard, because that goal would serve to organize the best of our energies 
and skills, because that challenge is one we are willing to accept, one we are unwilling to 
postpone and one we intend to win…” 63
 
The Moon Project was consistent with the “New Frontier” vision. He had promised to raise the 
United States to the ‘unchartered areas of science and space’ in the Inaugural64. The Americans 
of the 1960’s would again be pioneers like their forefathers – this time in full view of the world. 
The project involved scientists, servicemen, private contractors, public officials, engineers and 
military personnel in a ‘mind-stretching’, unifying national endeavor.  
The Moon Project was the most ambitious and visionary initiative of the Administration, and the 
leadership lesson from this case is that a national goal can be conceived that stretches the 
                                                 
58 The Moon Project has now become a synonym for ambitious public projects that advance the scientific and 
technological knowledge of mankind. Leading Foreign Affairs Columnist, Thomas L. Friedman uses it in his latest 
bestseller, ‘The World is Flat’ to describe the effort needed for improving American education (Thomas Friedman 
(2005) , The World is Flat, pp. 270) 
59 Appendix F: John F. Kennedy Moon Speech - Rice Stadium, September 12, 1962 
60 Dallek, Robert & Golway, Terry (2006), “Let Every Nation Know”, p. 116 
61 Appendix E: ‘JFK Moon Speech at Rice Stadium’, September 12, 1962 
62 Appendix E: President John F. Kennedy’s Speech to a Special Session of Congress on ‘Sending a Man to the 
Mon’ 
63 Appendix E: ‘JFK Moon Speech at Rice Stadium’, September 12, 1962 
64 Appendix C: President John F. Kennedy:  “Inaugural Address”   
January 20, 1961 www.americanrhetoric.com (Retrieved July 20, 2006) 
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country, marshals national efforts, appeals to the pride of the followers, is symbolic, and can be 
achieved within an urgent time schedule.  
U.S. capabilities actually had to be invented in order to achieve the future goal. By initiating the 
space race, JFK did not see an end to the ideological struggle, or to the economic, scientific and 
political competition with the Communists. The competition would not produce a celebrated 
‘victory’. The Moon project did not stop the Cold War, and JFK would not have believed it 
could65.  
66
Figure 3: Becoming the first nation to plant its flag on the Moon was essential to the competitive JFK. 
3.6 PRESIDENT KENNEDY’S VISION OF PEACE – THE NUCLEAR TEST BAN 
TREATY (1963) 
JFK’s resolve in pursuing the path of peace was a result of the devastating potential of the Cuban 
Missile Crisis. The Cuban Missile Crisis will be discussed more in ch. 4. Post-Cuba JFK 
believed the 1960’s was the most dangerous time in history67. His duties of governing in the 
nuclear age concerned him, and he would cite the nuclear risk in public, to educate the citizens. 
With regards to nuclear war, JFK was very worried about ‘miscalculation’ between Great 
Powers, and how fast uninvolved countries could be taken into war. He had studied military 
                                                 
65 Not until President Reagan started outspending the Soviets militarily, would the U.S. challenge the Soviet so 
dramatically that its economic system and production base would collapse. 
66 http://politiken.dk/VisArtikel.iasp?PageID=466993 (Retrieved on July 25, 2006). 
67 Sorensen, Theodore C. (1965), ‘Kennedy’, p. 745 
 37 
historian’s Barbara Tuchman’s ‘The Guns of August’ on WWI and was worried that smaller 
conflicts in the greater scheme of geopolitics might spiral out of proportions68. 
3.6.1 Understanding the Enemy 
After the Cuban Missile Crisis, JFK wanted to moderate both the substance and style of U.S. 
foreign policy. He strived to prevent the Cold War from monopolizing all energies to the 
detriment of all other national and international issues. He desired a fresh approach to the Soviet 
Union – but what could be done? Post-Cuba, JFK had long wanted to give a thematic speech on 
peace, and had not discussed his views on peace since his 1961 UN address69. The June 10, 1963 
Commencement at American University offered the occasion. 
 
70
Figure 4:  President John F. Kennedy’s American University Commencement Address, June 10, 
1963, announcing the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. 
                                                 
68 Sorensen, Theodore C. (1965), ‘Kennedy’, p. 513 
69 Dallek, Robert & Golway, Terry (2006), “Let Every Nation Know”, pp. 131  
70 www.jfklibrary.org (Retrieved on July 27, 2006) 
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3.6.2 “The Vision of Peace” Demanded a Tailored Speechwriting Process 
JFK’s vision of peace relied on a better understanding of the Soviets - JFK did not want to drive 
the Communists and their ideology from the face of the earth. Theodore O. Windt Jr. (2003) has 
analyzed the speechwriting process behind the American University Speech and found it was 
unusual and highly tailored. Unlike most foreign policy speeches, no official executive branch 
positions were asked for. The speech was largely a joint effort between Chief Speechwriter Ted 
Sorensen, JFK and a few members of the inner circle71. 
  
Why? The purpose of the secrecy was to present a fundamentally new vision of peace, 
emphasizing the positive in the relations with the Soviets. Sorensen (1965) writes that JFK did 
not want this policy watered down by the “usual threats of annihilation, boasts of nuclear 
stockpiles and lectures on treachery”72. In stead, JFK’s vision of a post-Cuban Missile crisis was 
a foreign policy that would be more thoughtful, subtle and sophisticated.  
He stressed that the U.S. did not have imperial ambitions, but a commitment to genuine, lasting 
peace:  
‘Not a Pax Americana enforced on the world by American weapons of war… not merely peace for 
Americans, but peace for all men, not peace in our time but peace for all time’73.   
 
JFK challenged his listeners to look with fresh eyes at the Soviet Union and the Cold War and to 
realize that the arms race was produced by man, therefore it could be resolved by man74. The 
new aspect was to call for the Americans to change their attitude, hoping for a similar change of 
attitude on the Soviet side75. 
 
                                                 
71 Windt Jr., Theodore O. (2003), ‘ Presidential Speechwriting as Rhetorical Collaboration’, pp. 99-100, Ch. 4 in 
‘Ritter, Kurt & Medhurst, Martin J.(Ed’s) (2003), ‘Presidential Speechwriting – From the New Deal to the Reagan 
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72 Sorensen, Theodore C. (1965), ‘Kennedy’, p. 731 
73 Appendix G: President John F. Kennedy’s ‘Strategy of Peace’ speech Commencement address at American 
University 
74 Appendix G: President John F. Kennedy’s ‘Strategy of Peace’ speech Commencement address at American 
University 
75 Reeves, Richard (1991), “President Kennedy”, pp. 513-514 
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He asked both sides to rethink their positions vis-à-vis each other and focus on mutual interests, 
and that they should learn to coexist: Not by making ‘the world safe for democracy’ in the words 
of Woodrow Wilson but by ‘making the world safe for diversity’. Finally, he addressed how 
peace had to result from common humanity:   
 ‘For, in the final analysis, our most basic common link is that we all inhabit this small planet. We 
all breathe the same air. We all cherish our children's future. And we are all mortal’. 76
 
The U.S. would now reduce the spread of nuclear arms and move the world toward peace by 
signing treaty to outlaw nuclear tests. He declared that the U.S. would no longer conduct 
atmospheric tests, as long as others also did not test. He hoped this declaration would make it 
possible to reach a formal binding treaty later. 
3.6.3 The Statesman vs. The Politician 
What was the political fate of JFK’s ‘vision of peace’? It was questionable whether U.S. public 
opinion would support a foreign policy that identified common interests with the Soviets. JFK 
was told that congressional mail was running 15 to 1 against the test ban treaty. His aides were 
astonished when JFK told them that, he would “gladly forfeit his reelection for the sake of the 
treaty” 77.  In the autumn of 1963 he saw the Test Ban Treaty had been embraced by the 
American people. The Democratic Party had been regarded by the public as the ‘peace party’, 
best of the two for keeping the country out of war78.  
 
Why do it? Ted Sorensen, Chief Speechwriter for JFK wrote two years later that the American 
University speech was ‘the first Presidential speech in eighteen years to succeed in reaching 
                                                 
76 Appendix G: President John F. Kennedy’s ‘Strategy of Peace’ speech Commencement address at American 
University 
77 Bescholss, Michael (1991), The Crisis Years - Kennedy and Khrushchev 1960 – 1963. New York: Edward 
Burlingame Books, an imprint of HarperCollins, 1991 p. 632. [“McNamara privately told the Joint Chiefs, ‘If you 
insist in opposing [the Nuclear Test Ban] treaty, well and good, but I am not going to let anyone oppose it out of 
emotion or ignorance.’ … [And see Beschloss at pp. 620 – 632 for a good discussion of JFK’s campaign to win 
approval of the Test Ban Treaty. 
78 Sorensen, Theodore C. (1965), ‘Kennedy’, p. 745 
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beyond the Cold War’79. It was a first step toward halting the arms race, building trust, 
discouraging proliferation and preventing radioactive pollution. There had been 336 nuclear 
explosions in the atmosphere by the United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union, yet now 
the three great powers had committed themselves to halt atmospheric tests. When JFK died, one 
hundred nations had signed the same pledge.  The treaty was a ‘first step’- a prelude to more 
agreements. 
3.7 EVALUATING PRESIDENT KENNEDY’S VISION 
This chapter tested whether ‘The New Frontier’ was a successful national vision – and whether 
visionary initiatives originated from it. The Idealist call to service and the Peace Corps 
developed the kind of compassionate and benevolent America, JFK envisioned.  
In the case of the Moon Project and the Test Ban Treaty, he strived to educate the American 
public on urgent needs, and by pursuing longer-term goals in the interest of national security, he 
strived to be a statesman and more than a politician.  
On the Test Ban treaty negotiations he had done what he thought best for the country, however 
unpopular this initiative might prove in a national climate that preferred confrontation with the 
Soviets rather than reconciliation80. 
 
 
                                                 
79 Sorensen, Theodore C. (1965), ‘Kennedy’, p. 730 
80 Leaming, Barbara (2006), ‘Jack Kennedy: The Education of a Statesman”, p. 264, W.W. Norton & Company. 
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4.0  FOURTH CHAPTER: THE PRESIDENT’S DECISION MAKING STYLE 
This chapter will present 
• Developing the Decision Making Style Hypothesis 
• Scholarly work on Presidential decision making 
o Alexander George & Thomas Preston:  Each President has his own 
“style” 
o Personality plays a role in the President’s decision making style 
• Analysis of JFK’s Decision-Making Style 
o JFK’s ‘Collegial Decision Making Model’  
o The Transition from Eisenhower’s Commando System to JFK’s 
Informal White House (1960-61)  
o After the Bay of Pigs Fiasco: Putting Kennedy Men in Strategic Spots 
(1961) 
o The Collegial Model in the Cuban Missile Crisis (1962) 
• Evaluating President Kennedy’s Decision Making Style 
4.1 DEVELOPING THE DECISION MAKING STYLE HYPOTHESIS 
This chapter focuses on the President and how he engages his advisors in their pursuit of a high 
quality decision.  
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The decisions are the bread and butter of the Presidency, or as the leading Presidential scholar 
Richard E. Neustadt writes: “The President is “a decision machine”81. The best information and 
advice must therefore be fed into the system82. It is therefore not surprising that President Nixon 
wrote in his memoirs “The key to a successful presidency is in the decision-making process”83. 
Presidential decisions are among the most consequential and status-quo disturbing of any 
political leader in the world. Each president during his time in office must face that key decision 
that comes to define his legacy – to mention a few: President George W. Bush’s decision to 
‘Remove Saddam’s regime’, President Harry Truman's decision to ‘Drop the Bomb’, or 
President Lyndon B. Johnson’s ‘Escalation of the Vietnam War’, etc. 
4.1.1 Scholarly work on Presidential decision making 
The Presidential decision making process has been studied by scholars in Political Science, such 
as Alexander George, Graham Allison, Thomas Preston, Karen M. Hult & Charles E Walcott, 
Norman C. Thomas, James P. Pfiffner, etc84. The problem inherent in these authors’ study of the 
decision process is its abstraction of reality. Only Graham Allison has traced the formation of a 
decision through the entire White House advisor system and the Departments in the Executive 
branch. He did this in his seminal work from 1969, ‘Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile 
Crisis’, published in The American Political Science Review and later published in the 1971 
book: ‘Essence of Decision’.  
In this work, Allison finds that three models, a rational actor model, an organizational process 
model and a bureaucratic politics model each provides fundamentally different answers to the 
Cuban Missile Crisis85. The foreign policy analysis field has not continued to develop Allison's 
                                                 
81 Neustadt, Richard E. (1990), ‘Presidential Power and the Modern Presidents – The Politics of Leadership from 
Roosevelt to Reagan’, The Free Press  
82 George, Alexander L. (1980), ‘Presidential Decision-making in Foreign Policy: The effective Use of Information 
and Advice; pp. , Boulder, co: Westview Press. 
83 Rudalevige, Andrew , Presidential Hierarchies and Decision Making: 
The Interaction of Organization and Information, p. 18 
84 Foreign policy decision making is particularly important as allies are engaged in crises, war and nuclear weapons. 
Ultimately, presidential decisions may jeopardize a country’s prestige and leadership among nations. 
85 Allison, Graham T. (1969), ‘Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis’, The American Political Science 
Review, Vol. 63, No. 3 (Sep., 1969), pp. 689-718 
 43 
highly complex bureaucratic politics model to the extent he hoped, as it requires extensive 
amount of empirical, qualitative data.   
Hult & Walcott (2005) analyze the formalization of organizational structures around the 
President and find that a ‘standard model’ of White House decision making structure has 
emerged86. Other scholars aim at strengthening the Presidential decision making system towards 
the bureaucracies87. 
4.1.2 Alexander George & Thomas Preston:  Each President has his own “style” 
In his “Presidential Decision-Making in Foreign Policy” Alexander George (1980) draws the 
lesson that each President brings a personal decision making style to the White House. It is 
determined by his prior policy experience and his professional schooling88.  
Preston (2001) has conducted a recent and very thorough decision-making study in his book 
“The President and his Inner Circle – Leadership Style and the Advisory Process in Foreign 
Affairs”. He lists prior experience as a variable that determines when a President uses his 
advisors, and how much he involves the bureaucracies in the Executive Branch89. 
We know that Eisenhower was comfortable with a formalized staffing system due to his past 
experience as a general in the U.S. Army and Commander in Chief of the Allied troops in the 2nd 
World War.  
Conversely, JFK had worked outside the established Massachusetts Democratic Party 
organization, and therefore had a more ‘personalized’ staffing structure and decision making 
style. 
 
                                                 
86 Hult, Karen M.  & Walcott, Charles E (2005)., ‘White House Structure and Decision Making: Elaborating the 
Standard Model’, Presidential Studies Quarterly 35, no. 2 (June 2005) 
87 Hult, Karen M. (2005), ‘Strengthening Presidential 
Decision-Making Capacity’, Presidential Studies Quarterly 30, no. 1 (March 2000) p. 27 
88 George, Alexander L.(1980), ‘Presidential Decisionmaking in Foreign Policy: The effective Use of Information 
and Advice’; Boulder, co: Westview Press, pp. 9-10  
89 Preston, Thomas (2001), “The President & His Inner Circle – Leadership Style and the Advisory Process in 
Foreign Affairs, Columbia University Press, p. 11-12, pp. 98-100 
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4.1.3 Personality plays a role in the President’s decision making style 
Apart from prior experience, personality determines a President’s operating style. Historian 
Richard Reeves describes JFK as interpersonally intelligent; a man who was comfortable in one-
on-one situations with another person, and believed his charm would always prevail90. This trait 
plays a role for his decision-making style – and subsequently his presidential effectiveness. 
Graham Allison does not take into account presidential personality in his decision making 
model. He develops the Model I: The Rational Actor Model91, which views presidents as generic 
rather than unique individuals with their own psychology92. 
A President does not simply “choose” a model. It is a product of experience and his personality 
and temperament. A President who favors secrecy and surprise, like Johnson and Roosevelt, is 
likely to find flexible arrangements more suitable than formal ones. George’s objective is to help 
prevent information failures under different decision making models. Sifting through Presidential 
biographies he develops three ideal types. President F.D. Roosevelt had a ‘competitive decision 
making style’ where he pitted advisors against each other93. President Eisenhower used a 
‘formalistic’ style in which he largely stayed outside of the policy process and made the final 
judgment.  
President John F. Kennedy however, gathered his top advisors around him for extensive group 
deliberation. This writer shall now analyze JFK’s collegial decision making model and its 
consequences in more detail. 
 
                                                 
90 This was something he had to reexamine after his first meeting with the Soviet leader, Nikita Khrustjev in Vienna 
(Reeves, Richard (1993), ‘President Kennedy - Profile of Power’, p. 19, Simon & Schuster ). 
91 Allison, Graham T. (1969), ‘Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis’, The American Political Science 
Review, Vol. 63, No. 3 (Sep., 1969), pp. 689-718, Allison, Graham (1971). Essence of Decision: Explaining the 
Cuban Missile Crisis, 1ed. Little Brown., Allison, Graham and Zelikow, Phillip (1999). Essence of Decision: 
Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, 2ed. Longman.,  
92 Pfiffner, James P., ‘Presidential Decision Making: Rationality, Advisory Systems, and Personality”, Presidential 
Studies Quarterly 35, no. 2 (June), pp. 217-228 
93 George, Alexander L.(1980), ‘Presidential Decisionmaking in Foreign Policy: The effective Use of Information 
and Advice’; Boulder, co: Westview Press, pp. 149-150 
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4.2 ANALYSIS OF JFK’S DECISION MAKING STYLE 
The Decision Making Style Hypothesis 
 
A President will be effective if he has a competent personal decision making style 
 
Bringing his campaign and Senate experience to the White House, Kennedy wanted a decision 
making process that was largely responsive to his own needs. Thus he developed his own 
organizational superstructure in the White House, and chose firstly not to hire a powerful chief of 
staff – JFK intended to be his own chief of staff. He relied on staffers such as Ted Sorensen to 
administer the paper flow, and staff members generally did not need an appointment to see the 
President94. 
4.2.1 JFK’s ‘Collegial Decision Making Model’ 
George (1980) develops his model as a result of research into how a President constitutes a 
policymaking group for different issues, how policy alternatives are created and evaluated, and 
how consensus is found on behalf of a policy. Most real-world decision-making groups tend to 
be small – between two to seven members, and choices tend to be reduced when ‘crucial 
choices’ have to be made95. 
JFK’s Collegial Decision-Making Model allows interconnection horizontally around the spokes 
that lead to the president. The horizontal contact between advisors reduces the specialists’ ties to 
their bureaucracies.  
 
 
                                                 
94 Examining the use of the collegial decision making model in the Cuban missile crisis, but mindful of the negative 
consequences described by Janis. its reliance on consensus building may lead to ‘groupthink’ 
94 Barnes, John A., ’John F. Kennedy on Leadership – The Lessons and Legacy of a President”, p. 131 
95 George, Alexander L.(1980), ‘Presidential Decisionmaking in Foreign Policy: The effective Use of Information 
and Advice; p. 151, Boulder, co: Westview Press. 
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Figure 5:  JFK’s Collegial Decision Making Model according to Alexander George 
 
The characteristics of JFK’s collegial model are the following: 
a. The President is at the center of a wheel with spokes connecting to individual 
advisors or cabinet heads. 
b. The Advisors form a collegial team that engages in group decision making. They 
consider information and options from group members in an effort to obtain cross-fertilization 
and creative problem solving. 
c. Information flows into the collegial team from lower points in the bureaucracy. 
The President occasionally reaches down to communicate directly with subordinates of cabinet 
heads in order to get more information and independent advice97 
4.2.2 The Transition from Eisenhower’s Commando System to JFK’s Informal White 
House  (1960-61) 
JFK’s decision making style was apparent in the re-organization of the White House after he 
took over from President Eisenhower98. Eisenhower explained how and why he had built up “a 
                                                 
96 George, Alexander L.(1980), ‘Presidential Decisionmaking in Foreign Policy: The effective Use of Information 
and Advice; pp. 153-157, Boulder, co: Westview Press. 
97  For more research on the ‘Collegial Model’ in Presidential Decision Making, please see: Mitchell, David, 
‘Advisors in U.S. Foreign Policy: An Evaluation of the Formal and Collegial Advisory Systems’, Syracuse 
University, Department of Political Science, http://www.isanet.org/noarchive/mitchell.html , pp. 1-38  
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military staff apparatus” that fed information to the Commander-in-Chief and implemented his 
decisions. 
 
99
Figure 6: President Eisenhower meets newly sworn in President Kennedy at the White House 
 
No easy matters would come to him as a President, if they were easy, they would be settled at a 
lower level, Eisenhower explained. This did not appeal to JFK - Eisenhower’s orderly thinking 
was exactly the “passive thinking” he wanted out – as pointed out by JFK: “Occasionally, in the 
past, I think the staff has been used to get a pre-arranged agreement which is only confirmed at 
the President’s desk, and that I don’t agree with”100. JFK thought Eisenhower’s structure too 
bureaucratic with too many debates and decisions outside the President’s reach and control. JFK 
did not think of himself as being on top of a chart, rather he wanted to be in the center, the center 
of all action101.   
 
                                                                                                                                                             
98 Reeves, Richard (1991), “President Kennedy”, pp. 21-23, pp. 29-33 
99 http://www.nationmaster.com/wikimir/images/upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/thumb/7/7b/250px-
Eisenhower_and_Kennedy.jpg (Retrieved on July 25, 2006) 
100 Schlesinger Jr., Arthur (1965), “A Thousand Days – John F. Kennedy in the White House”,Houghton Mufflin 
Company, p. 688 
101 Reeves, Richard (1993), ‘President Kennedy - Profile of Power’, p. 23, Simon & Schuster  
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4.2.3 After the Bay of Pigs Fiasco: Putting Kennedy Men in Strategic Spots (1961) 
This case shows how JFK learned from the Bay of Pigs in order to be more effective:  
JFK wanted to ensure a vigorous, centrally led Presidency. But the Bay of Pigs fiasco had 
humiliated him. In the months following the invasion, JFK said: How can I have been so 
stupid102. Kennedy thought it was his personal responsibility, regardless of the mistakes by the 
Chiefs of Staff or the CIA or President Eisenhower who had been involved in the planning in his 
last year as President.  
Neustadt claims that Kennedy learned fast from his mistakes at the Bay of Pigs. The 
consequence of the Bay of Pigs was a move from a more free-wheeling style in which JFK had 
largely trusted the CIA and the Chiefs of Staff and had given them free hands - to a more tightly 
controlled decision making process. His closest advisors in domestic policy, Theodore C. 
Sorensen and his brother, Attorney General, Robert F. Kennedy now worked as advisors in 
foreign policy. Their role would not be that much different; their assignment was to ensure 
thoughts were given to the impact of foreign policy decisions on his domestic popularity.  
 
4.2.4 The Collegial Model in the Cuban Missile Crisis (1963) 
In the case of the Cuban Missile Crisis, JFK tried to adapt his decision-making style to the 
complex and dangerous situation. The Cuban Missile Crisis arose when the Soviet Union had 
stationed middle-range missiles with nuclear warheads in Cuba, capable of reaching as far as 
New York City. The crisis was skilfully resolved during thirteen anxious days of diplomatic 
communication with the Soviets, and parallel posturing of threats and goodwill. 
JFK’s inclusion of domestic advisers like Robert Kennedy, Arthur Schlesinger, and Ted 
Sorensen in deliberations in the Executive Committee during the Cuban Missile Crisis reflected 
                                                 
102 Reeves, Richard (1993), ‘President Kennedy - Profile of Power’, p. 94, Simon & Schuster  
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his discomfort with the advice received from the CIA and Defence Department leading up to the 
Bay of Pigs103 104. 
Kennedy assembled a team of advisors in an Executive Committee. Schlesinger (1985) explains 
how the discussion in the Cuban Missile Crisis was free, intent, continuous and broad.  
 
105
Figure 7: The Executive Committee during the Cuban Missile Crisis 
 
In the ExComm, heavy emphasis was placed upon developing detailed options of substantive 
options such as blockade, air strike, political moves, trades, negotiations. In the end the group 
produced two feasible solutions, an air strike which with 90% probability could take out the 
Soviet nuclear missile launching sites – and a naval quarantine, which would put the next move 
in the hands of the Soviet leader, Khrustjev106.  
JFK personally favored the air strike option, but permitted his advisers to argue in favor of the 
quarantine option. Preston (2001) finds that JFK remained flexible and was willing to alter his 
own views subsequent to new evidence. He did not lock into a rigid position typical of what 
Preston calls ‘low complexity leaders’107. On Sorensen’s request JFK even abstained from 
                                                 
103 Rudalevige, Andrew , Presidential Hierarchies and Decision Making: 
the Interaction of Organization and Information, p. 13 
104  For more on the Cuban Missile Crisis Decision Making: Anderson, Paul A. (1983), Decision Making by 
Objection and the Cuban Missile Crisis’, Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 28 ( Jun., 1983), pp. 201-222 
105 https:/.../photoessays/ cabinetroom/peindex.html (Retrieved on August 5, 2006) 
106 Preston, Thomas (2001), The President and His Inner Circle Leadership Style and the Advisory Process in 
Foreign Policy Making, Columbia University Press, pp. 113-114 
107 President Kennedy wanted a course of action that “had the advantage of permitting other steps if this one was not 
successful” (Sorensen 1963: 85). 
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participation in order to ensure higher quality discussions as the presence of President Kennedy 
in the Cuban Missile Crisis Executive Committee constrained early discussions. The arguments 
for different solutions were kicked around, and the problem was inspected from all angles108.  
In the case of the Cuban Missile Crisis, JFK’s personal style demonstrated his great comfort with 
interpersonal relations, and his ability to put himself in the shoes of others and to hear views of 
advisors that had opposing views. He insisted on teamwork, not competition between peers109. 
4.3 EVALUATING PRESIDENT KENNEDY’S DECISION MAKING STYLE 
Through three cases; the transition from the Eisenhower, the Bay of Pigs and mainly in the 
Cuban Missile Crisis case, this chapter tested whether JFK had an effective personal decision 
making style in the White House.  
Even under great pressure, Kennedy’s operating style was the ‘personal command post’. This 
implied a deliberative reaching down the hierarchies to acquire details, finding alternatives and 
protecting options against premature decision closure.  
Former adviser, Walt Rostow and other advisers argue that the style of organization during the 
Cuban Missile Crisis ‘exactly fitted Kennedy’s instinctive style which was one of personal and 
intimate command’110. The crises exposed Kennedy’s decision making style to the world111.  
JFK often took issues out of the bureaucratic system in time to defend his own right to decide 
and invent options. He did it to control and stimulate a big and complex government to produce 
                                                 
108 Preston, Thomas (2001), The President and His Inner Circle Leadership Style and the Advisory Process in 
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wise and efficient execution112. It was JFK’s method for infusing his political values and choices 
into the permanent government, which he and his advisers thought had hardened since the 2nd 
World War. 
                                                 
112 Schlesinger Jr., Arthur (1965), “A Thousand Days – John F. Kennedy in the White House”, Houghton Mufflin 
Company, p. 686 
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5.0  FIFTH CHAPTER: DELEGATION 
This chapter will present 
• Theory on Presidential Advisors  
• JFK’s Personnel Policy: “Get the Best and the Brightest” & the 
“Action Intellectuals” 
• Delegation in Foreign Policy: Choosing Secretary of State, Dean Rusk 
• Secretary of Defense, Robert S. McNamara 
• A Chief Speechwriter with Full Access: Ted Sorensen  
• Bobby Kennedy: Partner in Political Control 
• Balancing Advice by Use of External Advisers: The British 
Ambassador, David Ormsby–Gore  
• Evaluating the leadership factor Delegation in the JFK presidency 
5.1 THEORY ON PRESIDENTIAL ADVISORS 
Thomas (1990) emphasizes that presidential advisors is more than the “inner circle”. Interaction 
between the President and his informal inner circle is a central feature of policy formulation, yet 
it is necessary to guard against overemphasizing this phenomenon. There exists a collective 
presidential decision-making process that is less the work of a few individuals and more the 
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orderly effort within the OMB, and a host of advisory committees and lastly the review by the 
inner circle113. 
The ‘the inner circle’ is held together by a mutual bond of loyalty: the President’s need for 
advisers who share his values and goals, but who can also broaden his perspective. The inner 
circle personnel are often “buffers”, “catalysts”, “liaison men”, “fixers”, “communications 
experts”, “policy advisers” and sometimes “ideologists”. They act as brokers between pressure 
groups and administration policy makers, ensuring that the President knows what lobbying 
efforts are permitted, thereby advancing the President’s own interests114.   
In Presidential Power (1960), Neustadt urges that presidents should be wary of their advisory 
systems. Presidents must ensure that their own priorities will prevail - rather than those of 
entrepreneurial staffers. He puts the President and his own calculation of his power stakes at the 
center of decision making. Pfiffner echoes this and notes that presidential “aides must be 
monitored”115 . The hypothesis will now examine how well JFK’s advisors furthered his political 
control.  
 
Hypothesis:  
A President will be successful if he delegates with an eye to his political control  
This will be tested against JFK’s selection of key advisors and how well they served him and 
their cabinet or functional area. 
 
                                                 
113 Thomas, Norman C., ‘Presidential Advice and Information: Policy and Program Formulation’, Law and 
Contemporary Problems, Vol. 35, No. 3, The Institutionalized Presidency (Summer 1970), pp. 540-572 
114 Harry McPherson, a staffer to President Johnson explained the problem of interpreting the president’s interests in 
the following way: 
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rely”114. (Rudalevige, Andrew, “Presidential Hierarchies and Decision Making: The Interaction of Organization and 
Information”, Presidential Studies Quarterly 35, No. 2 (June), p. 339) 
115 Pfiffner, James P., ‘Presidential Decision Making: Rationality, Advisory Systems, and Personality”, Presidential 
Studies Quarterly 35, no. 2 (June), pp. 217-228 
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5.2 JFK’S PERSONNEL POLICY: “GET THE BEST AND THE BRIGHTEST” & 
THE “ACTION INTELLECTUALS” 
The Kennedy Administration’s personnel policy was to choose serious scholars from the 
academic world. He named a number of leading academics, including fifteen Rhodes scholars to 
influential posts in his Administration116.  He said, that the best the President could do was to 
identify the best talent he could get, “people whose ideas were actionable”. JFK called them 
‘action intellectuals’ - academics that had managed organizations or managers that had written 
books117. 
 
118
Figure 8:  President Kennedy with his advisors: Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Vice President Lyndon B. 
Johnson, Attorney General Bobby Kennedy. 
 
JFK often evoked the differences between the role of a President and that of his Advisers: they 
may delay their advice, change their minds, and offer several alternatives. But their 
responsibilities are fundamentally different than the President’s119. JFK quoted Lincoln for 
                                                 
116 Barnes, John A. (2005), ‘John F. Kennedy on Leadership’, pp. 135-138 
117 Burns, James MacGregor (1961), ‘John Kennedy – A Political Profile’,pp. 275-280, Harcourt, Brace & World, 
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118 http://www.medaloffreedom.com/JohnFKennedyCabinet.jpg (Retrieved on July 6, 2006) 
119 Sorensen (1963:82) 
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saying that ‘I have gathered you together, to hear what I have written down. I do not wish your 
advice about the main matter – that I have determined for myself”120. 
5.3 DELEGATION IN FOREIGN POLICY - CHOOSING SECRETARY OF STATE, 
DEAN RUSK 
The cabinet member is the principal political executive in his particular policy arena, and is 
therefore more than a presidential staff resource or a personal adviser121. 
Dean Rusk was the Director of the Rockefeller Foundation, and was headhunted to the 
Administration. One of Dean Rusk’s qualifications was that he was not Adlai Stevenson. Adlai 
Stevenson was the two-time Presidential candidate in the Democratic Party, viewed as the wise 
statesman and strong foreign policy expert in the party. Rusk had been surprised when he found 
out that JFK wanted him as Secretary of State:  “Aren’t you going to choose Stevenson?”, JFK 
had said - “No, Adlai might forget who’s the President and who’s the Secretary of State”122. 
This anecdote displays the kind of loyalty that JFK sought from Rusk, which ensured a minimum 
of monitoring.    
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
120 APPENDIX A: THE PRESIDENCY IN 1960 The Presidency in 1960, Address by Senator John F. Kennedy 
121 Thomas, Norman C., ‘Presidential Advice and Information: Policy and Program Formulation’, Law and 
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122 Reeves, Rihchard (1993), ‘President Kennedy - Profile of Power’, p. 25, Simon & Schuster. 
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Figure 9:  President Kennedy with Secretary of State, Dean Rusk 
5.3.1 When choosing Rusk - JFK sought control 
Schlesinger notes that ‘it was not accidental’ that President JFK chose the Under Secretary of 
State, the ambassador to the United Nations, and the Assistant Secretary for Africa before he 
named the Secretary of State. He did not want a strong secretary such as Dean Acheson or the 
Republican John Foster Dulles, because he intended be his own secretary of state, and during his 
time the Oval office, he was closely involved in the formulation and implementation of 
American foreign policy, and felt that the State Department was ‘his’ department.  
The explanation for this ‘policy bias’ was that JFK’s primary policy interest long had been 
foreign affairs. He had traveled the world extensively to gather a broader view of the world, 
partly capitalizing on Joe Kennedy’s role as U.S. ambassador to Great Britain. He had known 
many world leaders like Britain’s PM Winston Churchill and PM Chamberlain and Israel’s 
leader, Ben Gurion. JFK had gained significant policy knowledge during his years on the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee.  
Rusk was frequently named as a victim if a Kennedy Administration shake-up, but Rusk actually 
stayed until the last day of the Johnson administration. Rusk was nevertheless a disappointment 
to JFK. He was too deferential, too quiet and too cautious in his public statements. He was so 
discreet that JFK joked that when he and Rusk were alone, Rusk would still whisper. Together, 
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they succeeded in reforming the State Department by making it a practice to seek out 
ambassadors with specific knowledge of the language, culture and politics of the country they 
were dispatched to124.  
 
Due to his policy experience, President JFK trusted his advisers enough to let them attack his 
own position in the Cuban Missile Crisis. He was flexible enough to possess an open advisory 
system that sought out competing perspectives through extensive policy debate. Preston (2001) 
explains that this reflects a certain leadership style in foreign affairs, which he calls the Director-
Navigator style –the most competent of his leadership categories125. Schlesinger notes: He was a 
source of ideas and knew more about certain areas than the senior officials at State and probably 
called as many issues to their attention as they did to his. JFK wanted to stay ahead of problems, 
know everything that was going on and nothing exasperated him more than to be surprised by a 
crisis126.  
Finally, Clark Clifford observed that for JFK ‘the Presidency was above all about foreign 
policy’, a field in which he felt comfortable127. Sorensen concluded that “Kennedy was one of 
the few Presidents who, in someone else’s administration, would have made a first rate Secretary 
of State himself, and that “his interest, energy, experience and enterprise in this area exceeded 
those in all other departments combined”128.  
These anecdotes provide the evidence, that Kennedy did have a personal feel for foreign policy, 
and that he most likely chose Dean Rusk to delegate authority with an eye to his own power base 
and influence in foreign policy. 
 
                                                 
124 Barnes, John A. (2005), ’John F. Kennedy On Leadership”, pp. 120-121 
125 Preston, Thomas (2001), The President and His Inner Circle Leadership Style and the Advisory Process in 
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126 Preston, Thomas (2001), The President and His Inner Circle Leadership Style and the Advisory Process in 
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127 Preston, Thomas (2001), The President and His Inner Circle Leadership Style and the Advisory Process in 
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128 Sorensen outlines a rational decision making process that fits the theoretical literature on rational decision 
making, that is found in public policy analysis and the Graham Allison Cuban Missile Crisis Analysis, and then 
describes how the steps are often intertwined, and the goals more blurry that concrete. 
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5.4 CHOOSING SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, ROBERT S. MCNAMARA 
Chance sometimes played a role in the choice of the men for the Kennedy White House. 
Kennedy had read an article in the Times Magazine about Robert S. McNamara, who had just 
become the first non-family member to be named president of the Ford Motor Company. 
129
Figure 10: President John F. Kennedy and Secretary of Defense, Robert S. McNamara 
 
McNamara had used quantitative analysis and ‘scientific management’ to turn around the Ford 
Motor Company. It was the kind of innovative leadership JFK needed to head the Pentagon, the 
world’s largest bureaucracy. JFK let McNamara choose between the Treasury Department and 
the Defense Department130.  
JFK was highly impressed with McNamara when he was in office. He invented so many good 
options for solving problems, and McNamara became the Administrations dominating cabinet 
personality, and no one doubted at Pentagon who was in charge. However, he was considered 
arrogant and was often referred to as an “IBM-machine with legs”131.  
 
                                                 
129 http://www.hq.usace.army.mil/history/vignettes/Vignet150.gif (Retrieved on July 15, 2006) 
130 Kennedy gave McNamara the choice even after he had offended him by asking if JFK really had written the 
‘Profiles in Courage’ book. 
131 “The Fog of War – Eleven Lessons from the Life of Robert S. McNamara” is the 2004 Oscar Winning 
Documentary, directed by Errol Morris, it is a film about the former US Secretary of Defence and the various 
difficult lessons he learned about the nature and conduct of modern war. 
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Did McNamara further JFK’s political control? McNamara succeeded under JFK in building up 
the U.S. Army and Navy Special Forces to fight unconventional wars in the world’s trouble 
spots132. He pushed the use of the helicopter in the Army and created the National 
Reconnaissance Office, which operates the U.S. network of intelligence satellites133. McNamara 
achieved the mission of renewing the American Defense, but failed as Secretary of Defense in 
his handling of the Vietnam War. By his continued use of systems analysis methods to 
understand the Vietnam War, a rational and detached analysis form, which did not fit for guerilla 
fighting.  
 
It was difficult for McNamara to really know what was going on in Vietnam. To gather more 
information he went on seven trips to inspect the country. He is today very skeptical about 
human ability to understand and avoid war, because our capability is simply too limited: “We are 
reasonable, but reason has its limits”, McNamara reflects134. 
Today McNamara is clear on whether President JFK would have escalated the Vietnam War and 
put 500,000 men there like Johnson did – JFK would have tried to get the U.S. out135. 
5.5 A CHIEF SPEECHWRITER WITH FULL ACCESS: TED SORENSEN 
While McNamara and Rusk were cabinet members, Sorensen was entitled Special Assistant to 
the President. The political control hypothesis is worth testing against the Sorensen-JFK 
relationship because it shows how JFK put high emphasis on public speaking, and delegated 
extensively to Sorensen to better reach political goals.  
Windt (2003) compares the relation between JFK and his speech writers to the relation between 
other Presidents and their speech writers – and finds that it is ‘questionable whether any modern 
presidential speechwriter has had the influence to do what (Ted) Sorensen did’136. 
                                                 
132 (The recent documentary “Fog Of War” portrays an 85 year-old McNamara reflecting on the lessons of his 
leadership does not say much on his relationship to JFK, but focuses on his relation to Johnson and Johnson’s 
decisions in the Vietnam War).  
133 Barnes A., John (2005), John F. Kennedy On Leadership – The Lessons and Legacy of a President, p. 133 
134 “The Fog of War (2004) , "Lesson 11”, Sony Classics.  
135 “The Fog of War (2004), Lesson 10”, Sony Classics 
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Ted Sorensen joined JFK’s staff as legislative assistant not long after Kennedy had been elected 
to the U.S. Senate. During the Senate years, Ted Sorensen performed a range of duties from 
legislative assistant to speech writer. Sorensen was a liberal whose thinking merged with JFK’s 
pragmatic realism to the point that ‘no one – not even Sorensen – was sure where his thoughts 
ended and where Kennedy’s began’. Slowly the ‘Kennedy-Sorensen speech writing 
collaboration’ emerged. Reflecting their collaboration, staff in the JFK White House would say 
that “When Kennedy is wounded, Sorensen bleeds” 137. 
 
Sorensen had an unusual access to JFK. Other than the President, no one could overrule 
Sorensen; therefore he did not have to ‘clear’ speech drafts with the policy-making officials in 
the Administration, as traditional speechwriters do138. Sorensen could in the words of one 
observer: ‘put ideas before Kennedy and force him to accept or reject them, seize upon 
Kennedy’s good intentions and translate them into specific policies’139.  
 
                                                                                                                                                             
136 Windt Jr., Theodore O. (2003), ‘ Presidential Speechwriting as Rhetorical Collaboration’, pp. 103, Ch. 4 in 
‘Ritter, Kurt & Medhurst, Martin J.(Ed’s) (2003), ‘Presidential Speechwriting – From the New Deal to the Reagan 
Revolution and Beyond’, Texas A&M University Press 
137 Windt Jr., Theodore O. (2003), ‘ Presidential Speechwriting as Rhetorical Collaboration’, p. 102, Ch. 4 in ‘Ritter, 
Kurt & Medhurst, Martin J.(Ed’s) (2003), ‘Presidential Speechwriting – From the New Deal to the Reagan 
Revolution and Beyond’, Texas A&M University Press 
138 Windt Jr., Theodore O. (2003), ‘ Presidential Speechwriting as Rhetorical Collaboration’, pp. 103, Ch. 4 in 
‘Ritter, Kurt & Medhurst, Martin J.(Ed’s) (2003), ‘Presidential Speechwriting – From the New Deal to the Reagan 
Revolution and Beyond’, Texas A&M University Press 
139 For scholarly work on when Speechwriters may become policy initiators, please see: Hult, Karen M. & Walcott, 
Charles E. (1998), ‘Policymakers and Wordsmiths: Writing for the President under Johnson and Nixon, Polity, Vol. 
30, No. 3, (Spring, 1998), pp. 465-487 
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140
Figure 11:  Chief Speechwriter Ted Sorensen and President John F. Kennedy 
 
Devoted to Kennedy’s political interests and not to a specific policy area, Sorensen was often the 
envy of others, sitting in on important decisions so that he knew the arguments for a policy. This 
enabled him to write better speeches, a lesson for future Presidents and speech writers141.  
Windt (2003) tells that a dramatic example of Sorensen’s contribution to policy emerged during 
the Cuban Missile Crisis when members of the ExComm deadlocked on whether to recommend 
an air strike or quarantine. Sorensen was ordered to write two speeches, and returned to the 
group with a series of questions, that clarified the issues and lead to a compromise solution that 
became the President’s policy.  
Sorensen had that access because JFK put a emphasis on public words. Because Sorensen knew 
JFK so well, he could write better speeches for him.  JFK often presented policy initiatives 
through speeches, e.g. with the Peace Corps and the Test Ban Treaty. Sorensen and JFK wanted 
their speeches to stand as enduring oral monuments of the Administration. 
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5.6 BOBBY KENNEDY – PARTNER IN POLITICAL CONTROL 
Next to McNamara and Rusk, Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy was the most important 
cabinet member - in a class by himself. Undoubtedly, JFK’s ability to assert political control was 
strengthened by the presence of his own brother in the Executive Branch. He naturally became a 
close confidant of the President on policy matters that ranged beyond the jurisdiction of his own 
department. Bobby’s influence was felt throughout the government, as bureaucrats occasionally 
could pick up the phone and hear the attorney general requesting action on an initiative. “Little 
Brother is watching you” became an Administration in-joke142.  
Bobby became the administration’s voice and conscience on civil rights matters. Despite the 
closeness, JFK never hesitated to reject his advice. JFK did not include Bobby in all major 
decisions. He was very assertive, to the nuisance of other advisors – the Undersecretary of State, 
Chester Bowles more than once went to the President and said: “Who is in charge here?”, “You 
are”, JFK replied, to which Bowles added “Then would you please tell that to your brother”143.  
 
144
Figure 12: Attorney General, Robert F. Kennedy 
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5.7 BALANCING ADVICE BY USE OF EXTERNAL ADVISERS: THE BRITISH 
AMBASSADOR, DAVID ORMSBY–GORE 
In order to delegate to further one’s political control, the leader must ensure to balance the 
information received by internal advisors with outside information. If this is not done, policy 
failures can more easily arise: One of the most esteemed studies in organizational theory is 
Irving Janis’ “Group-think” Model – building on the Bay of Pigs fiasco, Janis finds that policy 
failures happen when no one in the inner circle of a decision group objects to where the decision 
process is going. One way of ensuring a counter-balance of group opinion is to acquire external 
advice.  
JFK used informal advice networks to provide the control and feedback required by an apparent 
high need for involvement and information145. Consequently, Reporters, ambassadors or 
intellectuals who had just visited nation-states in crisis or written something that interested JFK 
might be called upon.   
President JFK also relied on external advisers outside of his inner circle in key decisions, in 
order to balance his own advisers’ views. One of them was British Ambassador, David Ormsby-
Gore146.  
Ormsby Gore was Kennedy’s friend from pre-2nd World War days in London. They had first 
debated the role and responsibilities of a leader in a democratic society in 1938 with their British 
friends in London. They argued how much attention a leader ought to pay to public opinion, and 
whether in cases where there was a gap between a leader’s views and the public’s, if the leader 
ought to wait for the people to catch up, or strive as Winston Churchill to educate an electorate 
that might punish him at the polls for his efforts.  
 
Ormsby-Gore later counseled Kennedy during his campaign for the Presidency and during his 
confrontations with Khrustjev. Historian Barbara Leaning claimed labels the relation between 
Kennedy and Ormsby-Gore as a ‘twenty-five year conversation’ on ideas, events and leadership 
                                                 
145 Preston, Thomas (2001), The President and His Inner Circle Leadership Style and the Advisory Process in 
Foreign Policy Making, Columbia University Press, pp. 113-114 
146 Leaming, Barbara (2006), ‘Jack Kennedy: The Education of a Statesman”, p. 372-373, W.W. Norton & 
Company. 
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lessons in history. She claimed the discussions had been useful for Kennedy’s education as a 
world leader: ‘Gore had a huge influence in helping JFK to devise a more flexible and intelligent 
approach to Soviet relations in the nuclear age…’147. 
In the Cuban Missile Crisis, JFK possessed an open advisory system, and Gore was part of this 
network. Despite objections from the Navy, JFK decided to adopt Ambassador David Ormsby 
Gore’s suggestion of shortening the quarantine line around Cuba from 800 to 500 miles to gain 
more time to resolve the crisis before the first interception of a Soviet ship148. 
5.8 EVALUATING THE LEADERSHIP FACTOR DELEGATION IN THE JFK 
PRESIDENCY 
Sorensen served as one of the closest, most trusted advisors, who knew JFK’s intellectual ideas. 
They cooperated closely on the speeches of the Administration. JFK gave him direct access, 
because he put a high emphasis on public words.  
British Ambassador Ormsby-Gore was also effective and included in the toughest crisis in 
history.  
McNamara was chosen as a rational, strong, highly intelligent civilian that could provide 
political control over a hardened military establishment, and prevent from running loose through 
standard operating military procedures.  
Rusk was probably chosen because JFK had conceived a greater role for himself in this area. 
Preston (2001) has demonstrated that JFK was one of the most vigilant and engaged Presidents 
in the foreign affairs area, and Rusk’s importance is reduced when this is taken into account.  
Kennedy knew what he was looking for in every placement. For some cabinet positions he 
needed brains, for others he needed people that would go along with him149.  JFK’s selection of 
advisors displays what Neustadt calls a rare fine distinction among his ‘fellow kings’. Neustadt 
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says this is the mark of a President who has a good feel for the office. Kennedy said he wanted a 
“cabinet of talent” and within the political possibilities he largely achieved it. 
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6.0  SIXTH CHAPTER: SUMMARY OF HYPOTHESIS TESTS 
“How can the three factors vision, decision-making style, and delegation - explain whether 
John F. Kennedy was an effective President?”   
 
• Evaluating President JFK’s Vision 
• Evaluating President JFK’s Decision Making Style 
• Evaluating Delegation in the JFK Presidency 
• Could other factors have led to  
 different conclusions on presidential leadership?  
o Integrity 
o Communication Skill 
o Political Skills 
6.1 EVALUATING KENNEDY’S VISION 
• ‘The New Frontier’ was the overarching vision from which he successfully derived 
visionary initiatives. The Peace Corps rested on the theme of Idealism developed in the 
Inaugural address.  
 
• The Moon Project was the most ambitious national scientific project in two decades, and 
visionary for the sake of propelling the U.S. forward in the space race. Kennedy did not 
only want to go to the moon soon, he wanted to get there first.  Why go to the moon? For 
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JFK who loved challenges, admired boldness and intellectual courage, the moon project 
would show the technical capacity and economic power of the U.S.    
• Finally, JFK’s vision of peaceful cooperation with the Soviets was a consequence of the 
Cuban Missile Crisis. The vision was enunciated with his Strategy of Peace speech at 
American University, in which he pledged for a pause in the Cold War, and announced 
the signing of the Test Ban Treaty.  
• These initiatives were visionary, and in all three cases he strived to educate the American 
public on urgent needs. By pursuing longer-term goals in the interest of national security, 
he strived to be a statesman and more than a politician. On the Test Ban treaty 
negotiations he had done what he thought best for the country, however unpopular his 
course of action might prove in a national climate that preferred confrontation with the 
Soviets to relaxation and contact150. 
6.2 EVALUATING PRESIDENT KENNEDY’S DECISION MAKING STYLE 
• This chapter tested whether President JFK had an effective personal decision making 
style. JFK often pulled issues out of the bureaucratic system in time to defend his own 
right to decide and his own right of innovation. He did it to control and stimulate a big 
and complex government to produce wise decision and efficient execution151.  
• Due to his prior policy experience in the area JFK was highly interested in foreign policy, 
and relied on a high level of information.  
 
Kennedy’s collegial decision making model was a consensus-seeking vehicle which ensured that 
problems were debated through cross-fertilization. 
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6.3 EVALUATING DELEGATION IN THE JFK PRESIDENCY 
 
• JFK knew what he was looking for in every placement. In some positions he needed 
brains, e.g. McNamara to run the Pentagon, for others he needed people that would go 
along with him such as Rusk and loyalists that could look out for his political interests, 
such as Ted Sorensen and Bobby Kennedy. 
• Sorensen was a typical “yes-man”, but served as one of the closest, most trusted advisors, 
who knew JFK’s intellectual ideas. They cooperated closely on the speeches of the 
Administration.  
• Ambassdor Ormsby-Gore was also effective and included in the toughest crisis in history.  
• McNamara was chosen as a rational, strong, highly intelligent civilian that could provide 
political control over a hardened military establishment, and prevent from running loose 
through standard operating military procedures.  
• Rusk was probably chosen because JFK had conceived a greater role for himself in the 
area of foreign policy. Preston (2001) has demonstrated that JFK was one of the most 
vigilant and engaged Presidents in foreign affairs. Rusk’s importance is reduced when 
this is taken into account.  
• JFK’s selection of advisors displays what Neustadt calls a ‘rare’ fine distinction among 
his ‘fellow kings’, the mark of a President that displays a good feel for the office. 
Kennedy said he wanted a “cabinet of talent”, which he within political constraints 
largely achieved. 
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6.4 COULD OTHER FACTORS HAVE LED TO DIFFERENT CONCLUSIONS ON 
PRESIDENTIAL LEADERSHIP? 
6.4.1 Integrity 
In his book “Eyewitness to Power” (2000), the former advisor to four recent presidents, David 
Gergen, lists integrity as a vital leadership trait for a president152. A focus on integrity could 
produce a more critical picture of Kennedy. JFK was unethical in his relation to women – he was 
known as a notorious womanizer, who had affairs with leading Hollywood actresses such as 
Marilyn Monroe even during his marriage. This kind of adultery would limit his possibilities of 
advocating for family values politically. JFK was probably saved by the ethics of that time – he 
could probably not have gotten away with today’s press code. President Clinton’s struggle with 
the press and the Republicans because of the Monica Lewinsky case comes to mind. From an 
ethics perspective, any analysis of a Presidency must always be relative. It is bound in a certain 
time period, and we must judge the President by the ethical standards of that time period. 
6.4.2 Communication Skills 
Some scholars see JFK’ as an outstanding communicator that spoke to Americans about their 
future in compelling ways, and did this better than any, except for President Franklin D. 
Roosevelt who lifted America from its knees during the depression with his ‘fireside chats’. JFK 
placed great emphasis on public words, whether written or spoken, in order to move the pubic 
opinion and to talk people carefully through the challenges and choices the nation faced, 
cultivating public opinion and building a foundation of support before he acted. 
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 70 
6.4.3 Political Skill 
How well did JFK succeed in getting his legislation through Congress? Political skill is the art of 
finding the means to achieve the ends set forth in one’s vision, by bargaining, bullying or buying. 
A President cannot build on narrow groups, but must build political capital with wider circles of 
followers. The thesis has chosen not to look at this important factor. 
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7.0  SEVENTH CHAPTER: CONCLUSION 
• Vision, Decision-Making Style and Delegation - 
how relevant are they to Presidential Effectiveness? 
• Improving the Thesis Design  
• Unanswered Questions remain   
• Comparing President JFK to President G. W. Bush  
? Vision  
? Decision-Making Style 
? Delegation 
? Today’s Frontiers  
7.1 VISION, DECISION-MAKING STYLE AND DELEGATION – HOW 
RELEVANT ARE THEY TO PRESIDENTIAL EFFECTIVENESS? 
The MA thesis asked the research question:  
“How can the three factors vision, decision-making style, and delegation - 
explain whether John F. Kennedy was an effective President?” 
 
Reflecting on the relationships between the three factors, it is clear that the factors are 
interdependent. ‘Vision’ mobilizes external support for the leader’s overarching goals, and charts 
out a national direction. ‘Decision making style’ focuses on the ‘internal’, process-oriented 
aspects of leadership. The Delegation factor assesses what competence and which perspectives 
that will bring input into the decision-making which will carry out the vision. Because of this 
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interdependence having a good vision, but bad decision-making with poor input from advisors 
will lead to outcomes of inferior quality. A leader must thus master all three factors and all those 
not included. 
  
In the assessment of President John F. Kennedy’s leadership skills, the thesis concludes that he 
was effective because he and his advisors had a good judgment of the leadership levers. The 
Decision-making process was improved from the Bay of Pigs to the Cuban Missile Crisis, both 
by inviting external advisors and gathering key advisors over a weekly period in the Excomm for 
extended deliberation. The Delegation aspect was covered well by JFK as he chose proven 
academics like the economists James Tobin and John Kenneth Galbraith, and talented CEO’s and 
Foundation Presidents, such as McNamara and Rusk. 
7.2 IMPROVING THE THESIS DESIGN 
Ideally, the historical cases selected should be chosen as a function of the hypotheses, yet a better 
thesis design could be obtained by a tighter link between theory, hypotheses and cases. A more 
logical and mechanical development of the hypotheses would help with this. The process of 
deriving the hypotheses has been iterative, going back and forth between theory and empirical 
data. The empirical data itself could be more targeted, e.g. using more biographies and possibly 
newspaper clips from 1960-1963. 
It is also clear that some of the chapters are more empirical, such as the vision chapter and others 
have a better theoretical grounding, such as the decision-making style chapter. This imbalance 
would be improved in a second cut.   
In the final analysis, this is a JFK centered thesis, a result of the case study method. The general 
lessons in leadership are thus limited by the nature of the Kennedy Presidency itself, which only 
lasted 2 years and 10 months. Unlike two term presidents, we have less empirical data to 
investigate. 
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7.3 UNANSWERED QUESTIONS REMAIN 
Leadership analyses must descend to a specific level of analysis. To let factors control empirical 
data channels research efforts and ensures a level of pragmatism.  
Yet the lessons are limited because the effects of JFK’s vision have not been covered adequately. 
Much has been left out – and a series of further questions could improve the thesis: 
How did JFK’s approval ratings correlate with his leadership in events throughout the 
Presidency? What was the criticism in the major newspapers in the U.S. on the JFK 
Administration? How was JFK’s American University peace speech received by the Soviets? 
What did Khrustjev think of JFK? What was his personnel policy towards African-Americans? 
Did President L.B. Johnson’s dismantle JFK’s informal decision making system? Did JFK’s 
advisors get more power or influence under Johnson’s leadership? How do American Presidency 
scholars rank JFK vis-à-vis other Presidents and why? Answering these questions would all 
improve the validity of the conclusions on President JFK’s effectiveness.  
 
Applying the same three factors in a comparative case study analysis on President JFK and on 
President G. W Bush would provide stronger lessons in leadership. Therefore, a comparative 
analysis using the factors is briefly presented. 
7.4 COMPARISON BETWEEN PRESIDENT JFK AND PRESIDENT G. W. BUSH  
7.4.1 Vision 
President G.W. Bush’s vision has been ‘transformational’, as he has reduced America’s reliance 
on permanent alliances and international institutions, expanded the right of preemption into a 
preventive war and advocated coercive democratization as a solution to Middle East terrorism. 
His vision for spreading peace in the Middle East seemed successful in the early months after the 
invasion of Iraq, but in the fall of 2006 the country appears to be close to a civil war.  
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His vision for democracy is likely to fail, and the Americans no longer think democracy building 
is a key objective in foreign policy. Former National Security counselor to President Clinton, 
Joseph Nye Jr., writes that Bush’s vision has most likely been too ambitious for its time153. In the 
aftermath of 9/11, Bush had public support behind the war in Afghanistan. But Bush has charged 
too far ahead of his country and the world around him on Iraq, failing to ground his policy vision 
of spreading democracy and freedom in good contextual knowledge. 
 
7.4.2 The President’s Decision-Making Style 
Comparing President JFK’s handling of the Cuban Missile Crisis to President G.W. Bush’s 
decision making style leading to the Iraqi invasion is definitely relevant – the conditions differ of 
course, as the Iraqi invasion was a preemptive attack, and the Cuban Missile Crisis was a 
reaction to a severe threat. But it is clear Bush failed to manage information flows in his 
administration. There were no Weapons of Mass Destruction in Iraq, and the belief that 
democracy would flourish overnight and the insurgency would just go away was flawed. 
Apparently, this information was not fed into the decision-making process or it was discarded.  
Joseph Nye analyzes President G.W. Bush’s personal decision making style and says “Once a 
decision is made it is final and there is an absolute end to all advice and suggestion. There is no 
moving him after that”. Nye concludes – persistence can be admirable, but it is dangerous when 
it slows down the process of making corrections”154.  
Compare this to some of the strengths in JFK’s collegial decision-making style. He both 
accepted not to be physically present during the Cuban Missile Crisis to ensure open discussion, 
and gladly invited advisors with opposing views and he changed his mind and preferred shades 
of gray in the policy problem, and chose to move the quarantine line to get more time after 
advice from British Ambassador Ormbsby-Gore, as described in ch.5. 
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7.4.3 Delegation 
President G. W. Bush now struggles with the delegation aspects of leadership: Secretary of 
Defense Donald Rumsfeld who is responsible for the planning of the Iraqi war is seen as a 
“bully” across the federal government, and White House Chief of Staff Andrew Card tried for 18 
months to get the support of the President to get him fired.  
President JFK relied on Ambassador Ormsby-Gore  to balance his advice – and President G. W. 
Bush  also uses external advisors; such as former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, who has 
visited Iraq frequently. This case is demonstrated in Bob Woodward’s new book, “State of 
Denial”155. 
7.5 TODAY’S FRONTIERS 
“The New Frontier” was a shrewd and accurate picture of the many challenges facing America in 
the 1960’s; we now know that the decade was one of the more tumultuous in the twentieth 
century; filled with social and technological change.  
In 2006, we recognize that the policy challenges of our time are growing in complexity and 
interdependence. Today, politicians are standing at a parallel frontier of challenges: fighting 
AIDS, ensuring religious co-existence, creating alternative energy sources, combating climate 
change, etc.  
The overlaps between policy areas are growing – and to invent a successful, coherent political 
vision in this age that still is simple and memorable has now matured to a very difficult 
challenge. But to echo JFK: “Let us not shrink from that challenge in leadership – let’s welcome 
it”.    
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APPENDIX A 
“THE PRESIDENCY IN 1960” 
 
Address by Senator John F. Kennedy 
National Press Club, Washington, D.C. 
January 14, 1960 
http://www.jfklibrary.org/Historical+Resources/Archives/Reference+Desk/Speeches/JFK/JFK+P
re-Pres/The+Presidency+in+1960.htm (July 1, 2006) 
The modern presidential campaign covers every issue in and out of the platform from cranberries 
to creation. But the public is rarely alerted to a candidate's views about the central issue on which 
all the rest turn. That central issue--and the point of my comments this noon-- is not the farm 
problem or defense or India. It is the presidency itself. 
     Of course a candidate's views on specific policies are important, but Theodore Roosevelt and 
William Howard Taft shared policy views with entirely different results in the White House. Of 
course it is important to elect a good man with good intentions, but Woodrow Wilson and 
Warren G. Harding were both good men with good intentions; so were Lincoln and Buchanan; 
but there is a Lincoln Room in the White House and no Buchanan Room. 
     The history of this Nation--its brightest and its bleakest pages-- has been written largely in 
terms of the different views our Presidents have had of the Presidency itself. This history ought 
to tell us that the American people in 1960 have an imperative right to know what any man 
bidding for the Presidency thinks about the place he is bidding for, whether he is aware of and 
willing to use the powerful resources of that office; whether his model will be Taft or Roosevelt, 
Wilson or Harding. 
     Not since the days of Woodrow Wilson has any candidate spoken on the presidency itself 
before the votes have been irrevocably cast. Let us hope that the 1960 campaign, in addition to 
discussing the familiar issues where our positions too often blur, will also talk about the 
 78 
presidency itself, as an instrument for dealing with those issues, as an office with varying roles, 
powers, and limitations 
     During the past 8 years, we have seen one concept of the Presidency at work. Our needs and 
hopes have been eloquently stated--but the initiative and follow-through have too often been left 
to others. And too often his own objectives have been lost by the President's failure to override 
objections from within his own party, in the Congress or even in his Cabinet. 
     The American people in 1952 and 1956 may have preferred this detached, limited concept of 
the Presidency after 20 years of fast-moving, creative Presidential rule. Perhaps historians will 
regard this as necessarily one of those frequent periods of consolidation, a time to draw breath, to 
recoup our national energy. To quote the state of the Union message: "No Congress . . . on 
surveying the state of the Nation, has met with a more pleasing prospect than that which appears 
at the present time." 
     Unfortunately this is not Mr. Eisenhower's last message to the Congress, but Calvin 
Coolidge's. He followed to the White House Mr. Harding, whose sponsor declared very frankly 
that the times did not demand a first-rate President. If true, the times and the man met. 
     But the question is what do the times--and the people--demand for the next 4 years in the 
White House? 
     They demand a vigorous proponent of the national interest--not a passive broker for 
conflicting private interests. They demand a man capable of acting as the commander in chief of 
the Great Alliance, not merely a bookkeeper who feels that his work is done when the numbers 
on the balance sheet come even. They demand that he be the head of a responsible party, not rise 
so far above politics as to be invisible--a man who will formulate and fight for legislative 
policies, not be a casual bystander to the legislative process. 
     Today a restricted concept of the Presidency is not enough. For beneath today's surface gloss 
of peace and prosperity are increasingly dangerous, unsolved, long postponed problems--
problems that will inevitably explode to the surface during the next 4 years of the next 
administration--the growing missile gap, the rise of Communist China, the despair of the 
underdeveloped nations, the explosive situations in Berlin and in the Formosa Straits, the 
deterioration of NATO, the lack of an arms control agreement, and all the domestic problems of 
our farms, cities, and schools. 
     This administration has not faced up to these and other problems. Much has been said--but I 
am reminded of the old Chinese proverb: "There is a great deal of noise on the stairs but nobody 
comes into the room." 
     The President's state of the Union message reminded me of the exhortation from "King Lear" 
but goes: "I will do such things--what they are I know not . . . but they shall be the wonders of 
the earth." 
     In the decade that lies ahead--in the challenging revolutionary sixties--the American 
Presidency will demand more than ringing manifestoes issued from the rear of the battle. It will 
demand that the President place himself in the very thick of the fight, that he care passionately 
about the fate of the people he leads, that he be willing to serve them, at the risk of incurring 
their momentary displeasure. 
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     Whatever the political affiliation of our next President, whatever his views may be on all the 
issues and problems that rush in upon us, he must above all be the Chief Executive in every 
sense of the word. He must be prepared to exercise the fullest powers of his office--all that are 
specified and some that are not. He must master complex problems as well as receive one-page 
memorandums. He must originate action as well as study groups. He must reopen channels of 
communication between the world of thought and the seat of power. 
     Ulysses Grant considered the President "a purely administrative officer." If he administered 
the overnment departments efficiently, delegated his functions smoothly, and performed his 
ceremonies of state with decorum and grace, no more was to be expected of him. But that is not 
the place the Presidency was meant to have in American life. The President is alone, at the top--
the loneliest job there is, as Harry Truman has said. 
     If there is destructive dissension among the services, he alone can step in and straighten it out-
-instead of waiting for unanimity. If administrative agencies are not carrying out their mandate--
if a brushfire threatens some part of the globe--he alone can act, without waiting for the 
Congress. If his farm program fails, he alone deserves the blame, not his Secretary of 
Agriculture. 
     "The President is at liberty, both in law and conscience, to be as big a man as he can." So 
wrote Prof. Woodrow Wilson. But President Woodrow Wilson discovered that to be a big man in 
the White House inevitably brings cries of dictatorship. 
     So did Lincoln and Jackson and the two Roosevelts. And so may the next occupant of that 
office, if he is the man the times demand. But how much better it would be, in the turbulent 
sixties, to have a Roosevelt or a Wilson than to have another James Buchanan, cringing in the 
White House, afraid to move. 
     Nor can we afford a Chief Executive who is praised primarily for what he did not do, the 
disasters he prevented, the bills he vetoed--a President wishing his subordinates would produce 
more missiles or build more schools. We will need instead what the Constitution envisioned: a 
Chief Executive who is the vital center of action in our whole scheme of Government. 
     This includes the legislative process as well. The President cannot afford--for the sake of the 
office as well as the Nation--to be another Warren G. Harding, described by one backer as a man 
who "would when elected, sign whatever bill the Senate sent him--and not send bills for the 
Senate to pass." Rather he must know when to lead the Congress when to consult it and when he 
should act alone. 
     Having served 14 years in the legislative branch, I would not look with favor upon its 
domination by the Executive. Under our government of "power as the rival of power," to use 
Hamilton's phrase, Congress must not surrender its responsibilities. But neither should it 
dominate. However large its share in the formulation of domestic programs, it is the President 
alone who must make the major decisions of our foreign policy. 
     That is what the Constitution wisely commands. And even domestically, the President must 
initiate policies and devise laws to meet the needs of the Nation. And he must be prepared to use 
all the resources of his office to ensure the enactment of that legislation--even when conflict is 
the result. 
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     By the end of his term Theodore Roosevelt was not popular in the Congress--particularly 
when he criticized an amendment to the Treasury appropriation which forbade the use of Secret 
Service men to investigate Congressmen. 
     And the feeling was mutual, Roosevelt saying: "I do not much admire the Senate because it is 
such a helpless body when efficient work is to be done." 
     And Woodrow Wilson was even more bitter after his frustrating quarrels. Asked if he might 
run for the Senate in 1920, he replied: "Outside of the United States, the Senate does not amount 
to a damn. And inside the United States the Senate is mostly despised. They haven't had a 
thought down there in 50 years." 
     But, however bitter their farewells, the facts of the matter are that Roosevelt and Wilson did 
get things done--not only through their Executive powers but through the Congress as well. 
Calvin Coolidge, on the other hand, departed from Washington with cheers of Congress still 
ringing in his ears. But when his World Court bill was under fire on Capitol Hill he sent no 
message, gave no encouragement to the bill's leaders, and paid little or no attention to the whole 
proceeding--and the cause of world justice was set back. 
     To be sure, Coolidge had held the usual White House breakfasts with congressional leaders--
but they were aimed, as he himself said, at "good fellowship," not a discussion of "public 
business." And at his press conferences, according to press historians, where he preferred to talk 
about the local flower show and its exhibits, reporters who finally extracted from him a single 
sentence--"I'm against that bill"--would rush to file tongue-in-cheek dispatches claiming that: 
"President Coolidge, in a fighting mood, today served notice on Congress that he intended to 
combat, with all the resources at his command, the pending bill . . ." 
     But in the coming months we will need a real fighting mood in the White House--a man who 
will not retreat in the face of pressure from his congressional leaders--who will not let down 
those supporting his views on the floor. Divided Government over the past 6 years has only been 
further confused by this lack of legislative leadership. To restore it next year will help restore 
purpose to both the Presidency and the Congress. 
     The facts of the matter are that legislative leadership is not possible without party leadership, 
in the most political sense--and Mr. Eisenhower prefers to stay above politics (although a weekly 
news magazine last fall reported the startling news, and I quote, that "President Eisenhower is 
emerging as a major political figure"). When asked early in his first term, how he liked the 
"game of politics," he replied with a frown that his questioner was using a derogatory phrase. 
"Being President," he said, "is a very great experience . . . but the word 'politics' . . . I have no 
great liking for that." 
     But no President, it seems to me, can escape politics. He has not only been chosen by the 
Nation--he has been chosen by his party. And if he insists that he is "President of all the people" 
and should, therefore, offend none of them--if he blurs the issues and differences between the 
parties--if he neglects the party machinery and avoids his party's leadership--then he has not only 
weakened the political party as an instrument of the democratic process--he has dealt a blow to 
the democratic process itself. 
     I prefer the example of Abe Lincoln, who loved politics with the passion of a born 
practitioner. For example, he waited up all night in 1863 to get the crucial returns on the Ohio 
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governorship. When the Unionist candidate was elected, Lincoln wired: "Glory God in the 
highest. Ohio has saved the Nation." 
     But the White House is not only the center of political leadership. It must be the center of 
moral leadership--a "bully pulpit," as Theodore Roosevelt described it. For only the President 
represents the national interest. And upon him alone converge all the needs and aspirations of all 
parts of the country, all departments of the Government, all nations of the world. 
     It is not enough merely to represent prevailing sentiment--to follow McKinley's practice, as 
described by Joe Cannon, of "keeping his ear so close to the ground he got it full of 
grasshoppers." We will need in the sixties a President who is willing and able to summon his 
national constituency to its finest hour--to alert the people to our dangers and our opportunities--
to demand of them the sacrifices that will be necessary. Despite the increasing evidence of a lost 
national purpose and a soft national will, F.D.R.'s words in his first inaugural still ring true: "In 
every dark hour of our national life, a leadership of frankness and vigor has met with that 
understanding and support of the people themselves which is essential to victory." 
     Roosevelt fulfilled the role of moral leadership. So did Wilson and Lincoln, Truman and 
Jackson and Teddy Roosevelt. They led the people as well as the Government--they fought for 
great ideals as well as bills. And the time has come to demand that kind of leadership again. 
     And so, as this vital campaign begins, let us discuss the issues the next President will face--
but let us also discuss the powers and tools with which we must face them. 
     For we must endow that office with extraordinary strength and vision. We must act in the 
image of Abraham Lincoln summoning his wartime Cabinet to a meeting on the Emancipation 
Proclamation. That Cabinet has [sic] been carefully chosen to please and reflect many elements 
in the country. But "I have gathered you together," Lincoln said, "to hear what I have written 
down. I do not wish your advice about the main matter--that I have determined for myself." 
     And later, when he went to sign, after several hours of exhausting handshaking that had left 
his arm weak, he said to those present: "If my name goes down in history, it will be for this act. 
My whole soul is in it. If my hand trembles when I sign this proclamation, all who examine the 
document hereafter will say: 'He hesitated.'" 
     But Lincoln's hand did not tremble. He did not hesitate. He did not equivocate. For he was the 
President of the United States. 
     It is in this spirit that we must go forth in the coming months and years. 
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APPENDIX B 
JFK “DEMOCRATIC PARTY NOMINATION SPEECH” 
Address of Senator John F. Kennedy Accepting the Democratic Party Nomination for the 
Presidency of the United States 
Memorial Coliseum, Los Angeles 
July 15, 1960 
 
http://www.jfklibrary.org/Historical+Resources/Archives/Reference+Desk/Speeches/JFK/JFK+Pre-
Pres/Address+of+Senator+John+F.+Kennedy+Accepting+the+Democratic+Party+Nomination+for+the+Presidency
+of+t.htm (July 1, 2006) 
Governor Stevenson, Senator Johnson, Mr. Butler, Senator Symington, Senator Humphrey, 
Speaker Rayburn, Fellow Democrats, I want to express my thanks to Governor Stevenson for his 
generous and heart-warming introduction. 
     It was my great honor to place his name in nomination at the 1956 Democratic Convention, 
and I am delighted to have his support and his counsel and his advice in the coming months 
ahead. 
     With a deep sense of duty and high resolve, I accept your nomination. 
     I accept it with a full and grateful heart--without reservation-- and with only one obligation--
the obligation to devote every effort of body, mind and spirit to lead our Party back to victory 
and our Nation back to greatness. 
     I am grateful, too, that you have provided me with such an eloquent statement of our Party's 
platform. Pledges which are made so eloquently are made to be kept. "The Rights of Man"--the 
civil and economic rights essential to the human dignity of all men--are indeed our goal and our 
first principles. This is a Platform on which I can run with enthusiasm and conviction. 
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     And I am grateful, finally, that I can rely in the coming months on so many others--on a 
distinguished running-mate who brings unity to our ticket and strength to our Platform, Lyndon 
Johnson--on one of the most articulate statesmen of our time, Adlai Stevenson--on a great 
spokesman for our needs as a Nation and a people, Stuart Symington--and on that fighting 
campaigner whose support I welcome, President Harry S. Truman-- on my traveling companion 
in Wisconsin and West Virginia, Senator Hubert Humphrey. On Paul Butler, our devoted and 
courageous Chairman. 
     I feel a lot safer now that they are on my side again. And I am proud of the contrast with our 
Republican competitors. For their ranks are apparently so thin that not one challenger has come 
forth with both the competence and the courage to make theirs an open convention. 
     I am fully aware of the fact that the Democratic Party, by nominating someone of my faith, 
has taken on what many regard as a new and hazardous risk--new, at least since 1928. But I look 
at it this way: the Democratic Party has once again placed its confidence in the American people, 
and in their ability to render a free, fair judgment. And you have, at the same time, placed your 
confidence in me, and in my ability to render a free, fair judgment--to uphold the Constitution 
and my oath of office--and to reject any kind of religious pressure or obligation that might 
directly or indirectly interfere with my conduct of the Presidency in the national interest. My 
record of fourteen years supporting public education--supporting complete separation of church 
and state--and resisting pressure from any source on any issue should be clear by now to 
everyone. 
     I hope that no American, considering the really critical issues facing this country, will waste 
his franchise by voting either for me or against me solely on account of my religious affiliation. 
It is not relevant. I want to stress, what some other political or religious leader may have said on 
this subject. It is not relevant what abuses may have existed in other countries or in other times. 
It is not relevant what pressures, if any, might conceivably be brought to bear on me. I am telling 
you now what you are entitled to know: that my decisions on any public policy will be my own--
as an American, a Democrat and a free man. 
     Under any circumstances, however, the victory we seek in November will not be easy. We all 
know that in our hearts. We recognize the power of the forces that will be aligned against us. We 
know they will invoke the name of Abraham Lincoln on behalf of their candidate--despite the 
fact that the political career of their candidate has often seemed to show charity toward none and 
malice for all. 
     We know that it will not be easy to campaign against a man who has spoken or voted on 
every known side of every known issue. Mr. Nixon may feel it is his turn now, after the New 
Deal and the Fair Deal--but before he deals, someone had better cut the cards. 
     That "someone" may be the millions of Americans who voted for President Eisenhower but 
balk at his would be, self-appointed successor. For just as historians tell us that Richard I was not 
fit to fill the shoes of bold Henry II--and that Richard Cromwell was not fit to wear the mantle of 
his uncle--they might add in future years that Richard Nixon did not measure to the footsteps of 
Dwight D. Eisenhower. 
     Perhaps he could carry on the party policies--the policies of Nixon, Benson, Dirksen and 
Goldwater. But this Nation cannot afford such a luxury. Perhaps we could better afford a 
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Coolidge following Harding. And perhaps we could afford a Pierce following Fillmore. But after 
Buchanan this nation needed a Lincoln--after Taft we needed a Wilson-- after Hoover we needed 
Franklin Roosevelt. . . . And after eight years of drugged and fitful sleep, this nation needs 
strong, creative Democratic leadership in the White House. 
     But we are not merely running against Mr. Nixon. Our task is not merely one of itemizing 
Republican failures. Nor is that wholly necessary. For the families forced from the farm will 
know how to vote without our telling them. The unemployed miners and textile workers will 
know how to vote. The old people without medical care--the families without a decent home--the 
parents of children without adequate food or schools--they all know that it's time for a change. 
     But I think the American people expect more from us than cries of indignation and attack. 
The times are too grave, the challenge too urgent, and the stakes too high--to permit the 
customary passions of political debate. We are not here to curse the darkness, but to light the 
candle that can guide us through that darkness to a safe and sane future. As Winston Churchill 
said on taking office some twenty years ago: if we open a quarrel between the present and the 
past, we shall be in danger of losing the future. 
     Today our concern must be with that future. For the world is changing. The old era is ending. 
The old ways will not do. 
     Abroad, the balance of power is shifting. There are new and more terrible weapons--new and 
uncertain nations--new pressures of population and deprivation. One-third of the world, it has 
been said, may be free- -but one-third is the victim of cruel repression--and the other one- third is 
rocked by the pangs of poverty, hunger and envy. More energy is released by the awakening of 
these new nations than by the fission of the atom itself. 
     Meanwhile, Communist influence has penetrated further into Asia, stood astride the Middle 
East and now festers some ninety miles off the coast of Florida. Friends have slipped into 
neutrality--and neutrals into hostility. As our keynoter reminded us, the President who began his 
career by going to Korea ends it by staying away from Japan. 
     The world has been close to war before--but now man, who has survived all previous threats 
to his existence, has taken into his mortal hands the power to exterminate the entire species some 
seven times over. 
     Here at home, the changing face of the future is equally revolutionary. The New Deal and the 
Fair Deal were bold measures for their generations--but this is a new generation. 
     A technological revolution on the farm has led to an output explosion--but we have not yet 
learned to harness that explosion usefully, while protecting our farmers' right to full parity 
income. 
     An urban population explosion has overcrowded our schools, cluttered up our suburbs, and 
increased the squalor of our slums. 
     A peaceful revolution for human rights--demanding an end to racial discrimination in all parts 
of our community life--has strained at the leashes imposed by timid executive leadership. 
     A medical revolution has extended the life of our elder citizens without providing the dignity 
and security those later years deserve. And a revolution of automation finds machines replacing 
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men in the mines and mills of America, without replacing their incomes or their training or their 
needs to pay the family doctor, grocer and landlord. 
     There has also been a change--a slippage--in our intellectual and moral strength. Seven lean 
years of drouth and famine have withered a field of ideas. Blight has descended on our 
regulatory agencies--and a dry rot, beginning in Washington, is seeping into every corner of 
America--in the payola mentality, the expense account way of life, the confusion between what 
is legal and what is right. Too many Americans have lost their way, their will and their sense of 
historic purpose. 
     It is a time, in short, for a new generation of leadership--new men to cope with new problems 
and new opportunities. 
     All over the world, particularly in the newer nations, young men are coming to power--men 
who are not bound by the traditions of the past--men who are not blinded by the old fears and 
hates and rivalries-- young men who can cast off the old slogans and delusions and suspicions. 
     The Republican nominee-to-be, of course, is also a young man. But his approach is as old as 
McKinley. His party is the party of the past. His speeches are generalities from Poor Richard's 
Almanac. Their platform, made up of left-over Democratic planks, has the courage of our old 
convictions. Their pledge is a pledge to the status quo--and today there can be no status quo. 
     For I stand tonight facing west on what was once the last frontier. From the lands that stretch 
three thousand miles behind me, the pioneers of old gave up their safety, their comfort and 
sometimes their lives to build a new world here in the West. They were not the captives of their 
own doubts, the prisoners of their own price tags. Their motto was not "every man for himself"--
but "all for the common cause." They were determined to make that new world strong and free, 
to overcome its hazards and its hardships, to conquer the enemies that threatened from without 
and within. 
     Today some would say that those struggles are all over--that all the horizons have been 
explored--that all the battles have been won-- that there is no longer an American frontier. 
     But I trust that no one in this vast assemblage will agree with those sentiments. For the 
problems are not all solved and the battles are not all won--and we stand today on the edge of a 
New Frontier--the frontier of the 1960's--a frontier of unknown opportunities and perils-- a 
frontier of unfulfilled hopes and threats. 
     Woodrow Wilson's New Freedom promised our nation a new political and economic 
framework. Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal promised security and succor to those in need. But 
the New Frontier of which I speak is not a set of promises--it is a set of challenges. It sums up 
not what I intend to offer the American people, but what I intend to ask of them. It appeals to 
their pride, not to their pocketbook--it holds out the promise of more sacrifice instead of more 
security. 
     But I tell you the New Frontier is here, whether we seek it or not. Beyond that frontier are the 
uncharted areas of science and space, unsolved problems of peace and war, unconquered pockets 
of ignorance and prejudice, unanswered questions of poverty and surplus. It would be easier to 
shrink back from that frontier, to look to the safe mediocrity of the past, to be lulled by good 
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intentions and high rhetoric--and those who prefer that course should not cast their votes for me, 
regardless of party. 
     But I believe the times demand new invention, innovation, imagination, decision. I am asking 
each of you to be pioneers on that New Frontier. My call is to the young in heart, regardless of 
age--to all who respond to the Scriptural call: "Be strong and of a good courage; be not afraid, 
neither be thou dismayed." 
     For courage--not complacency--is our need today--leadership--not salesmanship. And the 
only valid test of leadership is the ability to lead, and lead vigorously. A tired nation, said David 
Lloyd George, is a Tory nation--and the United States today cannot afford to be either tired or 
Tory. 
     There may be those who wish to hear more--more promises to this group or that--more harsh 
rhetoric about the men in the Kremlin--more assurances of a golden future, where taxes are 
always low and subsidies ever high. But my promises are in the platform you have adopted--our 
ends will not be won by rhetoric and we can have faith in the future only if we have faith in 
ourselves. 
     For the harsh facts of the matter are that we stand on this frontier at a turning-point in history. 
We must prove all over again whether this nation--or any nation so conceived--can long endure--
whether our society--with its freedom of choice, its breadth of opportunity, its range of 
alternatives--can compete with the single-minded advance of the Communist system. 
     Can a nation organized and governed such as ours endure? That is the real question. Have we 
the nerve and the will? Can we carry through in an age where we will witness not only new 
breakthroughs in weapons of destruction--but also a race for mastery of the sky and the rain, the 
ocean and the tides, the far side of space and the inside of men's minds? 
     Are we up to the task--are we equal to the challenge? Are we willing to match the Russian 
sacrifice of the present for the future--or must we sacrifice our future in order to enjoy the 
present? 
     That is the question of the New Frontier. That is the choice our nation must make--a choice 
that lies not merely between two men or two parties, but between the public interest and private 
comfort--between national greatness and national decline--between the fresh air of progress and 
the stale, dank atmosphere of "normalcy"--between determined dedication and creeping 
mediocrity. 
     All mankind waits upon our decision. A whole world looks to see what we will do. We cannot 
fail their trust, we cannot fail to try. 
     It has been a long road from that first snowy day in New Hampshire to this crowded 
convention city. Now begins another long journey, taking me into your cities and homes all over 
America. Give me your help, your hand, your voice, your vote. Recall with me the words of 
Isaiah: "They that wait upon the Lord shall renew their strength; they shall mount up with wings 
as eagles; they shall run and not be weary." 
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     As we face the coming challenge, we too, shall wait upon the Lord, and ask that he renew our 
strength. Then shall we be equal to the test. Then we shall not be weary. And then we shall 
prevail.     Thank you. 
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APPENDIX C 
JOHN F. KENNEDY: “INAUGURAL ADDRESS”   
January 20, 1961 Washington, D.C.,  
The Mall. www.americanrhetoric.com (July 1, 2006) 
 
Vice President Johnson, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Chief Justice, President Eisenhower, Vice President 
Nixon, President Truman, Reverend Clergy, fellow citizens: 
 
We observe today not a victory of party, but a celebration of freedom -- symbolizing an end, as 
well as a beginning -- signifying renewal, as well as change. For I have sworn before you and 
Almighty God the same solemn oath our forebears prescribed nearly a century and three-quarters 
ago. 
The world is very different now. For man holds in his mortal hands the power to abolish all 
forms of human poverty and all forms of human life. And yet the same revolutionary beliefs for 
which our forebears fought are still at issue around the globe -- the belief that the rights of man 
come not from the generosity of the state, but from the hand of God. 
We dare not forget today that we are the heirs of that first revolution. Let the word go forth from 
this time and place, to friend and foe alike, that the torch has been passed to a new generation of 
Americans -- born in this century, tempered by war, disciplined by a hard and bitter peace, proud 
of our ancient heritage, and unwilling to witness or permit the slow undoing of those human 
rights to which this nation has always been committed, and to which we are committed today at 
home and around the world. 
 
Let every nation know, whether it wishes us well or ill, that we shall pay any price, bear any 
burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe, to assure the survival and the 
success of liberty. 
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This much we pledge -- and more. 
 
To those old allies whose cultural and spiritual origins we share, we pledge the loyalty of faithful 
friends. United there is little we cannot do in a host of cooperative ventures. Divided there is 
little we can do -- for we dare not meet a powerful challenge at odds and split asunder. 
To those new states whom we welcome to the ranks of the free, we pledge our word that one 
form of colonial control shall not have passed away merely to be replaced by a far more iron 
tyranny. We shall not always expect to find them supporting our view. But we shall always hope 
to find them strongly supporting their own freedom -- and to remember that, in the past, those 
who foolishly sought power by riding the back of the tiger ended up inside. 
To those people in the huts and villages of half the globe struggling to break the bonds of mass 
misery, we pledge our best efforts to help them help themselves, for whatever period is required -
- not because the Communists may be doing it, not because we seek their votes, but because it is 
right. If a free society cannot help the many who are poor, it cannot save the few who are rich. 
To our sister republics south of our border, we offer a special pledge: to convert our good words 
into good deeds, in a new alliance for progress, to assist free men and free governments in 
casting off the chains of poverty. But this peaceful revolution of hope cannot become the prey of 
hostile powers. Let all our neighbors know that we shall join with them to oppose aggression or 
subversion anywhere in the Americas. And let every other power know that this hemisphere 
intends to remain the master of its own house. 
To that world assembly of sovereign states, the United Nations, our last best hope in an age 
where the instruments of war have far outpaced the instruments of peace, we renew our pledge of 
support -- to prevent it from becoming merely a forum for invective, to strengthen its shield of 
the new and the weak, and to enlarge the area in which its writ may run. 
 
Finally, to those nations who would make themselves our adversary, we offer not a pledge but a 
request: that both sides begin anew the quest for peace, before the dark powers of destruction 
unleashed by science engulf all humanity in planned or accidental self-destruction. 
 
We dare not tempt them with weakness. For only when our arms are sufficient beyond doubt can 
we be certain beyond doubt that they will never be employed. 
But neither can two great and powerful groups of nations take comfort from our present course -- 
both sides overburdened by the cost of modern weapons, both rightly alarmed by the steady 
spread of the deadly atom, yet both racing to alter that uncertain balance of terror that stays the 
hand of mankind's final war. 
So let us begin anew -- remembering on both sides that civility is not a sign of weakness, and 
sincerity is always subject to proof. Let us never negotiate out of fear, but let us never fear to 
negotiate. 
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Let both sides explore what problems unite us instead of belaboring those problems which divide 
us. 
 
Let both sides, for the first time, formulate serious and precise proposals for the inspection and 
control of arms, and bring the absolute power to destroy other nations under the absolute control 
of all nations. 
 
Let both sides seek to invoke the wonders of science instead of its terrors. Together let us explore 
the stars, conquer the deserts, eradicate disease, tap the ocean depths, and encourage the arts and 
commerce. 
 
Let both sides unite to heed, in all corners of the earth, the command of Isaiah -- to "undo the 
heavy burdens, and [to] let the oppressed go free."¹ 
 
And, if a beachhead of cooperation may push back the jungle of suspicion, let both sides join in 
creating a new endeavor -- not a new balance of power, but a new world of law -- where the 
strong are just, and the weak secure, and the peace preserved. 
 
All this will not be finished in the first one hundred days. Nor will it be finished in the first one 
thousand days; nor in the life of this Administration; nor even perhaps in our lifetime on this 
planet. But let us begin. 
 
In your hands, my fellow citizens, more than mine, will rest the final success or failure of our 
course. Since this country was founded, each generation of Americans has been summoned to 
give testimony to its national loyalty. The graves of young Americans who answered the call to 
service surround the globe. 
 
Now the trumpet summons us again -- not as a call to bear arms, though arms we need -- not as a 
call to battle, though embattled we are -- but a call to bear the burden of a long twilight struggle, 
year in and year out, "rejoicing in hope; patient in tribulation,"² a struggle against the common 
enemies of man: tyranny, poverty, disease, and war itself. 
Can we forge against these enemies a grand and global alliance, North and South, East and West, 
that can assure a more fruitful life for all mankind? Will you join in that historic effort? 
 
In the long history of the world, only a few generations have been granted the role of defending 
freedom in its hour of maximum danger. I do not shrink from this responsibility -- I welcome it. I 
do not believe that any of us would exchange places with any other people or any other 
generation. The energy, the faith, the devotion which we bring to this endeavor will light our 
country and all who serve it. And the glow from that fire can truly light the world. 
 
And so, my fellow Americans, ask not what your country can do for you; ask what you can do 
for your country. 
 
My fellow citizens of the world, ask not what America will do for you, but what together we can 
do for the freedom of man. 
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Finally, whether you are citizens of America or citizens of the world, ask of us here the same 
high standards of strength and sacrifice which we ask of you. With a good conscience our only 
sure reward, with history the final judge of our deeds, let us go forth to lead the land we love, 
asking His blessing and His help, but knowing that here on earth God's work must truly be our 
own. 
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APPENDIX D 
PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY’S “STATEMENT ON ESTABLISHING THE PEACE 
CORPS” 
 
Washington D.C., March 1, 1961 
http://www.jfklibrary.org/Historical+Resources/Archives/Reference+Desk/Speeches/JFK/003POF03Peac
eCorp03011961.htm (July 1, 2006) 
I have today signed an Executive Order providing for the establishment of a Peace Corps on a 
temporary pilot basis. I am also sending to Congress a message proposing authorization of a 
permanent Peace Corps. This Corps will be a pool of trained American men and women sent 
overseas by the U.S. Government or through private institutions and organizations to help 
foreign countries meet their urgent needs for skilled manpower. 
     It is our hope to have 500 or more people in the field by the end of the year. 
     The initial reactions to the Peace Corps proposal are convincing proof that we have, in this 
country, an immense reservoir of such men and women--anxious to sacrifice their energies and 
time and toil to the cause of world peace and human progress. 
     In establishing our Peace Corps we intend to make full use of the resources and talents of 
private institutions and groups. Universities, voluntary agencies, labor unions and industry will 
be asked to share in this effort--contributing diverse sources of energy and imagination--making 
it clear that the responsibility for peace is the responsibility of our entire society. 
     We will only send abroad Americans who are wanted by the host country--who have a real 
job to do--and who are qualified to do that job. Programs will be developed with care, and after 
full negotiation, in order to make sure that the Peace Corps is wanted and will contribute to the 
welfare of other people. Our Peace Corps is not designed as an instrument of diplomacy or 
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propaganda or ideological conflict. It is designed to permit our people to exercise more fully 
their responsibilities in the great common cause of world development. 
     Life in the Peace Corps will not be easy. There will be no salary and allowances will be at a 
level sufficient only to maintain health and meet basic needs. Men and women will be expected 
to work and live alongside the nationals of the country in which they are stationed--doing the 
same work, eating the same food, talking the same language. 
     But if the life will not be easy, it will be rich and satisfying. For every young American who 
participates in the Peace Corps--who works in a foreign land--will know that he or she is sharing 
in the great common task of bringing to man that decent way of life which is the foundation of 
freedom and a condition of peace. 
(NOTE: The President departed substantially from this written text in his spoken remarks.  The 
order referred to is Executive Order 10924.) 
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APPENDIX E 
PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY’S “SPEECH TO A SPECIAL SESSION OF 
CONGRESS ON ‘SENDING A MAN TO THE MOON’” 
 
Special Message to the Congress on Urgent National Needs 
Delivered before a joint session of Congress 
May 25, 1961 
 
http://www.jfklibrary.org/Historical+Resources/Archives/Reference+Desk/Speeches/JFK/Urgent+N
ational+Needs+Page+4.htm (July 1, 2006) 
Mr. Speaker, Mr. Vice President, my copartners in Government, gentlemen-and ladies: 
     The Constitution imposes upon me the obligation to "from time to time give to the Congress 
information of the State of the Union." While this has traditionally been interpreted as an annual affair, 
this tradition has been broken in extraordinary times. 
     These are extraordinary times. And we face an extraordinary challenge. Our strength as well as our 
convictions have imposed upon this nation the role of leader in freedom's cause. 
     No role in history could be more difficult or more important. We stand for freedom. 
     That is our conviction for ourselves--that is our only commitment to others. No friend, no neutral and 
no adversary should think otherwise. We are not against any man--or any nation--or any system--except 
as it is hostile to freedom. Nor am I here to present a new military doctrine, bearing any one name or 
aimed at any one area. I am here to promote the freedom doctrine. 
I. 
     The great battleground for the defense and expansion of freedom today is the whole southern half of 
the globe--Asia, Latin America, Africa and the Middle East--the lands of the rising peoples. Their 
revolution is the greatest in human history. They seek an end to injustice, tyranny, and exploitation. More 
than an end, they seek a beginning. 
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     And theirs is a revolution which we would support regardless of the Cold War, and regardless of 
which political or economic route they should choose to freedom. 
     For the adversaries of freedom did not create the revolution; nor did they create the conditions which 
compel it. But they are seeking to ride the crest of its wave--to capture it for themselves. 
     Yet their aggression is more often concealed than open. They have fired no missiles; and their troops 
are seldom seen. They send arms, agitators, aid, technicians and propaganda to every troubled area. But 
where fighting is required, it is usually done by others--by guerrillas striking at night, by assassins 
striking alone--assassins who have taken the lives of four thousand civil officers in the last twelve months 
in Vietnam alone--by subversives and saboteurs and insurrectionists, who in some cases control whole 
areas inside of independent nations. 
     [At this point the following paragraph, which appears in the text as signed and transmitted to the 
Senate and House of Representatives, was omitted in the reading of the message: 
     They possess a powerful intercontinental striking force, large forces for conventional war, a well-
trained underground in nearly every country, the power to conscript talent and manpower for any 
purpose, the capacity for quick decisions, a closed society without dissent or free information, and long 
experience in the techniques of violence and subversion. They make the most of their scientific successes, 
their economic progress and their pose as a foe of colonialism and friend of popular revolution. They 
prey on unstable or unpopular governments, unsealed, or unknown boundaries, unfilled hopes, convulsive 
change, massive poverty, illiteracy, unrest and frustration.] 
     With these formidable weapons, the adversaries of freedom plan to consolidate their territory--to 
exploit, to control, and finally to destroy the hopes of the world's newest nations; and they have ambition 
to do it before the end of this decade. It is a contest of will and purpose as well as force and violence--a 
battle for minds and souls as well as lives and territory. And in that contest, we cannot stand aside. 
     We stand, as we have always stood from our earliest beginnings, for the independence and equality of 
all nations. This nation was born of revolution and raised in freedom. And we do not intend to leave an 
open road for despotism. 
     There is no single simple policy which meets this challenge. Experience has taught us that no one 
nation has the power or the wisdom to solve all the problems of the world or manage its revolutionary 
tides--that extending our commitments does not always increase our security--that any initiative carries 
with it the risk of a temporary defeat--that nuclear weapons cannot prevent subversion--that no free 
people can be kept free without will and energy of their own--and that no two nations or situations are 
exactly alike. 
     Yet there is much we can do--and must do. The proposals I bring before you are numerous and varied. 
They arise from the host of special opportunities and dangers which have become increasingly clear in 
recent months. Taken together, I believe that they can mark another step forward in our effort as a people. 
I am here to ask the help of this Congress and the nation in approving these necessary measures. 
II. ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL PROGRESS AT HOME 
     The first and basic task confronting this nation this year was to turn recession into recovery. An 
affirmative anti-recession program, initiated with your cooperation, supported the natural forces in the 
private sector; and our economy is now enjoying renewed confidence and energy. The recession has been 
halted. Recovery is under way. 
     But the task of abating unemployment and achieving a full use of our resources does remain a serious 
challenge for us all. Large-scale unemployment during a recession is bad enough, but large-scale 
unemployment during a period of prosperity would be intolerable. 
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     I am therefore transmitting to the Congress a new Manpower Development and Training program, to 
train or retrain several hundred thousand workers, particularly in those areas where we have seen chronic 
unemployment as a result of technological factors in new occupational skills over a four-year period, in 
order to replace those skills made obsolete by automation and industrial change with the new skills which 
the new processes demand. 
     It should be a satisfaction to us all that we have made great strides in restoring world confidence in the 
dollar, halting the outflow of gold and improving our balance of payments. During the last two months, 
our gold stocks actually increased by seventeen million dollars, compared to a loss of 635 million dollars 
during the last two months of 1960. We must maintain this progress--and this will require the cooperation 
and restraint of everyone. As recovery progresses, there will be temptations to seek unjustified price and 
wage increases. These we cannot afford. They will only handicap our efforts to compete abroad and to 
achieve full recovery here at home. Labor and management must--and I am confident that they will--
pursue responsible wage and price policies in these critical times. I look to the President's Advisory 
Committee on Labor Management Policy to give a strong lead in this direction. 
     Moreover, if the budget deficit now increased by the needs of our security is to be held within 
manageable proportions, it will be necessary to hold tightly to prudent fiscal standards; and I request the 
cooperation of the Congress in this regard--to refrain from adding funds or programs, desirable as they 
may be, to the Budget--to end the postal deficit, as my predecessor also recommended, through increased 
rates--a deficit incidentally, this year, which exceeds the fiscal 1962 cost of all the space and defense 
measures that I am submitting today--to provide full pay-as-you-go highway financing--and to close those 
tax loopholes earlier specified. Our security and progress cannot be cheaply purchased; and their price 
must be found in what we all forego as well as what we all must pay. 
 
III. ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL PROGRESS ABROAD 
     I stress the strength of our economy because it is essential to the strength of our nation. And what is 
true in our case is true in the case of other countries. Their strength in the struggle for freedom depends on 
the strength of their economic and their social progress. 
     We would be badly mistaken to consider their problems in military terms alone. For no amount of 
arms and armies can help stabilize those governments which are unable or unwilling to achieve social and 
economic reform and development. Military pacts cannot help nations whose social injustice and 
economic chaos invite insurgency and penetration and subversion. The most skillful counter-guerrilla 
efforts cannot succeed where the local population is too caught up in its own misery to be concerned 
about the advance of communism. 
     But for those who share this view, we stand ready now, as we have in the past, to provide generously 
of our skills, and our capital, and our food to assist the peoples of the less-developed nations to reach their 
goals in freedom--to help them before they are engulfed in crisis. 
     This is also our great opportunity in 1961. If we grasp it, then subversion to prevent its success is 
exposed as an unjustifiable attempt to keep these nations from either being free or equal. But if we do not 
pursue it, and if they do not pursue it, the bankruptcy of unstable governments, one by one, and of 
unfilled hopes will surely lead to a series of totalitarian receiverships. 
     Earlier in the year, I outlined to the Congress a new program for aiding emerging nations; and it is my 
intention to transmit shortly draft legislation to implement this program, to establish a new Act for 
International Development, and to add to the figures previously requested, in view of the swift pace of 
critical events, an additional 250 million dollars for a Presidential Contingency Fund, to be used only 
upon a Presidential determination in each case, with regular and complete reports to the Congress in each 
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case, when there is a sudden and extraordinary drain upon our regular funds which we cannot foresee--as 
illustrated by recent events in Southeast Asia--and it makes necessary the use of this emergency reserve. 
The total amount requested--now raised to 2..65 billion dollars--is both minimal and crucial. I do not see 
how anyone who is concerned--as we all are--about the growing threats to freedom around the globe--and 
who is asking what more we can do as a people--can weaken or oppose the single most important 
program available for building the frontiers of freedom. 
IV. 
     All that I have said makes it clear that we are engaged in a world-wide struggle in which we bear a 
heavy burden to preserve and promote the ideals that we share with all mankind, or have alien ideals 
forced upon them. That struggle has highlighted the role of our Information Agency. It is essential that the 
funds previously requested for this effort be not only approved in full, but increased by 2 million, 400 
thousand dollars, to a total of 121 million dollars. 
     This new request is for additional radio and television to Latin America and Southeast Asia. These 
tools are particularly effective and essential in the cities and villages of those great continents as a means 
of reaching millions of uncertain peoples to tell them of our interest in their fight for freedom. In Latin 
America, we are proposing to increase our Spanish and Portuguese broadcasts to a total of 154 hours a 
week, compared to 42 hours today, none of which is in Portuguese, the language of about one-third of the 
people of South America. The Soviets, Red Chinese and satellites already broadcast into Latin America 
more than 134 hours a week in Spanish and Portuguese. Communist China alone does more public 
information broadcasting in our own hemisphere than we do. Moreover, powerful propaganda broadcasts 
from Havana now are heard throughout Latin America, encouraging new revolutions in several countries. 
     Similarly, in Laos, Vietnam, Cambodia, and Thailand, we must communicate our determination and 
support to those upon whom our hopes for resisting the communist tide in that continent ultimately 
depend. Our interest is in the truth. 
V. OUR PARTNERSHIP FOR SELF-DEFENSE 
     But while we talk of sharing and building and the competition of ideas, others talk of arms and 
threaten war. So we have learned to keep our defenses strong--and to cooperate with others in a 
partnership of self-defense. The events of recent weeks have caused us to look anew at these efforts. 
     The center of freedom's defense is our network of world alliances, extending from NATO, 
recommended by a Democratic President and approved by a Republican Congress, to SEATO, 
recommended by a Republican President and approved by a Democratic Congress. These alliances were 
constructed in the 1940's and 1950's--it is our task and responsibility in the 1960's to strengthen them. 
     To meet the changing conditions of power--and power relationships have changed--we have endorsed 
an increased emphasis on NATO's conventional strength. At the same time we are affirming our 
conviction that the NATO nuclear deterrent must also be kept strong. I have made clear our intention to 
commit to the NATO command, for this purpose, the 5 Polaris submarines originally suggested by 
President Eisenhower, with the possibility, if needed, of more to come. 
     Second, a major part of our partnership for self-defense is the Military Assistance Program. The main 
burden of local defense against local attack, subversion, insurrection or guerrilla warfare must of 
necessity rest with local forces. Where these forces have the necessary will and capacity to cope with such 
threats, our intervention is rarely necessary or helpful. Where the will is present and only capacity is 
lacking, our Military Assistance Program can be of help. 
     But this program, like economic assistance, needs a new emphasis. It cannot be extended without 
regard to the social, political and military reforms essential to internal respect and stability. The 
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equipment and training provided must be tailored to legitimate local needs and to our own foreign and 
military policies, not to our supply of military stocks or a local leader's desire for military display. And 
military assistance can, in addition to its military purposes, make a contribution to economic progress, as 
do our own Army Engineers. 
     In an earlier message, I requested 1.6 billion dollars for Military Assistance, stating that this would 
maintain existing force levels, but that I could not foresee how much more might be required. It is now 
clear that this is not enough. The present crisis in Southeast Asia, on which the Vice President has made a 
valuable report--the rising threat of communism in Latin America--the increased arms traffic in Africa--
and all the new pressures on every nation found on the map by tracing your fingers along the borders of 
the Communist bloc in Asia and the Middle East--all make clear the dimension of our needs. 
     I therefore request the Congress to provide a total of 1.885 billion dollars for Military Assistance in the 
coming fiscal year--an amount less than that requested a year ago--but a minimum which must be assured 
if we are to help those nations make secure their independence. This must be prudently and wisely spent--
and that will be our common endeavor. Military and economic assistance has been a heavy burden on our 
citizens for a long time, and I recognize the strong pressures against it; but this battle is far from over, it is 
reaching a crucial stage, and I believe we should participate in it. We cannot merely state our opposition 
to totalitarian advance without paying the price of helping those now under the greatest pressure. 
 
VI. OUR OWN MILITARY AND INTELLIGENCE SHIELD 
     In line with these developments, I have directed a further reinforcement of our own capacity to deter or 
resist non-nuclear aggression. In the conventional field, with one exception, I find no present need for 
large new levies of men. What is needed is rather a change of position to give us still further increases in 
flexibility. 
     Therefore, I am directing the Secretary of Defense to undertake a reorganization and modernization of 
the Army's divisional structure, to increase its non-nuclear firepower, to improve its tactical mobility in 
any environment, to insure its flexibility to meet any direct or indirect threat, to facilitate its coordination 
with our major allies, and to provide more modern mechanized divisions in Europe and bring their 
equipment up to date, and new airborne brigades in both the Pacific and Europe. 
     And secondly, I am asking the Congress for an additional 100 million dollars to begin the procurement 
task necessary to re-equip this new Army structure with the most modern material. New helicopters, new 
armored personnel carriers, and new howitzers, for example, must be obtained now. 
     Third, I am directing the Secretary of Defense to expand rapidly and substantially, in cooperation with 
our Allies, the orientation of existing forces for the conduct of non-nuclear war, paramilitary operations 
and sub-limited or unconventional wars. 
     In addition our special forces and unconventional warfare units will be increased and reoriented. 
Throughout the services new emphasis must be placed on the special skills and languages which are 
required to work with local populations. 
     Fourth, the Army is developing plans to make possible a much more rapid deployment of a major 
portion of its highly trained reserve forces. When these plans are completed and the reserve is 
strengthened, two combat-equipped divisions, plus their supporting forces, a total of 89,000 men, could 
be ready in an emergency for operations with but 3 weeks' notice--2 more divisions with but 5 weeks' 
notice--and six additional divisions and their supporting forces, making a total of 10 divisions, could be 
deployable with less than 8 weeks' notice. In short, these new plans will allow us to almost double the 
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combat power of the Army in less than two months, compared to the nearly nine months heretofore 
required. 
     Fifth, to enhance the already formidable ability of the Marine Corps to respond to limited war 
emergencies, I am asking the Congress for 60 million dollars to increase the Marine Corps strength to 
190,000 men. This will increase the initial impact and staying power of our three Marine divisions and 
three air wings, and provide a trained nucleus for further expansion, if necessary for self-defense. 
     Finally, to cite one other area of activities that are both legitimate and necessary as a means of self-
defense in an age of hidden perils, our whole intelligence effort must be reviewed, and its coordination 
with other elements of policy assured. The Congress and the American people are entitled to know that 
we will institute whatever new organization, policies, and control are necessary. 
VII. CIVIL DEFENSE 
     One major element of the national security program which this nation has never squarely faced up to is 
civil defense. This problem arises not from present trends but from national inaction in which most of us 
have participated. In the past decade we have intermittently considered a variety of programs, but we have 
never adopted a consistent policy. Public considerations have been largely characterized by apathy, 
indifference and skepticism; while, at the same time, many of the civil defense plans have been so far-
reaching and unrealistic that they have not gained essential support. 
     This Administration has been looking hard at exactly what civil defense can and cannot do. It cannot 
be obtained cheaply. It cannot give an assurance of blast protection that will be proof against surprise 
attack or guaranteed against obsolescence or destruction. And it cannot deter a nuclear attack. 
     We will deter an enemy from making a nuclear attack only if our retaliatory power is so strong and so 
invulnerable that he knows he would be destroyed by our response. If we have that strength, civil defense 
is not needed to deter an attack. If we should ever lack it, civil defense would not be an adequate 
substitute. 
     But this deterrent concept assumes rational calculations by rational men. And the history of this planet, 
and particularly the history of the 20th century, is sufficient to remind us of the possibilities of an 
irrational attack, a miscalculation, an accidental war, [or a war of escalation in which the stakes by each 
side gradually increase to the point of maximum danger] which cannot be either foreseen or deterred. It is 
on this basis that civil defense can be readily justifiable--as insurance for the civilian population in case of 
an enemy miscalculation. It is insurance we trust will never be needed--but insurance which we could 
never forgive ourselves for foregoing in the event of catastrophe. 
     Once the validity of this concept is recognized, there is no point in delaying the initiation of a nation-
wide long-range program of identifying present fallout shelter capacity and providing shelter in new and 
existing structures. Such a program would protect millions of people against the hazards of radioactive 
fallout in the event of large-scale nuclear attack. Effective performance of the entire program not only 
requires new legislative authority and more funds, but also sound organizational arrangements. 
     Therefore, under the authority vested in me by Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1958, I am assigning 
responsibility for this program to the top civilian authority already responsible for continental defense, the 
Secretary of Defense. It is important that this function remain civilian, in nature and leadership; and this 
feature will not be changed. 
     The Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization will be reconstituted as a small staff agency to assist in 
the coordination of these functions. To more accurately describe its role, its title should be changed to the 
Office of Emergency Planning. 
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     As soon as those newly charged with these responsibilities have prepared new authorization and 
appropriation requests, such requests will be transmitted to the Congress for a much strengthened Federal-
State civil defense program. Such a program will provide Federal funds for identifying fallout shelter 
capacity in existing, structures, and it will include, where appropriate, incorporation of shelter in Federal 
buildings, new requirements for shelter in buildings constructed with Federal assistance, and matching 
grants and other incentives for constructing shelter in State and local and private buildings. 
     Federal appropriations for civil defense in fiscal 1962 under this program will in all likelihood be more 
than triple the pending budget requests; and they will increase sharply in subsequent years. Financial 
participation will also be required from State and local governments and from private citizens. But no 
insurance is cost-free; and every American citizen and his community must decide for themselves 
whether this form of survival insurance justifies the expenditure of effort, time and money. For myself, I 
am convinced that it does. 
VIII. DISARMAMENT 
     I cannot end this discussion of defense and armaments without emphasizing our strongest hope: the 
creation of an orderly world where disarmament will be possible. Our aims do not prepare for war--they 
are efforts to discourage and resist the adventures of others that could end in war. 
     That is why it is consistent with these efforts that we continue to press for properly safeguarded 
disarmament measures. At Geneva, in cooperation with the United Kingdom, we have put forward 
concrete proposals to make clear our wish to meet the Soviets half way in an effective nuclear test ban 
treaty--the first significant but essential step on the road towards disarmament. Up to now, their response 
has not been what we hoped, but Mr. Dean returned last night to Geneva, and we intend to go the last mile 
in patience to secure this gain if we can. 
     Meanwhile, we are determined to keep disarmament high on our agenda--to make an intensified effort 
to develop acceptable political and technical alternatives to the present arms race. To this end I shall send 
to the Congress a measure to establish a strengthened and enlarged Disarmament Agency 
 
IX. SPACE 
     Finally, if we are to win the battle that is now going on around the world between freedom and 
tyranny, the dramatic achievements in space which occurred in recent weeks should have made clear to us 
all, as did the Sputnik in 1957, the impact of this adventure on the minds of men everywhere, who are 
attempting to make a determination of which road they should take. Since early in my term, our efforts in 
space have been under review. With the advice of the Vice President, who is Chairman of the National 
Space Council, we have examined where we are strong and where we are not, where we may succeed and 
where we may not. Now it is time to take longer strides--time for a great new American enterprise--time 
for this nation to take a clearly leading role in space achievement, which in many ways may hold the key 
to our future on earth. 
     I believe we possess all the resources and talents necessary. But the facts of the matter are that we have 
never made the national decisions or marshalled the national resources required for such leadership. We 
have never specified long-range goals on an urgent time schedule, or managed our resources and our time 
so as to insure their fulfillment. 
     Recognizing the head start obtained by the Soviets with their large rocket engines, which gives them 
many months of leadtime, and recognizing the likelihood that they will exploit this lead for some time to 
come in still more impressive successes, we nevertheless are required to make new efforts on our own. 
For while we cannot guarantee that we shall one day be first, we can guarantee that any failure to make 
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this effort will make us last. We take an additional risk by making it in full view of the world, but as 
shown by the feat of astronaut Shepard, this very risk enhances our stature when we are successful. But 
this is not merely a race. Space is open to us now; and our eagerness to share its meaning is not governed 
by the efforts of others. We go into space because whatever mankind must undertake, free men must fully 
share. 
     I therefore ask the Congress, above and beyond the increases I have earlier requested for space 
activities, to provide the funds which are needed to meet the following national goals: 
     First, I believe that this nation should commit itself to achieving the goal, before this decade is out, of 
landing a man on the moon and returning him safely to the earth. No single space project in this period 
will be more impressive to mankind, or more important for the long-range exploration of space; and none 
will be so difficult or expensive to accomplish. We propose to accelerate the development of the 
appropriate lunar space craft. We propose to develop alternate liquid and solid fuel boosters, much larger 
than any now being developed, until certain which is superior. We propose additional funds for other 
engine development and for unmanned explorations--explorations which are particularly important for 
one purpose which this nation will never overlook: the survival of the man who first makes this daring 
flight. But in a very real sense, it will not be one man going to the moon--if we make this judgment 
affirmatively, it will be an entire nation. For all of us must work to put him there. 
     Secondly, an additional 23 million dollars, together with 7 million dollars already available, will 
accelerate development of the Rover nuclear rocket. This gives promise of some day providing a means 
for even more exciting and ambitious exploration of space, perhaps beyond the moon, perhaps to the very 
end of the solar system itself. 
     Third, an additional 50 million dollars will make the most of our present leadership, by accelerating 
the use of space satellites for world-wide communications. 
     Fourth, an additional 75 million dollars--of which 53 million dollars is for the Weather Bureau--will 
help give us at the earliest possible time a satellite system for world-wide weather observation. 
     Let it be clear--and this is a judgment which the Members of the Congress must finally make--let it be 
clear that I am asking the Congress and the country to accept a firm commitment to a new course of 
action, a course which will last for many years and carry very heavy costs: 531 million dollars in fiscal 
'62--an estimated seven to nine billion dollars additional over the next five years. If we are to go only half 
way, or reduce our sights in the face of difficulty, in my judgment it would be better not to go at all. 
     Now this is a choice which this country must make, and I am confident that under the leadership of the 
Space Committees of the Congress, and the Appropriating Committees, that you will consider the matter 
carefully. 
     It is a most important decision that we make as a nation. But all of you have lived through the last four 
years and have seen the significance of space and the adventures in space, and no one can predict with 
certainty what the ultimate meaning will be of mastery of space. 
     I believe we should go to the moon. But I think every citizen of this country as well as the Members of 
the Congress should consider the matter carefully in making their judgment, to which we have given 
attention over many weeks and months, because it is a heavy burden, and there is no sense in agreeing or 
desiring that the United States take an affirmative position in outer space, unless we are prepared to do the 
work and bear the burdens to make it successful. If we are not, we should decide today and this year. 
     This decision demands a major national commitment of scientific and technical manpower, materiel 
and facilities, and the possibility of their diversion from other important activities where they are already 
thinly spread. It means a degree of dedication, organization and discipline which have not always 
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characterized our research and development efforts. It means we cannot afford undue work stoppages, 
inflated costs of material or talent, wasteful interagency rivalries, or a high turnover of key personnel. 
     New objectives and new money cannot solve these problems. They could in fact, aggravate them 
further--unless every scientist, every engineer, every serviceman, every technician, contractor, and civil 
servant gives his personal pledge that this nation will move forward, with the full speed of freedom, in the 
exciting adventure of space. 
X. CONCLUSION 
     In conclusion, let me emphasize one point. It is not a pleasure for any President of the United States, as 
I am sure it was not a pleasure for my predecessors, to come before the Congress and ask for new 
appropriations which place burdens on our people. I came to this conclusion with some reluctance. But in 
my judgment, this is a most serious time in the life of our country and in the life of freedom around the 
globe, and it is the obligation, I believe, of the President of the United States to at least make his 
recommendations to the Members of the Congress, so that they can reach their own conclusions with that 
judgment before them. You must decide yourselves, as I have decided, and I am confident that whether 
you finally decide in the way that I have decided or not, that your judgment--as my judgment--is reached 
on what is in the best interests of our country. 
     In conclusion, let me emphasize one point: that we are determined, as a nation in 1961 that freedom 
shall survive and succeed--and whatever the peril and set-backs, we have some very large advantages. 
     The first is the simple fact that we are on the side of liberty--and since the beginning of history, and 
particularly since the end of the Second World War, liberty has been winning out all over the globe. 
     A second real asset is that we are not alone. We have friends and allies all over the world who share 
our devotion to freedom. May I cite as a symbol of traditional and effective friendship the great ally I am 
about to visit--France. I look forward to my visit to France, and to my discussion with a great Captain of 
the Western World, President de Gaulle, as a meeting of particular significance, permitting the kind of 
close and ranging consultation that will strengthen both our countries and serve the common purposes of 
world-wide peace and liberty. Such serious conversations do not require a pale unanimity--they are rather 
the instruments of trust and understanding over a long road. 
     A third asset is our desire for peace. It is sincere, and I believe the world knows it. We are proving it in 
our patience at the test ban table, and we are proving it in the UN where our efforts have been directed to 
maintaining that organization's usefulness as a protector of the independence of small nations. In these 
and other instances, the response of our opponents has not been encouraging. 
     Yet it is important to know that our patience at the bargaining table is nearly inexhaustible, though our 
credulity is limited that our hopes for peace are unfailing, while our determination to protect our security 
is resolute. For these reasons I have long thought it wise to meet with the Soviet Premier for a personal 
exchange of views. A meeting in Vienna turned out to be convenient for us both; and the Austrian 
government has kindly made us welcome. No formal agenda is planned and no negotiations will be 
undertaken; but we will make clear America's enduring concern is for both peace and freedom--that we 
are anxious to live in harmony with the Russian people--that we seek no conquests, no satellites, no 
riches--that we seek only the day when "nation shall not lift up sword against nation, neither shall they 
learn war any more." 
     Finally, our greatest asset in this struggle is the American people--their willingness to pay the price for 
these programs--to understand and accept a long struggle--to share their resources with other less 
fortunate people--to meet the tax levels and close the tax loopholes I have requested--to exercise self-
restraint instead of pushing up wages or prices, or over-producing certain crops, or spreading military 
secrets, or urging unessential expenditures or improper monopolies or harmful work stoppages--to serve 
 103 
in the Peace Corps or the Armed Services or the Federal Civil Service or the Congress--to strive for 
excellence in their schools, in their cities and in their physical fitness and that of their children--to take 
part in Civil Defense--to pay higher postal rates, and higher payroll taxes and higher teachers' salaries, in 
order to strengthen our society--to show friendship to students and visitors from other lands who visit us 
and go back in many cases to be the future leaders, with an image of America--and I want that image, and 
I know you do, to be affirmative and positive--and, finally, to practice democracy at home, in all States, 
with all races, to respect each other and to protect the Constitutional rights of all citizens. 
     I have not asked for a single program which did not cause one or all Americans some inconvenience, 
or some hardship, or some sacrifice. But they have responded and you in the Congress have responded to 
your duty--and I feel confident in asking today for a similar response to these new and larger demands. It 
is heartening to know, as I journey abroad, that our country is united in its commitment to freedom and is 
ready to do its duty. 
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JOHN F. KENNEDY “MOON SPEECH - RICE STADIUM” 
Rice Stadium, Texas,  
September 12, 1962    
http://www1.jsc.nasa.gov/er/seh/ricetalk.htm (July 1, 2006) 
President Pitzer, Mr. Vice President, Governor, Congressman Thomas, Senator Wiley, and 
Congressman Miller, Mr. Webb, Mr. Bell, scientists, distinguished guests, and ladies and 
gentlemen:  
I appreciate your president having made me an honorary visiting professor, and I will assure you 
that my first lecture will be very brief.  
I am delighted to be here and I'm particularly delighted to be here on this occasion.  
We meet at a college noted for knowledge, in a city noted for progress, in a State noted for 
strength, and we stand in need of all all three, for we meet in an hour of change and challenge, in 
a decade of hope and fear, in an age of both knowledge and ignorance. The greater our 
knowledge increases, the greater our ignorance unfolds.  
Despite the striking fact that most of the scientists that the world has ever known are alive and 
working today, despite the fact that this Nation¹s own scientific manpower is doubling every 12 
years in a rate of growth more than three times that of our population as a whole, despite that, the 
vast stretches of the unknown and the unanswered and the unfinished still far outstrip our 
collective comprehension.  
No man can fully grasp how far and how fast we have come, but condense, if you will, the 
50,000 years of man¹s recorded history in a time span of but a half-century. Stated in these terms, 
we know very little about the first 40 years, except at the end of them advanced man had learned 
to use the skins of animals to cover them. Then about 10 years ago, under this standard, man 
emerged from his caves to construct other kinds of shelter. Only five years ago man learned to 
write and use a cart with wheels. Christianity began less than two years ago. The printing press 
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came this year, and then less than two months ago, during this whole 50-year span of human 
history, the steam engine provided a new source of power.  
Newton explored the meaning of gravity. Last month electric lights and telephones and 
automobiles and airplanes became available. Only last week did we develop penicillin and 
television and nuclear power, and now if America's new spacecraft succeeds in reaching Venus, 
we will have literally reached the stars before midnight tonight.  
This is a breathtaking pace, and such a pace cannot help but create new ills as it dispels old, new 
ignorance, new problems, new dangers. Surely the opening vistas of space promise high costs 
and hardships, as well as high reward.  
So it is not surprising that some would have us stay where we are a little longer to rest, to wait. 
But this city of Houston, this State of Texas, this country of the United States was not built by 
those who waited and rested and wished to look behind them. This country was conquered by 
those who moved forward--and so will space.  
William Bradford, speaking in 1630 of the founding of the Plymouth Bay Colony, said that all 
great and honorable actions are accompanied with great difficulties, and both must be enterprised 
and overcome with answerable courage.  
If this capsule history of our progress teaches us anything, it is that man, in his quest for 
knowledge and progress, is determined and cannot be deterred. The exploration of space will go 
ahead, whether we join in it or not, and it is one of the great adventures of all time, and no nation 
which expects to be the leader of other nations can expect to stay behind in the race for space.  
Those who came before us made certain that this country rode the first waves of the industrial 
revolutions, the first waves of modern invention, and the first wave of nuclear power, and this 
generation does not intend to founder in the backwash of the coming age of space. We mean to 
be a part of it--we mean to lead it. For the eyes of the world now look into space, to the moon 
and to the planets beyond, and we have vowed that we shall not see it governed by a hostile flag 
of conquest, but by a banner of freedom and peace. We have vowed that we shall not see space 
filled with weapons of mass destruction, but with instruments of knowledge and understanding.  
Yet the vows of this Nation can only be fulfilled if we in this Nation are first, and, therefore, we 
intend to be first. In short, our leadership in science and in industry, our hopes for peace and 
security, our obligations to ourselves as well as others, all require us to make this effort, to solve 
these mysteries, to solve them for the good of all men, and to become the world's leading space-
faring nation.  
We set sail on this new sea because there is new knowledge to be gained, and new rights to be 
won, and they must be won and used for the progress of all people. For space science, like 
nuclear science and all technology, has no conscience of its own. Whether it will become a force 
for good or ill depends on man, and only if the United States occupies a position of pre-eminence 
can we help decide whether this new ocean will be a sea of peace or a new terrifying theater of 
war. I do not say the we should or will go unprotected against the hostile misuse of space any 
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more than we go unprotected against the hostile use of land or sea, but I do say that space can be 
explored and mastered without feeding the fires of war, without repeating the mistakes that man 
has made in extending his writ around this globe of ours.  
There is no strife, no prejudice, no national conflict in outer space as yet. Its hazards are hostile 
to us all. Its conquest deserves the best of all mankind, and its opportunity for peaceful 
cooperation many never come again. But why, some say, the moon? Why choose this as our 
goal? And they may well ask why climb the highest mountain? Why, 35 years ago, fly the 
Atlantic? Why does Rice play Texas?  
We choose to go to the moon. We choose to go to the moon in this decade and do the other 
things, not because they are easy, but because they are hard, because that goal will serve to 
organize and measure the best of our energies and skills, because that challenge is one that we 
are willing to accept, one we are unwilling to postpone, and one which we intend to win, and the 
others, too.  
It is for these reasons that I regard the decision last year to shift our efforts in space from low to 
high gear as among the most important decisions that will be made during my incumbency in the 
office of the Presidency.  
In the last 24 hours we have seen facilities now being created for the greatest and most complex 
exploration in man's history. We have felt the ground shake and the air shattered by the testing of 
a Saturn C-1 booster rocket, many times as powerful as the Atlas which launched John Glenn, 
generating power equivalent to 10,000 automobiles with their accelerators on the floor. We have 
seen the site where the F-1 rocket engines, each one as powerful as all eight engines of the 
Saturn combined, will be clustered together to make the advanced Saturn missile, assembled in a 
new building to be built at Cape Canaveral as tall as a 48 story structure, as wide as a city block, 
and as long as two lengths of this field.  
Within these last 19 months at least 45 satellites have circled the earth. Some 40 of them were 
"made in the United States of America" and they were far more sophisticated and supplied far 
more knowledge to the people of the world than those of the Soviet Union.  
The Mariner spacecraft now on its way to Venus is the most intricate instrument in the history of 
space science. The accuracy of that shot is comparable to firing a missile from Cape Canaveral 
and dropping it in this stadium between the the 40-yard lines.  
Transit satellites are helping our ships at sea to steer a safer course. Tiros satellites have given us 
unprecedented warnings of hurricanes and storms, and will do the same for forest fires and 
icebergs.  
We have had our failures, but so have others, even if they do not admit them. And they may be 
less public.  
To be sure, we are behind, and will be behind for some time in manned flight. But we do not 
intend to stay behind, and in this decade, we shall make up and move ahead.  
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The growth of our science and education will be enriched by new knowledge of our universe and 
environment, by new techniques of learning and mapping and observation, by new tools and 
computers for industry, medicine, the home as well as the school. Technical institutions, such as 
Rice, will reap the harvest of these gains.  
And finally, the space effort itself, while still in its infancy, has already created a great number of 
new companies, and tens of thousands of new jobs. Space and related industries are generating 
new demands in investment and skilled personnel, and this city and this State, and this region, 
will share greatly in this growth. What was once the furthest outpost on the old frontier of the 
West will be the furthest outpost on the new frontier of science and space. Houston, your City of 
Houston, with its Manned Spacecraft Center, will become the heart of a large scientific and 
engineering community. During the next 5 years the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration expects to double the number of scientists and engineers in this area, to increase 
its outlays for salaries and expenses to $60 million a year; to invest some $200 million in plant 
and laboratory facilities; and to direct or contract for new space efforts over $1 billion from this 
Center in this City.  
To be sure, all this costs us all a good deal of money. This year¹s space budget is three times 
what it was in January 1961, and it is greater than the space budget of the previous eight years 
combined. That budget now stands at $5,400 million a year--a staggering sum, though somewhat 
less than we pay for cigarettes and cigars every year. Space expenditures will soon rise some 
more, from 40 cents per person per week to more than 50 cents a week for every man, woman 
and child in the United Stated, for we have given this program a high national priority--even 
though I realize that this is in some measure an act of faith and vision, for we do not now know 
what benefits await us.  
But if I were to say, my fellow citizens, that we shall send to the moon, 240,000 miles away from 
the control station in Houston, a giant rocket more than 300 feet tall, the length of this football 
field, made of new metal alloys, some of which have not yet been invented, capable of standing 
heat and stresses several times more than have ever been experienced, fitted together with a 
precision better than the finest watch, carrying all the equipment needed for propulsion, 
guidance, control, communications, food and survival, on an untried mission, to an unknown 
celestial body, and then return it safely to earth, re-entering the atmosphere at speeds of over 
25,000 miles per hour, causing heat about half that of the temperature of the sun--almost as hot 
as it is here today--and do all this, and do it right, and do it first before this decade is out--then 
we must be bold.  
I'm the one who is doing all the work, so we just want you to stay cool for a minute. [laughter]  
However, I think we're going to do it, and I think that we must pay what needs to be paid. I don't 
think we ought to waste any money, but I think we ought to do the job. And this will be done in 
the decade of the sixties. It may be done while some of you are still here at school at this college 
and university. It will be done during the term of office of some of the people who sit here on 
this platform. But it will be done. And it will be done before the end of this decade.  
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I am delighted that this university is playing a part in putting a man on the moon as part of a 
great national effort of the United States of America.  
Many years ago the great British explorer George Mallory, who was to die on Mount Everest, 
was asked why did he want to climb it. He said, "Because it is there."  
Well, space is there, and we're going to climb it, and the moon and the planets are there, and new 
hopes for knowledge and peace are there. And, therefore, as we set sail we ask God's blessing on 
the most hazardous and dangerous and greatest adventure on which man has ever embarked.  
Thank you. 
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PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY’S  “‘STRATEGY OF PEACE SPEECH’” 
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Washington,D.C. 
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/003POF03AmericanUniversity06101963.htm  (July 1, 2006) 
 
President Anderson, members of the faculty, board of trustees, distinguished guests, my old 
colleague, Senator Bob Byrd, who has earned his degree through many years of attending night 
law school, while I am earning mine in the next 30 minutes, distinguished guests, ladies and 
gentlemen  
     It is with great pride that I participate in this ceremony of the American University, sponsored 
by the Methodist Church, founded by Bishop John Fletcher Hurst, and first opened by President 
Woodrow Wilson in 1914. This is a young and growing university, but it has already fulfilled 
Bishop Hurst's enlightened hope for the study of history and public affairs in a city devoted to 
the making of history and the conduct of the public's business. By sponsoring this institution of 
higher learning for all who wish to learn, whatever their color or their creed, the Methodists of 
this area and the Nation deserve the Nation's thanks, and I commend all those who are today 
graduating. 
     Professor Woodrow Wilson once said that every man sent out from a university should be a 
man of his nation as well as a man of his time, and I am confident that the men and women who 
carry the honor of graduating from this institution will continue to give from their lives, from 
their talents, a high measure of public service and public support. 
     "There are few earthly things more beautiful than a university," wrote John Masefield in his 
tribute to English universities--and his words are equally true today. He did not refer to spires 
and towers, to campus greens and ivied walls. He admired the splendid beauty of the university, 
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he said, because it was "a place where those who hate ignorance may strive to know, where those 
who perceive truth may strive to make others see." 
     I have, therefore, chosen this time and this place to discuss a topic on which ignorance too 
often abounds and the truth is too rarely perceived--yet it is the most important topic on earth: 
world peace. 
     What kind of peace do I mean? What kind of peace do we seek? Not a Pax Americana 
enforced on the world by American weapons of war. Not the peace of the grave or the security of 
the slave. I am talking about genuine peace, the kind of peace that makes life on earth worth 
living, the kind that enables men and nations to grow and to hope and to build a better life for 
their children--not merely peace for Americans but peace for all men and women--not merely 
peace in our time but peace for all time. 
     I speak of peace because of the new face of war. Total war makes no sense in an age when 
great powers can maintain large and relatively invulnerable nuclear forces and refuse to 
surrender without resort to those forces. It makes no sense in an age when a single nuclear 
weapon contains almost ten times the explosive force delivered by all the allied air forces in the 
Second World War. It makes no sense in an age when the deadly poisons produced by a nuclear 
exchange would be carried by wind and water and soil and seed to the far corners of the globe 
and to generations yet unborn. 
     Today the expenditure of billions of dollars every year on weapons acquired for the purpose 
of making sure we never need to use them is essential to keeping the peace. But surely the 
acquisition of such idle stockpiles--which can only destroy and never create--is not the only, 
much less the most efficient, means of assuring peace. 
     I speak of peace, therefore, as the necessary rational end of rational men. I realize that the 
pursuit of peace is not as dramatic as the pursuit of war--and frequently the words of the pursuer 
fall on deaf ears. But we have no more urgent task. 
     Some say that it is useless to speak of world peace or world law or world disarmament--and 
that it will be useless until the leaders of the Soviet Union adopt a more enlightened attitude. I 
hope they do. I believe we can help them do it. But I also believe that we must reexamine our 
own attitude--as individuals and as a Nation--for our attitude is as essential as theirs. And every 
graduate of this school, every thoughtful citizen who despairs of war and wishes to bring peace, 
should begin by looking inward--by examining his own attitude toward the possibilities of peace, 
toward the Soviet Union, toward the course of the cold war and toward freedom and peace here 
at home. 
     First: Let us examine our attitude toward peace itself. Too many of us think it is impossible. 
Too many think it unreal. But that is a dangerous, defeatist belief. It leads to the conclusion that 
war is inevitable--that mankind is doomed--that we are gripped by forces we cannot control. 
     We need not accept that view. Our problems are manmade--therefore, they can be solved by 
man. And man can be as big as he wants. No problem of human destiny is beyond human beings. 
Man's reason and spirit have often solved the seemingly unsolvable--and we believe they can do 
it again. 
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     I am not referring to the absolute, infinite concept of peace and good will of which some 
fantasies and fanatics dream. I do not deny the value of hopes and dreams but we merely invite 
discouragement and incredulity by making that our only and immediate goal. 
     Let us focus instead on a more practical, more attainable peace-- based not on a sudden 
revolution in human nature but on a gradual evolution in human institutions--on a series of 
concrete actions and effective agreements which are in the interest of all concerned. There is no 
single, simple key to this peace--no grand or magic formula to be adopted by one or two powers. 
Genuine peace must be the product of many nations, the sum of many acts. It must be dynamic, 
not static, changing to meet the challenge of each new generation. For peace is a process--a way 
of solving problems. 
     With such a peace, there will still be quarrels and conflicting interests, as there are within 
families and nations. World peace, like community peace, does not require that each man love 
his neighbor--it requires only that they live together in mutual tolerance, submitting their 
disputes to a just and peaceful settlement. And history teaches us that enmities between nations, 
as between individuals, do not last forever. However fixed our likes and dislikes may seem, the 
tide of time and events will often bring surprising changes in the relations between nations and 
neighbors. 
     So let us persevere. Peace need not be impracticable, and war need not be inevitable. By 
defining our goal more clearly, by making it seem more manageable and less remote, we can 
help all peoples to see it, to draw hope from it, and to move irresistibly toward it. 
     Second: Let us reexamine our attitude toward the Soviet Union. It is discouraging to think 
that their leaders may actually believe what their propagandists write. It is discouraging to read a 
recent authoritative Soviet text on Military Strategy and find, on page after page, wholly baseless 
and incredible claims--such as the allegation that "American imperialist circles are preparing to 
unleash different types of wars . . . that there is a very real threat of a preventive war being 
unleashed by American imperialists against the Soviet Union . . . [and that] the political aims of 
the American imperialists are to enslave economically and politically the European and other 
capitalist countries . . . [and] to achieve world domination . . . by means of aggressive wars." 
     Truly, as it was written long ago: "The wicked flee when no man pursueth." Yet it is sad to 
read these Soviet statements--to realize the extent of the gulf between us. But it is also a 
warning--a warning to the American people not to fall into the same trap as the Soviets, not to 
see only a distorted and desperate view of the other side, not to see conflict as inevitable, 
accommodation as impossible, and communication as nothing more than an exchange of threats. 
     No government or social system is so evil that its people must be considered as lacking in 
virtue. As Americans, we find communism profoundly repugnant as a negation of personal 
freedom and dignity. But we can still hail the Russian people for their many achievements--in 
science and space, in economic and industrial growth, in culture and in acts of courage. 
     Among the many traits the peoples of our two countries have in common, none is stronger 
than our mutual abhorrence of war. Almost unique among the major world powers, we have 
never been at war with each other. And no nation in the history of battle ever suffered more than 
the Soviet Union suffered in the course of the Second World War. At least 20 million lost their 
lives. Countless millions of homes and farms were burned or sacked. A third of the nation's 
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territory, including nearly two thirds of its industrial base, was turned into a wasteland--a loss 
equivalent to the devastation of this country east of Chicago. 
     Today, should total war ever break out again--no matter how--our two countries would 
become the primary targets. It is an ironic but accurate fact that the two strongest powers are the 
two in the most danger of devastation. All we have built, all we have worked for, would be 
destroyed in the first 24 hours. And even in the cold war, which brings burdens and dangers to so 
many nations, including this Nation's closest allies--our two countries bear the heaviest burdens. 
For we are both devoting massive sums of money to weapons that could be better devoted to 
combating ignorance, poverty, and disease. We are both caught up in a vicious and dangerous 
cycle in which suspicion on one side breeds suspicion on the other, and new weapons beget 
counterweapons. 
     In short, both the United States and its allies, and the Soviet Union and its allies, have a 
mutually deep interest in a just and genuine peace and in halting the arms race. Agreements to 
this end are in the interests of the Soviet Union as well as ours--and even the most hostile nations 
can be relied upon to accept and keep those treaty obligations, and only those treaty obligations, 
which are in their own interest. 
     So, let us not be blind to our differences--but let us also direct attention to our common 
interests and to the means by which those differences can be resolved. And if we cannot end now 
our differences, at least we can help make the world safe for diversity. For, in the final analysis, 
our most basic common link is that we all inhabit this small planet. We all breathe the same air. 
We all cherish our children's future. And we are all mortal. 
     Third: Let us reexamine our attitude toward the cold war, remembering that we are not 
engaged in a debate, seeking to pile up debating points. We are not here distributing blame or 
pointing the finger of judgment. We must deal with the world as it is, and not as it might have 
been had the history of the last 18 years been different. 
     We must, therefore, persevere in the search for peace in the hope that constructive changes 
within the Communist bloc might bring within reach solutions which now seem beyond us. We 
must conduct our affairs in such a way that it becomes in the Communists' interest to agree on a 
genuine peace. Above all, while defending our own vital interests, nuclear powers must avert 
those confrontations which bring an adversary to a choice of either a humiliating retreat or a 
nuclear war. To adopt that kind of course in the nuclear age would be evidence only of the 
bankruptcy of our policy--or of a collective death-wish for the world. 
     To secure these ends, America's weapons are nonprovocative, carefully controlled, designed 
to deter, and capable of selective use. Our military forces are committed to peace and disciplined 
in self- restraint. Our diplomats are instructed to avoid unnecessary irritants and purely rhetorical 
hostility. 
     For we can seek a relaxation of tension without relaxing our guard. And, for our part, we do 
not need to use threats to prove that we are resolute. We do not need to jam foreign broadcasts 
out of fear our faith will be eroded. We are unwilling to impose our system on any unwilling 
people--but we are willing and able to engage in peaceful competition with any people on earth. 
     Meanwhile, we seek to strengthen the United Nations, to help solve its financial problems, to 
make it a more effective instrument for peace, to develop it into a genuine world security system-
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-a system capable of resolving disputes on the basis of law, of insuring the security of the large 
and the small, and of creating conditions under which arms can finally be abolished. 
     At the same time we seek to keep peace inside the non-Communist world, where many 
nations, all of them our friends, are divided over issues which weaken Western unity, which 
invite Communist intervention or which threaten to erupt into war. Our efforts in West New 
Guinea, in the Congo, in the Middle East, and in the Indian subcontinent, have been persistent 
and patient despite criticism from both sides. We have also tried to set an example for others--by 
seeking to adjust small but significant differences with our own closest neighbors in Mexico and 
in Canada. 
     Speaking of other nations, I wish to make one point clear. We are bound to many nations by 
alliances. Those alliances exist because our concern and theirs substantially overlap. Our 
commitment to defend Western Europe and West Berlin, for example, stands undiminished 
because of the identity of our vital interests. The United States will make no deal with the Soviet 
Union at the expense of other nations and other peoples, not merely because they are our 
partners, but also because their interests and ours converge 
     Our interests converge, however, not only in defending the frontiers of freedom, but in 
pursuing the paths of peace. It is our hope-- and the purpose of allied policies--to convince the 
Soviet Union that she, too, should let each nation choose its own future, so long as that choice 
does not interfere with the choices of others. The Communist drive to impose their political and 
economic system on others is the primary cause of world tension today. For there can be no 
doubt that, if all nations could refrain from interfering in the self-determination of others, the 
peace would be much more assured. 
     This will require a new effort to achieve world law--a new context for world discussions. It 
will require increased understanding between the Soviets and ourselves. And increased 
understanding will require increased contact and communication. One step in this direction is the 
proposed arrangement for a direct line between Moscow and Washington, to avoid on each side 
the dangerous delays, misunderstandings, and misreadings of the other's actions which might 
occur at a time of crisis. 
     We have also been talking in Geneva about the other first-step measures of arms control 
designed to limit the intensity of the arms race and to reduce the risks of accidental war. Our 
primary long range interest in Geneva, however, is general and complete disarmament-- designed 
to take place by stages, permitting parallel political developments to build the new institutions of 
peace which would take the place of arms. The pursuit of disarmament has been an effort of this 
Government since the 1920's. It has been urgently sought by the past three administrations. And 
however dim the prospects may be today, we intend to continue this effort--to continue it in 
order that all countries, including our own, can better grasp what the problems and possibilities 
of disarmament are. 
     The one major area of these negotiations where the end is in sight, yet where a fresh start is 
badly needed, is in a treaty to outlaw nuclear tests. The conclusion of such a treaty, so near and 
yet so far, would check the spiraling arms race in one of its most dangerous areas. It would place 
the nuclear powers in a position to deal more effectively with one of the greatest hazards which 
man faces in 1963, the further spread of nuclear arms. It would increase our security--it would 
decrease the prospects of war. Surely this goal is sufficiently important to require our steady 
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pursuit, yielding neither to the temptation to give up the whole effort nor the temptation to give 
up our insistence on vital and responsible safeguards. 
     I am taking this opportunity, therefore, to announce two important decisions in this regard. 
     First: Chairman khrushchev, Prime Minister Macmillan, and I have agreed that high-level 
discussions will shortly begin in Moscow looking toward early agreement on a comprehensive 
test ban treaty. Our hopes must be tempered with the caution of history--but with our hopes go 
the hopes of all mankind. 
     Second: To make clear our good faith and solemn convictions on the matter, I now declare 
that the United States does not propose to conduct nuclear tests in the atmosphere so long as 
other states do not do so. We will not be the first to resume. Such a declaration is no substitute 
for a formal binding treaty, but I hope it will help us achieve it. 
     Finally, my fellow Americans, let us examine our attitude toward peace and freedom here at 
home. The quality and spirit of our own society must justify and support our efforts abroad. We 
must show it in the dedication of our own lives--as many of you who are graduating today will 
have a unique opportunity to do, by serving without pay in the Peace Corps abroad or in the 
proposed National Service Corps here at home. 
     But wherever we are, we must all, in our daily lives, live up to the age-old faith that peace and 
freedom walk together. In too many of our cities today, the peace is not secure because the 
freedom is incomplete. 
     It is the responsibility of the executive branch at all levels of government--local, State, and 
National--to provide and protect that freedom for all of our citizens by all means within their 
authority. It is the responsibility of the legislative branch at all levels, wherever that authority is 
not now adequate, to make it adequate. And it is the responsibility of all citizens in all sections of 
this country to respect the rights of all others and to respect the law of the land. 
     All this is not unrelated to world peace. "When a man's ways please the Lord," the Scriptures 
tell us, "he maketh even his enemies to be at peace with him." And is not peace, in the last 
analysis, basically a matter of human rights--the right to live out our lives without fear of 
devastation--the right to breathe air as nature provided it--the right of future generations to a 
healthy existence? 
     While we proceed to safeguard our national interests, let us also safeguard human interests. 
And the elimination of war and arms is clearly in the interest of both. No treaty, however much it 
may be to the advantage of all, however tightly it may be worded, can provide absolute security 
against the risks of deception and evasion. But it can--if it is sufficiently effective in its 
enforcement and if it is sufficiently in the interests of its signers--offer far more security and far 
fewer risks than an unabated, uncontrolled, unpredictable arms race. 
     The United States, as the world knows, will never start a war. We do not want a war. We do 
not now expect a war. This generation of Americans has already had enough--more than enough-
-of war and hate and oppression. We shall be prepared if others wish it. We shall be alert to try to 
stop it. But we shall also do our part to build a world of peace where the weak are safe and the 
strong are just. We are not helpless before that task or hopeless of its success. Confident and 
unafraid, we labor on--not toward a strategy of annihilation but toward a strategy of peace. 
 
 115 
APPENDIX H 
PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY’S “‘ICH BIN EIN BERLINER SPEECH’” 
Remarks at the Rudolph Wilde Platz 
West Berlin 
June 26, 1963 
http://www.jfklibrary.org/Historical+Resources/Archives/Reference+Desk/Speeches/JFK
/003POF03BerlinWall06261963.htm   (July 1, 2006) 
 
I am proud to come to this city as the guest of your distinguished Mayor, who has symbolized 
throughout the world the fighting spirit of West Berlin. And I am proud to visit the Federal 
Republic with your distinguished Chancellor who for so many years has committed Germany to 
democracy and freedom and progress, and to come here in the company of my fellow American, 
General Clay, who has been in this city during its great moments of crisis and will come again if 
ever needed. 
     Two thousand years ago the proudest boast was "civis Romanus sum." Today, in the world of 
freedom, the proudest boast is "Ich bin ein Berliner." 
     I appreciate my interpreter translating my German! 
     There are many people in the world who really don't understand, or say they don't, what is the 
great issue between the free world and the Communist world. Let them come to Berlin. There are 
some who say that communism is the wave of the future. Let them come to Berlin. And there are 
some who say in Europe and elsewhere we can work with the Communists. Let them come to 
Berlin. And there are even a few who say that it is true that communism is an evil system, but it 
permits us to make economic progress. Lass' sie nach Berlin kommen. Let them come to Berlin. 
     Freedom has many difficulties and democracy is not perfect, but we have never had to put a 
wall up to keep our people in, to prevent them from leaving us. I want to say, on behalf of my 
countrymen, who live many miles away on the other side of the Atlantic, who are far distant 
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from you, that they take the greatest pride that they have been able to share with you, even from 
a distance, the story of the last 18 years. I know of no town, no city, that has been besieged for 
18 years that still lives with the vitality and the force, and the hope and the determination of the 
city of West Berlin. While the wall is the most obvious and vivid demonstration of the failures of 
the Communist system, for all the world to see, we take no satisfaction in it, for it is, as your 
Mayor has said, an offense not only against history but an offense against humanity, separating 
families, dividing husbands and wives and brothers and sisters, and dividing a people who wish 
to be joined together. 
     What is true of this city is true of Germany--real, lasting peace in Europe can never be 
assured as long as one German out of four is denied the elementary right of free men, and that is 
to make a free choice. In 18 years of peace and good faith, this generation of Germans has earned 
the right to be free, including the right to unite their families and their nation in lasting peace, 
with good will to all people. You live in a defended island of freedom, but your life is part of the 
main. So let me ask you as I close, to lift your eyes beyond the dangers of today, to the hopes of 
tomorrow, beyond the freedom merely of this city of Berlin, or your country of Germany, to the 
advance of freedom everywhere, beyond the wall to the day of peace with justice, beyond 
yourselves and ourselves to all mankind. 
     Freedom is indivisible, and when one man is enslaved, all are not free. When all are free, then 
we can look forward to that day when this city will be joined as one and this country and this 
great Continent of Europe in a peaceful and hopeful globe. When that day finally comes, as it 
will, the people of West Berlin can take sober satisfaction in the fact that they were in the front 
lines for almost two decades. 
     All free men, wherever they may live, are citizens of Berlin, and, therefore, as a free man, I 
take pride in the words "Ich bin ein Berliner." 
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APPENDIX I 
 PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY’S ADRESS  BEFORE THE 18TH GENERAL 
ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED NATIONS 
Address Before the 18th General Assembly of the United Nations 
President John F. Kennedy 
New York 
September 20, 1963 
http://www.jfklibrary.org/Historical+Resources/Archives/Reference+Desk/Speeches/JFK/003POF03_18t
hGeneralAssembly09201963.htm (July 1, 2006) 
 
Mr. President--as one who has taken some interest in the election of Presidents, I want to 
congratulate you on your election to this high office -- Mr. Secretary General, delegates to the 
United Nations, ladies and gentlemen: 
     We meet again in the quest for peace. 
     Twenty-four months ago, when I last had the honor of addressing this body, the shadow of 
fear lay darkly across the world. The freedom of West Berlin was in immediate peril. Agreement 
on a neutral Laos seemed remote. The mandate of the United Nations in the Congo was under 
fire. The financial outlook for this organization was in doubt. Dag Hammarskjold was dead. The 
doctrine of troika was being pressed in his place, and atmospheric tests had been resumed by the 
Soviet Union. 
     Those were anxious days for mankind--and some men wondered aloud whether this 
organization could survive. But the 16th and 17th General Assemblies achieved not only survival 
but progress. Rising to its responsibility, the United Nations helped reduce the tensions and 
helped to hold back the darkness. 
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     Today the clouds have lifted a little so that new rays of hope can break through. The pressures 
on West Berlin appear to be temporarily eased. Political unity in the Congo has been largely 
restored. A neutral coalition in Laos, while still in difficulty, is at least in being. The integrity of 
the United Nations Secretariat has been reaffirmed. A United Nations Decade of Development is 
under way. And, for the first time in 17 years of effort, a specific step has been taken to limit the 
nuclear arms race. 
     I refer, of course, to the treaty to ban nuclear tests in the atmosphere, outer space, and under 
water--concluded by the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States--and already 
signed by nearly 100 countries. It has been hailed by people the world over who are thankful to 
be free from the fears of nuclear fallout, and I am confident that on next Tuesday at 10:30 o'clock 
in the morning it will receive the overwhelming endorsement of the Senate of the United States. 
     The world has not escaped from the darkness. The long shadows of conflict and crisis envelop 
us still. But we meet today in an atmosphere of rising hope, and at a moment of comparative 
calm. My presence here today is not a sign of crisis, but of confidence. I am not here to report on 
a new threat to the peace or new signs of war. I have come to salute the United Nations and to 
show the support of the American people for your daily deliberations. 
     For the value of this body's work is not dependent on the existence of emergencies--nor can 
the winning of peace consist only of dramatic victories. Peace is a daily, a weekly, a monthly 
process, gradually changing opinions, slowly eroding old barriers, quietly building new 
structures. And however undramatic the pursuit of peace, that pursuit must go on. 
     Today we may have reached a pause in the cold war--but that is not a lasting peace. A test ban 
treaty is a milestone--but it is not the millennium. We have not been released from our 
obligations--we have been given an opportunity. And if we fail to make the most of this moment 
and this momentum--if we convert our new-found hopes and understandings into new walls and 
weapons of hostility--if this pause in the cold war merely leads to its renewal and not to its end--
then the indictment of posterity will rightly point its finger at us all. But if we can stretch this 
pause into a period of cooperation--if both sides can now gain new confidence and experience in 
concrete collaborations for peace--if we can now be as bold and farsighted in the control of 
deadly weapons as we have been in their creation--then surely this first small step can be the start 
of a long and fruitful journey. 
     The task of building the peace lies with the leaders of every nation, large and small. For the 
great powers have no monopoly on conflict or ambition. The cold war is not the only expression 
of tension in this world--and the nuclear race is not the only arms race. Even little wars are 
dangerous in a nuclear world. The long labor of peace is an undertaking for every nation--and in 
this effort none of us can remain unaligned. To this goal none can be uncommitted. 
     The reduction of global tension must not be an excuse for the narrow pursuit of self-interest. 
If the Soviet Union and the United States, with all of their global interests and clashing 
commitments of ideology, and with nuclear weapons still aimed at each other today, can find 
areas of common interest and agreement, then surely other nations can do the same--nations 
caught in regional conflicts, in racial issues, or in the death throes of old colonialism. Chronic 
disputes which divert precious resources from the needs of the people or drain the energies of 
both sides serve the interests of no one--and the badge of responsibility in the modern world is a 
willingness to seek peaceful solutions. 
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     It is never too early to try; and it's never too late to talk; and it's high time that many disputes 
on the agenda of this Assembly were taken off the debating schedule and placed on the 
negotiating table. 
     The fact remains that the United States, as a major nuclear power, does have a special 
responsibility in the world. It is, in fact, a threefold responsibility--a responsibility to our own 
citizens; a responsibility to the people of the whole world who are affected by our decisions; and 
to the next generation of humanity. We believe the Soviet Union also has these special 
responsibilities--and that those responsibilities require our two nations to concentrate less on our 
differences and more on the means of resolving them peacefully. For too long both of us have 
increased our military budgets, our nuclear stockpiles, and our capacity to destroy all life on this 
hemisphere--human, animal, vegetable--without any corresponding increase in our security. 
     Our conflicts, to be sure, are real. Our concepts of the world are different. No service is 
performed by failing to make clear our disagreements. A central difference is the belief of the 
American people in the self-determination of all people. 
     We believe that the people of Germany and Berlin must be free to reunite their capital and 
their country. 
     We believe that the people of Cuba must be free to secure the fruits of the revolution that 
have been betrayed from within and exploited from without. 
     In short, we believe that all the world--in Eastern Europe as well as Western, in Southern 
Africa as well as Northern, in old nations as well as new--that people must be free to choose their 
own future, without discrimination or dictation, without coercion or subversion. 
     These are the basic differences between the Soviet Union and the United States, and they 
cannot be concealed. So long as they exist, they set limits to agreement, and they forbid the 
relaxation of our vigilance. Our defense around the world will be maintained for the protection of 
freedom--and our determination to safeguard that freedom will measure up to any threat or 
challenge. 
     But I would say to the leaders of the Soviet Union, and to their people, that if either of our 
countries is to be fully secure, we need a much better weapon than the H-bomb--a weapon better 
than ballistic missiles or nuclear submarines--and that better weapon is peaceful cooperation. 
     We have, in recent years, agreed on a limited test ban treaty, on an emergency 
communications link between our capitals, on a statement of principles for disarmament, on an 
increase in cultural exchange, on cooperation in outer space, on the peaceful exploration of the 
Antarctic, and on temporing last year's crisis over Cuba. 
     I believe, therefore, that the Soviet Union and the United States, together with their allies, can 
achieve further agreements--agreements which spring from our mutual interest in avoiding 
mutual destruction. 
     There can be no doubt about the agenda of further steps. We must continue to seek 
agreements on measures which prevent war by accident or miscalculation. We must continue to 
seek agreements on safeguards against surprise attack, including observation posts at key points. 
We must continue to seek agreement on further measures to curb the nuclear arms race, by 
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controlling the transfer of nuclear weapons, converting fissionable materials to peaceful 
purposes, and banning underground testing, with adequate inspection and enforcement. We must 
continue to seek agreement on a freer flow of information and people from East to West and 
West to East. 
     We must continue to seek agreement, encouraged by yesterday's affirmative response to this 
proposal by the Soviet Foreign Minister, on an arrangement to keep weapons of mass destruction 
out of outer space. Let us get our negotiators back to the negotiating table to work out a 
practicable arrangement to this end. 
     In these and other ways, let us move up the steep and difficult path toward comprehensive 
disarmament, securing mutual confidence through mutual verification, and building the 
institutions of peace as we dismantle the engines of war. We must not let failure to agree on all 
points delay agreements where agreement is possible. And we must not put forward proposals 
for propaganda purposes. 
     Finally, in a field where the United States and the Soviet Union have a special capacity--in the 
field of space--there is room for new cooperation, for further joint efforts in the regulation and 
exploration of space. I include among these possibilities a joint expedition to the moon. Space 
offers no problems of sovereignty; by resolution of this Assembly, the members of the United 
Nations have foresworn any claim to territorial rights in outer space or on celestial bodies, and 
declared that international law and the United Nations Charter will apply. Why, therefore, should 
man's first flight to the moon be a matter of national competition? Why should the United States 
and the Soviet Union, in preparing for such expeditions, become involved in immense 
duplications of research, construction, and expenditure? Surely we should explore whether the 
scientists and astronauts of our two countries--indeed of all the world--cannot work together in 
the conquest of space, sending someday in this decade to the moon not the representatives of a 
single nation, but the representatives of all of our countries. 
     All these and other new steps toward peaceful cooperation may be possible. Most of them 
will require on our part full consultation with our allies--for their interests are as much involved 
as our own, and we will not make an agreement at their expense. Most of them will require long 
and careful negotiation. And most of them will require a new approach to the cold war--a desire 
not to "bury" one's adversary, but to compete in a host of peaceful arenas, in ideas, in production, 
and ultimately in service to all mankind. 
     The contest will continue--the contest between those who see a monolithic world and those 
who believe in diversity--but it should be a contest in leadership and responsibility instead of 
destruction, a contest in achievement instead of intimidation. Speaking for the United States of 
America, I welcome such a contest. For we believe that truth is stronger than error--and that 
freedom is more enduring than coercion. And in the contest for a better life, all the world can be 
a winner. 
     The effort to improve the conditions of man, however, is not a task for the few. It is the task 
of all nations--acting alone, acting in groups, acting in the United Nations, for plague and 
pestilence, and plunder and pollution, the hazards of nature, and the hunger of children are the 
foes of every nation. The earth, the sea, and the air are the concern of every nation. And science, 
technology, and education can be the ally of every nation. 
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     Never before has man had such capacity to control his own environment, to end thirst and 
hunger, to conquer poverty and disease, to banish illiteracy and massive human misery. We have 
the power to make this the best generation of mankind in the history of the world--or to make it 
the last. 
     The United States since the close of the war has sent over $100 billion worth of assistance to 
nations seeking economic viability. And 2 years ago this week we formed a Peace Corps to help 
interested nations meet the demand for trained manpower. Other industrialized nations whose 
economies were rebuilt not so long ago with some help from us are now in turn recognizing their 
responsibility to the less developed nations. 
     The provision of development assistance by individual nations must go on. But the United 
Nations also must play a larger role in helping bring to all men the fruits of modern science and 
industry. A United Nations conference on this subject held earlier this year in Geneva opened 
new vistas for the developing countries. Next year a United Nations Conference on Trade will 
consider the needs of these nations for new markets. And more than four-fifths of the entire 
United Nations system can be found today mobilizing the weapons of science and technology for 
the United Nations' Decade of Development. 
     But more can be done. 
     --A world center for health communications under the World Health Organization could warn 
of epidemics and the adverse effects of certain drugs as well as transmit the results of new 
experiments and new discoveries. 
     --Regional research centers could advance our common medical knowledge and train new 
scientists and doctors for new nations. 
     --A global system of satellites could provide communication and weather information for all 
corners of the earth. 
     --A worldwide program of conservation could protect the forest and wild game preserves now 
in danger of extinction for all time, improve the marine harvest of food from our oceans, and 
prevent the contamination of air and water by industrial as well as nuclear pollution. 
     --And, finally, a worldwide program of farm productivity and food distribution, similar to our 
country's "Food for Peace" program, could now give every child the food he needs. 
     But man does not live by bread alone--and the members of this organization are committed by 
the Charter to promote and respect human rights. Those rights are not respected when a Buddhist 
priest is driven from his pagoda, when a synagogue is shut down, when a Protestant church 
cannot open a mission, when a Cardinal is forced into hiding, or when a crowded church service 
is bombed. The United States of America is opposed to discrimination and persecution on 
grounds of race and religion anywhere in the world, including our own Nation. We are working 
to right the wrongs of our own country. 
     Through legislation and administrative action, through moral and legal commitment this 
Government has launched a determined effort to rid our Nation of discrimination which has 
existed far too long--in education, in housing, in transportation, in employment, in the civil 
service, in recreation, and in places of public accommodation. And therefore, in this or any other 
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forum, we do not hesitate to condemn racial or religious injustice, whether committed or 
permitted by friend or foe. 
     I know that some of you have experienced discrimination in this country. But I ask you to 
believe me when I tell you that this is not the wish of most Americans--that we share your regret 
and resentment-- and that we intend to end such practices for all time to come, not only for our 
visitors, but for our own citizens as well. 
     I hope that not only our Nation but all other multiracial societies will meet these standards of 
fairness and justice. We are opposed to apartheid and all forms of human oppression. We do not 
advocate the rights of black Africans in order to drive out white Africans. Our concern is the 
right of all men to equal protection under the law--and since human rights are indivisible, this 
body cannot stand aside when those rights are abused and neglected by any member state. 
     New efforts are needed if this Assembly's Declaration of Human Rights, now 15 years old, is 
to have full meaning. And new means should be found for promoting the free expression and 
trade of ideas--through travel and communication, and through increased exchanges of people, 
and books, and broadcasts. For as the world renounces the competition of weapons, competition 
in ideas must flourish--and that competition must be as full and as fair as possible. 
     The United States delegation will be prepared to suggest to the United Nations initiatives in 
the pursuit of all the goals. For this is an organization for peace--and peace cannot come without 
work and without progress. 
     The peacekeeping record of the United Nations has been a proud one, though its tasks are 
always formidable. We are fortunate to have the skills of our distinguished Secretary General 
and the brave efforts of those who have been serving the cause of peace in the Congo, in the 
Middle East, in Korea and Kashmir, in West New Guinea and Malaysia. But what the United 
Nations has done in the past is less important than the tasks for the future. We cannot take its 
peacekeeping machinery for granted. That machinery must be soundly financed--which it cannot 
be if some members are allowed to prevent it from meeting its obligations by failing to meet 
their own. The United Nations must be supported by all those who exercise their franchise here. 
And its operations must be backed to the end. 
     Too often a project is undertaken in the excitement of a crisis and then it begins to lose its 
appeal as the problems drag on and the bills pile up. But we must have the steadfastness to see 
every enterprise through. 
     It is, for example, most important not to jeopardize the extraordinary United Nations gains in 
the Congo. The nation which sought this organization's help only 3 years ago has now asked the 
United Nations' presence to remain a little longer. I believe this Assembly should do what is 
necessary to preserve the gains already made and to protect the new nation in its struggle for 
progress. Let us complete what we have started. For "No man who puts his hand to the plow and 
looks back," as the Scriptures tell us, "No man who puts his hand to the plow and looks back is 
fit for the Kingdom of God." 
     I also hope that the recent initiative of several members in preparing standby peace forces for 
United Nations call will encourage similar commitments by others. This Nation remains ready to 
provide logistic and other material support. 
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     Policing, moreover, is not enough without provision for pacific settlement. We should 
increase the resort to special missions of fact- finding and conciliation, make greater use of the 
International Court of Justice, and accelerate the work of the International Law Commission. 
     The United Nations cannot survive as a static organization. Its obligations are increasing as 
well as its size. Its Charter must be changed as well as its customs. The authors of that Charter 
did not intend that it be frozen in perpetuity. The science of weapons and war has made us all, far 
more than 18 years ago in San Francisco, one world and one human race, with one common 
destiny. In such a world, absolute sovereignty no longer assures us of absolute security. The 
conventions of peace must pull abreast and then ahead of the inventions of war. The United 
Nations, building on its successes and learning from its failures, must be developed into a 
genuine world security system. 
     But peace does not rest in charters and covenants alone. It lies in the hearts and minds of all 
people. And if it is cast out there, then no act, no pact, no treaty, no organization can hope to 
preserve it without the support and the wholehearted commitment of all people. So let us not rest 
all our hopes on parchment and on paper; let us strive to build peace, a desire for peace, a 
willingness to work for peace, in the hearts and minds of all our people. I believe that we can. I 
believe the problems of human destiny are not beyond the reach of human beings. 
     Two years ago I told this body that the United States had proposed, and was willing to sign, a 
limited test ban treaty. Today that treaty has been signed. It will not put an end to war. It will not 
remove basic conflicts. It will not secure freedom for all. But it can be a lever, and Archimedes, 
in explaining the principles of the lever, was said to have declared to his friends: "Give me a 
place where I can stand--and I shall move the world." 
     My fellow inhabitants of this planet: Let us take our stand here in this Assembly of nations. 
And let us see if we, in our own time, can move the world to a just and lasting peace. 
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